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1 Setting The Scene for Research on Discrimination in 
German Education
The primary function of the
sociologist is to search out the 
determinants and consequences 
of diverse forms of social
behavior.
(Merton, 1949)
In  this introductory chapter I aim  at briefly setting the scene for my study on dis­
crimination in  German education. I reason that such a study is needed, how discrim­
ination can be understood, and why both scientists and lay public do care and should 
care. I aim  at showing that education is of particular importance when it comes to 
discrimination, inequality, inequity, and fairness, and which questions on discrim­
ination in  education I deem most interesting. I then present some methodological 
premises of my study. Many thoughts and argum ents in  later chapters are built on 
these premises. Finally, I give a  brief outlook on the single chapters of this disserta­
tion.
1.1 What is Discrimination?
Before I discuss different definitions and conceptualizations of discrimination in 
chapter 2, the reader may use the following as a basic and general working defini­
tion of discrimination for this introductory chapter: Discrimination is the act of treat­
ing two otherwise identical individuals differently based on any attribute, behavior, 
or characteristic that allows to distinguish these individuals (see, e.g., Blank et al., 
2004; Heckman, 1998; Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Quillian, 2006, for similar conceptu­
alizations). This is essentially a summary of popular definitions of discrimination. 
However, I will show in chapter 2 that—even though it is m ore useful than many other 
definitions—it has some problems that necessitate adaptation. As for an  alternative,
but—as I shall argue in chapter 2—not necessarily equivalent wording, the reader may
think of discrimination as the individual-level causal effect of any attribute, behavior, 
or characteristic o fan  individual on how this individual is treated by another person. 
Bothwordings are to be understoodin acounterfactualsense andfocus on differential 
treatmentthatm ayarise from treatingaparticularindividualeitherm ore negatively or
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m ore positively than it would have been treated in  light of a  counterfactual attribute, 
behavior, or characteristic.
In  chapter 2 I shall argue that this very basic and general definition of discrimi­
nation as a  causal effect is a much m ore useful starting point than many alternative 
definitions of discrimination put forth in  the literature. However, even this defini­
tion I will criticize and adapt. In  any case, to be useful for empirical research, the 
researcher needs to specify which attribute, behavior, or characteristic supposedly 
causes differential treatm ent. The m ost prom inent example of such a  cause or source 
of discrimination in the English and American literature has been a person's race, 
closely followed by sex or gender, respectively (see, e.g., Colella et al., 2017, for a re­
view of 100 years of research on discrimination in psychology). In  fact, most theoreti­
cal studies on discrimination have touched upon both race and gender (e.g., Aigner & 
Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; Becker, 1957/1971; J. R. Feagin & Booher Feagin, 1986; Levin 
& Levin, 1982; Phelps, 1972). For recent reviews that focus on racial discrimination 
see Pager and Shepherd (2008), Charles and Guryan (2011).
Discrimination caused by a person's race is usually called racial discrimination but 
some use the broader term  racism instead. Discrimination by virtue of a person's sex 
or gender, respectively, is usually called sex or gender discrimination, respectively. 
Over time, especially sociologists have come to prefer the term  gender over the term  
sex to highlight social and cultural components in stereotypes, prejudice, and discrim­
ination against women. I shall use both term s to underline social and cultural factors
but also the biological factors that contribute to both actual and perceived differences
between men and women. Because the German literature is more concerned with eth­
nic discrimination (German: “ethnische Diskriminierung”) instead of racial discrimi­
nation (see, e.g., Diehl & Fick, 2016, for a recent review), I shall use the term  ethnic 
discrim inationtoreferto  the situation ofdifferentgroupsofim m igrantsinG erm any. 
Interestingly, discrimination based on a person's social class background (e.g., Jack­
son, 2009), sometimes discussed under the broader concept of classism (Lott, 2002), 
has received less attention and, if so, very often merely as mediating or confounding 
process in discrimination based on race or ethnicity (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2004; Blalock, 1967; Mickelson, 2003; Myrdal, 1944). That racial or ethnic discrimina­
tion might be driven by social or socioeconomic factors is nevertheless an important 
observation that will be discussed at several occasions in this dissertation.
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1.2 Why Discrimination?
Social scientists study discrimination typically—if not always explicitly—for two differ­
ent reasons: First, discrimination on the basis of characteristics such as sex or gender, 
social class, and ethnicity, is of interest in its own right, as it violates norm s prevalent 
in  contemporary societies such as norm s of fairness or meritocratic principles (Marsh 
et al., 2003; Rawls, 1971). Therefore, discrimination is usually considered unjust and 
unfair and sometimes explicitly defined as unjust or unfair treatm ent (see, e.g., Do- 
vidio et al., 2010; Holzer & Ludwig, 2003). Many forms of discrimination that are con­
sidered unjust or unfair are also illegal in  most developed countries (e.g., Chopin & 
Germaine, 2016; Fredman, 2012). Understood and motivated as unjust or unfair treat­
m ent, discrimination is a societal outcome that needs to be explained. Put differently, 
discrimination may be the explanandum in a sociological explanation.
Secondly, discrimination may be be part of the explanans: Sociologists and econo­
mists very often motivate research on discrimination with inequalities between social 
groups, such as blacks and whites or m en and women, in  various outcomes, such as 
wages, housing, or college admissions. Key questions in  this dom inant strand of the 
literature are: How can inequality theoretically be explained by discrimination and to 
what extent is inequality between groups actually due to discrimination? Both classic 
(Aigner & Cain, 1977; Becker, 1957/1971; Myrdal, 1944; Phelps, 1972) and m ore recent 
contributions (Carneiro et al., 2005; Heckman, 1998; Mickelson, 2003) argueover these 
question drawing on methodological, conceptual, and theoretical arguments as well 
as—last but not least—empirical evidence.
The distinction between discrimination as explanandum and discrimination as part 
of the explanans in an  explanation of inequality between groups is virtually never 
m ade explicit and only sometimes discussed implicitly or touched upon. However, I 
find it crucial for a full understanding of how discrimination should be defined, iden­
tified, and estimated. That and how it m atters, I will show in  chapters 2 and 3.
1.3 Why Education?
The answer to the question Why Education? might simply be this: “Education makes 
life better.” (Hout, 2012, p. 394). In  fact, in  Germany just like virtually anywhere else 
in  the world, education has repeatedly shown to be positively associated with many 
individual and societal outcomes that are usually deemed positive such as occupa­
tional status and social class destination (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Breen & Jonsson, 2005; 
Ishida et al., 1995; Jackson et al., 2005; Klein, 2011; Müller & Pollak, 2004; Sewell et
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al., 1970; Sewell et al., 1969; Sewell & Hauser, 1975), wages, earnings, and income 
(Brand & Xie, 2010; Card, 1999; Harmon et al., 2003; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004), 
higher likelihood of employment and lower likelihood of unemployment (Ashenfel- 
ter & Ham, 1979; Blundell et al., 1999; Mincer, 1991; OECD, 2016a), better health and 
various health related behaviors (Brunello et al., 2013; Brunello et al., 2016; Conti et 
al., 2010; von dem  Knesebeck et al., 2006), m easures of subjective well being includ­
ing happiness and life satisfaction (Dolan et al., 2008; Kahneman & Krueger, 2006; 
Yang, 2008) and various social returns such as reduced crim e rates (Chiras & Crea, 
2004), increased political participation and civic engagement (Dee, 2004a; Henderson 
& Chatfield, 2011; Mayer, 2011; Verba et al., 1995), increased pro-environmental be­
havior (Meyer, 2015), as well as various liberal attitudes including support of freedom, 
pluralism, and democracy (Dee, 2004a; Robinson et al., 1999; Verba et al., 1995), and 
lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes and racial prejudice (Biernat & Crandall, 1999; 
Carvacho et al., 2013; Quillian, 1995; S. L. Schneider, 2008; Wagner & Zick, 1995).
All of these associations are demonstrably at least in  part causal effects—some di­
rect, some indirect—in the counterfactual sense: Had individuals or states invested in 
and, thus, acquired, m ore (less) education, they would have had ended up with m ore 
(less) income, better (worse) health, lower (higher) crim e rates, m ore (less) demo­
cratic citizens, and so on. While I, in  contrast to Hout (2012), would like to avoid a 
normative judgment, most people would probably agree that these findings indeed 
suggest that education makes life better.
1.4 What Would We Want to Know About Discrimination in Education?
With regard to inequality in  German education, it is a  well established fact that in­
equality of educational opportunity and inequality of educational outcomes along the 
lines of social class or socioeconomic status are comparatively large. International stud­
ies on educational achievement in term s of obtained degrees and certificates as well 
as competencies such as literacy or numeracy have shown repeatedly that social in­
equality in  German education is relatively high compared to other countries in  both 
elementary and secondary school (e.g, Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 
2012; Breen & Jonsson, 2005; OECD, 2016b; Wendt et al., 2016), notwithstanding a— 
not always statistically significant—decrease in  inequality over tim e both with regard 
to degrees (Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Breen et al., 2009) and competencies (Bos, Tarelli, 
et al., 2012; Prenzel et al., 2013; Wendt et al., 2016). Effect sizes for social class differ­
ences between students from lower or working class families and those from  upper 
or upper middle class families in  m ath and reading competencies lie around d =  .8 at
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the end of elementary school (e.g., Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; 
Stanat et al., 2012; Wendt et al., 2016, and my own calculations in  chapter 5). The 
lower competencies of students from  low social class families lead to worse grades 
and track recommendations for lower secondary school tracks. However, even con­
ditional on competencies and other relevant covariates, num erous studies find that 
teachers award worse grades and recom mend or prefer lower tracks for students from 
lower class families (e.g., Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; Ditton, 
2013; Ditton et al., 2005; Maaz et al., 2011; Maaz et al., 2010; T. Schneider, 2011; Wendt 
et al., 2016). Surprisingly, there are only very few quantitative empirical studies that 
explicitly theorize and investigate social class discrimination or classism in German 
education (e.g., T. Schneider, 2011).
Similarly, the immigrant-native achievement gap in  German education is larger 
than in many other countries around the world with regard to various m easures of 
achievement such as years of schooling and highest degrees obtained (Dustmann et 
al., 2012; Heath et al., 2008) or competencies in  reading, m ath, and science (Bos, 
Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; Marks, 2005; OECD, 2016b; Schnepf, 2007; 
Wendt et al., 2016). Just like in  other countries, in  Germany, too, the immigrant-native 
achievement gap is partly due to socioeconomic differences between immigrants and 
natives and, thus, is reduced once m easures of socioeconomic status (SES) or social 
class are controlled for (Dustmann et al., 2012; Kristen & Granato, 2007; Marks, 2005; 
OECD, 2016b). However, usually and in  Germany in particular, the disadvantage of 
immigrants cannot be fully explained by these factors—in fact, Germany turns out 
to have a  comparatively large if not the largest immigrant-native achievement gap in 
competencies net of SES (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2012; OECD, 2016b). Effect sizes for 
the achievement gap in various competencies vary depending on the operationaliza­
tion of immigrant status: Students with two parents born abroad lag behind about half
a standard deviation ( d =  . 5 ), students where only one parent is born abroad lag be­
hind about a quarter (d = .25) or some third of a standard deviation (d «  .3) (e.g., Bos, 
Tarelli, e tal., 2012;Bos, Wendt, etal., 2012;OECD, 2016b;S tana te ta l., 2012;W endtet 
al., 2016). Lookingatspecificgroupsofim m igrants, ittu rn so u tth a tth e  largestgroup, 
the immigrants ofTurkish origin, butalso other groups ofguest workers—e.g., from 
theform ersta te  ofYugoslavia, Italians, Portuguese, Spanish—perform ratherbadly in  
the German education system with regard to different indicators (e.g., Kristen, 2002; 
Kristen&Granato, 2007;Olczyk, 2016): S tudentsofTurkishoriginarenotonlylagging 
behindstudentsw ithoutim m igrantbackground—w itheffectssizesofaboutone stan­
dard deviation in competencies (Stanat et al., 2012; Walter, 2009)—they also perform 
worse than the  secondlargestgroup, studentsfrom the formerSovietUnion, bym ore
GESIS Series |  Volume 26 23
Sebastian E. Wenz |  1 Setting The Scene for Research on Discrimination in German Education
than half a standard deviation (Stanat et al., 2012; Walter, 2009). The lower compe­
tencies of immigrants in  general and the different groups of immigrants in  particu­
lar result in worse grades and worse track recommendations compared to their peers 
without immigrant background (Kristen, 2006b). Depending on the ethnic groups ex­
amined and control variables used, residual differences in grades and recommenda­
tions rem ain (e.g., Gresch, 2012; Kiss, 2013; Kristen, 2006b; also see the overview in 
Diehl & Fick, 2016). In  consequence, children with immigrant background in general 
andthose of Turkishorigin inparticular overproportionally en d u p in  lowersecondary 
tracks (Diefenbach, 2010; Kristen, 2002, 2003; Kristen & Dollmann, 2009). However, 
even though the question whether or not teachers discriminate by virtue of students' 
ethnicity has been investigated and it seems that discrimination plays only a m inor 
role in  explaining inequality between ethnic groups in  German education, evidence 
rem ains largely inconclusive due to several limitations of previous studies (see Diehl 
& Fick, 2016, for a review).
Less pronounced than both ethnic and socioeconomic achievement gaps are the 
differences in test scores, grades, track recommendations, track placement, and ed­
ucational achievement between boys and girls. The pattern in  tests scores and grades 
is such that boys outperform girls in  mathematics and girls outperform boys in  read­
ing (Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; Prenzel et al., 2013; Reiss et al., 
2016; Stanat et al., 2012; Wendt et al., 2016). Effect sizes of m ean differences are about 
.1 standard deviation at the end of elementary school for both subjects (Bos, Tarelli, 
et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012). At later stages in  their educational career, the 
advantage of girls in reading is found to be larger than the advantage of boys in  m ath­
ematics (Prenzel et al., 2013; Reiss et al., 2016). The same studies find that, over all 
subjects, girls increasingly outperform boys in  grades, track recommendations, track 
placement, and educational achievement. Some studies find that boys receive lower 
grades conditional on test scores and other relevant controls (e.g., Hochweber, 2010; 
Maaz et al., 2011), other studies do not find such an  effect (e.g., Wendt et al., 2016). 
By and large, observational studies suggest that, if anything, discriminatory grading 
to the disadvantage of boys is rather small in  effect size. Similarly, some studies find 
statistical significant disadvantages of boys rem aining in  teachers' track recom men­
dations or track preferences (e.g., Arnold et al., 2007; Ditton et al., 2005), but others— 
typically m ore recent studies—find no such effect (e.g., Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; T. 
Schneider, 2011).
For both students' social class and students' immigrant background or ethnicity, 
there is no conclusive evidence about the role of discrimination by teachers. Also, 
only one study implemented an experimental design to investigate ethnic discrimina­
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tion in  education using a sample of teachers (Sprietsma, 2013). Furthermore, we do 
not know much about teachers' stereotypes and prejudice—that is, the major determi­
nants of discrimination—towards different groups of students. If teachers' stereotypes 
about characteristics of different groups of students are correct on average and they 
do not hold negative prejudice towards these groups, discrimination that disadvan­
tages certain groups of students is rather unlikely, indeed. However, what if teachers' 
stereotypes are biased to the disadvantage of some groups and what if it can be shown 
that teachers do have negative prejudice towards particular groups—but maybe not 
others?
On the backdrop of the prevalent belief that discrimination by virtue of a person's 
socialclass background and ethnicity isconsidered unjustand unfair, and on the back­
drop of inequalities in  German education along the lines of social class and ethnicity, 
the general research questions in  this dissertation are, whether there is evidence for 
discrimination against ethnic m inorities in general, and students with a  Turkish back­
ground in  particular, or students from families of lower social classes in  German ed­
ucation and, if so, what are the underlying mechanisms?
As for the question at which point in  time discrimination in  education should be 
of greatest interest, it seems relevant to recall that there is convincing evidence that 
in  Germany, as in virtually all other developed countries, the first transition—the one 
from  elementary to secondary school—is the most im portant in  determining later lev­
els of educational achievement and, thus, educational inequality but also outcomes 
in  later life (e.g., Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Breen et al., 2009; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; 
Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). While later transitions and corrections to initial track place­
m ent are relatively less im portant in  the sense that they show less unequal transition 
patterns of different groups, they add to, that is, exacerbate, the overall level of in­
equality between groups in  German education (Buchholz & Schier, 2015; Hillmert & 
Jacob, 2005, 2010).
1.5 Methodological Foundations
1.5.1 Methodological Individualism
This dissertation is based on the principles of methodological individualism as pro­
posed, refined, and advocated by many economists, philosophers, and sociologists 
(see, e.g., Udehn, 2002, for a  brief history of methodological individualism). In this 
dissertation I adhere to a weak form of methodological individualism, similar to the
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positions taken by, among others, Popper (1945, 1957), Boudon (1986a, 1986b), or Cole­
m an (1986).
My perspective is very similar to what has been called institutional individualism 
(Agassi, 1975) and structural individualism (Wippler, 1978), respectively. These term s 
were introduced to highlight the differences to strong forms of methodological indi­
vidualism, as advocated, among others, by Homans (1967, 1970), Hummell and Opp 
(1968), and Elster (1982), including psychologism (Mill, 1843) and other individualistic 
methodologies (Hummell & Opp, 1968; Menger, 1883).
Therefore, the key methodological principle I follow is this: Social phenom ena, 
including discrimination, should be explained in  term s of individuals, their physical 
and psychic states, actions, interactions, social, institutional, structural, and physical 
environment (see Udehn, 2002, cell 1b in figure 2). While this position implies that, 
in principle, all social phenom ena can and, eventually, should be explained in  term s 
of individuals, it acknowledges that, in  a particular analysis, it is often not feasible to 
reduce the situation actors find themselves in  to motives and general laws of hum an 
nature (Popper, 1945).
The claim that this situation may only bee seen as endogenous to individual action 
or behavior and, thus, to forbid to accept this situation as exogenous, would inevitably 
lead to an infiniteregress takingus backall thew ayto a “beginning of society” (Popper, 
1945). I reject this claim and allow the social situation to be exogenous to individual 
action. This way, the social, institutional, structural, and physical environment de­
term ines individual action and behavior by enabling, incentivizing, and constraining 
it.
Especially relevant for a study on discrimination is also to note that methodolog­
ical individualism does not imply that the consequences of individual action or be­
havior are intended. Actually, methodological individualists typically stress the unin­
tended consequences of hum an action or behavior—so do I. Hence, social phenom ­
ena are typically, at least partly, unintended consequences of actions of individuals. 
Even m ore so, what individuals do might not necessarily be properly described as in­
tentional action, but—at least sometimes—m ore appropriately as automatic, sponta­
neous, or unconscious behavior (Boudon, 1998, 2003; Esser, 2001, 2009; Kroneberg, 
2010; Kroneberg & Kalter, 2012). Mainly social psychologists but also sociologists 
and, recently, even economists, have pointed to automatic, spontaneous, and implicit 
mechanisms that determine discriminatory treatm ent (Bertrand et al., 2005; Devine, 
1989; J. Feagin & Eckberg, 1980; Fiske, 1993b, 1998, 2000; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
The demand for microfoundations is a  normative claim. It states that social phe­
nom ena should be explained in  term s of individuals. I think that, ultimately, this claim
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Figure 1.1: Representation of Coleman (1986)'s scheme from  Raub et al. (2011).
is justified only insofar as microfoundations add anything to our understanding of the 
social phenom ena we are studying. That is, it has to be shown that microfoundations 
make a  difference. Following Udehn (2002, p. 501), this position coincides with view­
ing methodological individualism m ore as a “heuristic device or research program 
the fertility of which can only be ascertained a  posteriori” than as an “a  priori and 
universal principle”.
However, in research on discrimination it is actually not difficult to show that mi­
crofoundations matter. In  fact, assumptions or hypotheses about how individuals per­
ceive, categorize, and, eventually, treat others based on the others' sex, social back­
ground, or ethnic background, m atter a lot for both micro and macro outcomes. For 
those who are skeptical of methodological individualism as a  universal principle in 
social science research, I will show—throughout this dissertation—why and how indi­
viduals m atter in research on discrimination.
1.5.2 Model of Sociological Explanation
A schematic model for how to apply the rules of methodological individualism as out­
lined above, is the model of sociological explanation as advocated by Esser (1999). It 
builds on the macro-micro-macro scheme popularized by Coleman (1986) but already 
described by McClelland (1961) and others (see Raub et al., 2011, for a review of the 
scheme with focus on the links from  m acro to micro and from  micro to macro).
According to the model, there are three major steps in every sociological explana­
tion: First, the researcher has to investigate the “logic of the situation” (Popper, 1945) 
that applies to those individuals whose actions are to be explained. This involves a 
description of the situation (i.e., node A in  figure 1.1), that is, the relevant social, in­
stitutional, structural, and physical environment. It also includes empirical or analyt­
ical bridge assumptions (arrow 1) about effects from the situation in  A on the actors' 
knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, etc., and, thus, their m ore or less consciously perceived
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set of alternatives (node B  ). In a  study on discrimination in  education, it has to be de­
scribed in  which situation teachers are, when they treat—and supposedly discriminate 
against—students of different background. The situation might be structured by laws 
or other rules that guide and constrain teachers in  how to treat students, for example 
how to grade them  or how to give track recommendations at the end of elementary 
school.
What follows is also known as “logic of selection” (Esser, 1999). Its key component 
is a micro-theory that explains how actors act or behave (arrow 2) under the given 
conditions. For instance, statistical discrimination theory (Aigner & Cain, 1977) would 
suggest that teachersjudge andtreat students according to a weighted sum  of observed 
individual behavior and known group averages. Combining the logic of the situation 
and the logic of selection leads to predictions about behavioral outcomes (node C ) 
that can be evaluated against empirical data. In  a third step, the “logic of aggregation” 
(Esser, 1999) dictates that the behavior of individual teachers has to be aggregated to 
the macro-level (node D) following particular transform ation rules (arrow 3). This 
step is considered very im portant but generally underrated (Coleman, 1986; Esser, 
1999; Raub et al., 2011).
1.5.3 Value Judgments in the Study of Discrimination
I have already said that discrimination has been studied by many because it is consid­
ered unfair or unjust, or because it is illegal to discriminate against a person by virtue 
of characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or gender. Therefore, discrimination is a 
“value loaded term” (Myrdal, 1944, p. 214). Arrow (1998, p. 91) even goes so far as to 
claim that “[t]here is no way of separating completely the study of [...] discrimination 
[...] from  moral feelings”.  Similarly, Quillian (2006, p. 300) notes that political ideology 
affects how discrimination is defined (see chapter 2).
However, following Hume (1738)'s dictum, there is no m ethod, scientific or oth­
erwise, to derive—without further assumptions—what ought (not) to be from  what is 
(not). This holds for sociology as an empirical science (Weber, 1922) and, of course, 
it holds for a  study on discrimination, too (Myrdal, 1944, p. 214). Actually, it strikes 
m e that in  a study on discrimination in  particular, it is all the more “im portant to be 
analytic” (Arrow, 1998, p. 91) at all stages of the research process. I tried to be ana­
lytic, not political or m oral, when I defined, identified, and estimated discrimination, 
and when I interpreted my empirical findings in  this study. So, while it is neverthe­
less rather likely that my own moral feelings slipped in at some point, I hope that my 
argum ents are convincing on scientific grounds.
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1.6 How this Study is Structured
In  chapter 2 I introduce and discuss various useful and some not so useful definitions 
of discrimination. I  show how these definitions are related to the two distinct motiva­
tions for studying discrimination I have proposed in this introduction—discrimination 
as explanandum and as explanans. I show that understanding discrimination as a 
causal effect of an information about or a signal sent out by an  individual on how this 
individual is treated by another individual is the m ost useful approach to the empir­
ical study of discrimination. To this end, I make use of formal argum ents from  the 
recent literature on causality and causal inference about how to define and identify 
different causal effects.
In  chapter 3, I review theories and models of discrimination from several disci­
plines including economics, social psychology, and sociology that might help under­
stand why and predict whether teachers in  German education discriminate among 
students by virtue of students' ethnicity, social class background, or gender. I discuss 
the general usefulness of the theories, existing evidence of whether actors actually 
behave according to the mechanisms suggested by the different approaches, and how 
they can be applied to the German education system.
In  chapter 4, I discuss the central role of prejudice for understanding and predicting 
discriminatory behavior. I discuss the results and limitations of the few quantitative 
studies on explicit and implicit prejudice of teachers in German education towards 
different groups of students. Using one of these studies as a test case, I then present 
an  analysis in  which I quantify the bias in this study due to its geographically limited 
convenience sample of students. This is a limitation that, except one, all these studies 
have. To address this limitation and complement the findings of existing studies of 
teachers' prejudice, I show how to identify teachers and educators m ore generally in 
sufficient num bers in  data from the German General Social Survey (GGSS/ALLBUS). I 
thereafter analyze teachers' prejudices towards different ethnic groups.
In  chapter 5, I introduce an item  battery to m easure teachers' stereotypes about 
average competencies of different groups of students that I developed together with 
colleagues at the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS). I briefly discuss the role 
and functions of stereotypes in  social cognition, intergroup relations, and, thus, dis­
crimination in  education and elsewhere. I then review in greater detail different con­
ceptualizations of what stereotypes are and how they have been m easured over time. 
Based on the definition we chose at the NEPS and I prefer in  this study, I give a  de­
tailed account of the process of developing the new item battery. I present quanti­
tative analyses that—based on theoretical considerations—speak to the validity of the
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new instrum ent and allow to examine the accuracy of teachers' stereotypes towards 
different groups of students.
In  chapter 6, I present results from analyses of experimental data that I collected 
in collaboration with Kerstin Hoenig and Anne Landhäußer to examine discrimina­
tion by teachers when assigning grades to essays and forming expectations about fu­
ture performance of students signaling different ethnic background, social class back­
ground, and gender. I address several shortcomings of prior experimental research 
that all too often confounds social and ethnic discrimination by design, ignores the 
possibility of heterogeneous treatm ent effects across the distribution of ability, and is 
based on samples that heavily restrict the external validity of the findings.
I conclude in  chapter 7.
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The first thing to note is that 
discrimination is by no means 
easy to define concisely.
(Blalock, 1967)
In  this chapter I am concerned with questions of how to define and—to some 
extent—how to identify discrimination. My discussion will show why it is im portant to 
thoroughly think through what is m eant by discrimination and to lay out definitions 
explicitly. In  fact, many empirical studies on discrimination in  general but also on 
discrimination in  German education in  particular seemingly fail with regard to the 
form er and obviously fail with regard to the latter. At least in  this regard, it seems, 
there has been only little, if any, change over the last decades, given Blalock (1967, 
p. 15) was right, when he wrote: “Many texts and descriptive works fail to attem pt any 
definition at all”.
2.1 On Useful and Not so Useful Definitions
My perspective on definitions and their role in  the empirical social sciences is prob­
ably best explained in  comparison to Popper (1945). I follow Popper (1945) in  key as­
pects but do not agree without qualifications. In principle, I share Popper (1945)'s 
view that scientific definitions fundamentally differ from theories and hypotheses be­
cause they do not not make any empirical claims and, thus, can neither be true nor 
false. Also, definitions are not m eant to grasp the essence of a term . I adopt Popper 
(1945)'s suggestion that scientific definitions are nominal definitions instead of essen­
tialist definitions. In conclusion, I agree with Popper (1945) that the m ain purpose of 
scientific definitions is to provide “shorthand labels” to “cut a  long story short”.
However, one could argue that Popper (1945) would be skeptical of the exercise in 
this chapter, namely to ask which definition of discrimination we should adopt and 
which definitions we should not adopt in an empirical study on discrimination in  Ger­
m an education. Such an  endeavor might be seen as a violation of Popper (1945)'s prin- 
cip les,asitstartsw ith theterm discrim ination , i.e., thedefin iendum ,andseekstofind
a definition, i.e., the definiens. Popper (1945) suggests that scientists should not and
do not read a definition from left to right: Therefore, the question What is discrimina­
tion? “doesnotplayanyrole inscience” accordingtoPopper(1945). Instead, scientific 
definitions are read from right to left—that is, they start with the definiens and pick
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a definiendum as a short label. Thus, a relevant question—based, for the sake of an 
example, on the definition of discrimination from  Levin and Levin (1982)—would be: 
What should we call differential or unequal treatment of members of some group or category 
on the basis of their group membership rather than on the basis of their individual qualities? 
The answer Levin and Levin (1982) gave, without asking the question, is discrimina­
tion. I would give the same answer, but I find the question to be ill posed. Put differ­
ently, I find their definition of discrimination—like many others—not very useful for 
empirical research in the social sciences.
So, maybe in  contrast to Popper (1945), who suggests that “scientific or nominalist 
definitions do not contain any knowledge whatever, not even any 'opinion' ”,  I think
that definitions can be more or less useful. I say maybe, because Popper (1959/2004,
pp. 15, 33-34) implicitly seem to share this perspective (also see Lakatos, 1980). Be­
fore Idiscuss variousdefinitionsofdiscrim inationandw hyIfindsom e ofthem m ore 
usefulthanothers, here are m ym aincriteriaforevaluatinghow usefu ladefin itionof 
discrim inationis. Probablythe m ostim portan tgeneralcriterion isthatthe definition 
should enable empirical researchers to answer their research questions. Therefore, a 
definitionofdiscrim inationshould—am ongstothers—allow totestfordifferentm ech- 
anisms of discrimination, to investigate discrimination against different groups, to 
examine the role discrimination plays in determining inequality, to assess the devel­
opment of discrimination over time, and to compare discrimination across different 
contexts such as countries, federal states, schools, or neighborhoods. Many of the 
definitions I criticize and reject in the rem ainder of this chapter are not very useful 
becausetheydonothelptoansw erthesequestionsbutm akeitd ifficultorevenim pos- 
sible to do so—some because they are too narrow, some because they are too broad, 
some for other reasons.
Also, I think that useful definitions should adhere to the methodological standards 
laid out in chapter 1. Most importantly, definitions of discrimination should not ex­
plicitly refer to or implicitly reflect any societal norms such as norms of fairness or 
meritocratic principles. Certainly, it is nevertheless legitimate that considerations of 
justice and fairness motivate research on discrimination.
Last but not least: While I think that the term s used by empirical social scientists 
do not need to match or reflect how they are used or understood by the lay public, 
it is—ceteris paribus—a good thing if we can reduce the costs of translating back and 
forth between scientific and public terminology.
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2.2 Conceptualizing Discrimination: Premises
In  this section, I lay out some premises on which my discussion of useful and not 
so useful definitions of discrimination is built. Many of these premises state which 
approaches I do not find useful in  conceptualizing discrimination. I intend to get those 
less useful ideas out of the way before focusing in  greater detail on m ore important 
and—not necessarily equivalent—m ore useful ideas.
2.2.1 Discrimination is About Behavior---Not About Attitudes Or Beliefs
Virtually every definition of discrimination refers to some form  of behavior, action, 
or treatm ent. Or, as Pager and Shepherd (2008, p. 182) put it: “A key feature of any 
definition of discrimination is its focus on behavior.” Therefore, I will, as is typically 
done and in  line with the methodological principles discussed in  chapter 1, assume 
that discrimination m eans that, eventually, an individual is doing something towards 
another individual. Note that this position is even shared in some contributions on so 
called institutional discrimination: “The “bottom line” in all types of discrimination 
is someone actually doing something to someone else” (J. R. Feagin & Booher Feagin, 
1986, p. 25).
Since discrimination is about behavior, it is not equivalent with attitudes or beliefs 
and, thus, not equivalent with prejudice or stereotypes. Both analytically and em­
pirically, sociologists and other social scientists have typically distinguished between 
these concepts. An early account of an empirical investigation is the classic study by 
LaPiere (1934) that shows that the relation of ethnic prejudice with ethnic discrimi­
nation may be very low. More recent meta-analyzes confirm that discrimination is 
only moderately correlated with both stereotypes and prejudice (Schütz & Six, 1996;
Talaska et al., 2008). In  the same vein, M erton (1949) argues that “[p]rejudicial atti­
tudes not need [to] coincide with discriminatory behavior” (Merton, 1949, pp. 102­
103) and presents a typology of ethnic prejudice and discrimination that includes the 
prejudiced non-discriminator as well as the non-prejudiced discriminator.
I suggest that a definition of discrimination shouldn't even refer to attitudes or be­
liefs. Defining discrimination as, for example, “the behavioral manifestation of prej- 
udice” (J. M. Jones, 1997, p. 10)essentiallyrulesoutanyotherm echanism ofdiscrim - 
ination. T hisw ouldrenderm eaninglessanyresearchondiscrim inationnotbasedon 
prejudice, such as discrimination based on processes of stereotyping.
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2.2.2 Discrimination is Not Necessarily Intentional
While especially earlier definitions conceptualized discrimination as intentional or 
conscious action (e.g., Aigner & Cain, 1977; Allport, 1954; Becker, 1957/1971; Blalock, 
1967; Pincus, 1996) it is now widely agreed upon that this is a too narrow view on the 
empirical reality of social cognition, interpersonal behavior, and intergroup relations.
Based mainly on pioneering research by cognitive and social psychologists on pro­
cesses of automatic, unconscious, implicit, or unintentional categorization (e.g., All­
port, 1954; Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990; Fiske et al., 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), 
today, social scientists from different fields agree that discrimination and its key de- 
term inants—stereotypes and prejudice—can be unconscious (Quillian, 2008), implicit 
(e.g., Bertrand et al., 2005; Greenwald & Krieger, 2006; W ittenbrink et al., 1997), auto­
matic (e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997; Lepore & Brown, 1997), unintentional 
(e.g., J. Feagin & Eckberg, 1980), or subtle (e.g., Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew 
& Meertens, 1995). For reviews on these forms of cognition, affect, and behavior see, 
e.g., Fazio and Olson (2003), Pager and Shepherd (2008), Quillian (2006).
Therefore, in contrast to Aigner and Cain (1977), Becker (1957/1971), Blalock (1967) 
and others, I do not limit the concept of discrimination to intentional or conscious 
behavior but treat unintentional or unconscious discrimination as equally discrimi­
natory. In  this study, for establishing discrimination, it does not m atter whether a 
teacher intends to harm  or consciously disadvantages a  student. All that m atters is 
whether and, if so, to which degree the student had been treated differently had they 
been of different ethnicity, class, or sex.
However, this is not to say that it cannot be interesting to distinguish between dif­
ferent forms of discrimination. Also, my position does not imply that intentional and 
unintentional acts of discrimination should be seen as morally equal. In fact, glob­
ally, a  majority of people will probably not see them  as morally equal, which might 
be reason enough for empirical researchers to investigate these forms separately. My 
position also does not m ean that I reject theories or models that treat discrimination 
as intentional or conscious. In  contrast, I will argue in  this chapter and chapter 3 that, 
usually, such theories can easily be used to model both intentional and unintentional 
discrimination.
2.2.3 Discrimination is Not by Definition Unjust or Unfair
In chapter 1 I have argued that one of two major motivations to study discrimination 
is that in contemporary societies many consider discrimination based on variables 
such as sex, race, or class unfair and unjust. Therefore, it is not too surprising that
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discrimination has also been defined as unjust or unfair treatm ent (see, e.g., Blank 
et al., 2004; Dovidio et al., 2010; Holzer & Ludwig, 2003; D. J. Schneider, 2004, for such 
conceptualizations).
However, above I have argued that definitions of discrimination should adhere to 
the methodological standards laid out in  chapter 1 and should, thus, not refer to or 
reflect any societal norm s or principles. I see two problems arising if scholars do so 
anyway: First, defining discrimination as unfair or unjust m eans to build a definition 
on normative and political term s. Since we have no scientific m ethod to agree on what 
is just or fair and what is unjust or unfair, we are stuck with a problem that Simpson 
and Yinger (1972) summarized as follows:
The essence of social discrimination is that there are some who say: we are 
“nicely distinguishing”; while others reply: no you are drawing “an unfair 
or injurious distinction” (Simpson & Yinger, 1972, p. 28)
Secondly, understanding discrimination as unjust or unfair, as something bad, some­
thing that should not be, something to reject and condemn probably explains why 
“some activists take all inequality among racial groups as discrimination” while “some 
conservative scholars, restrict discrimination only to acts that are intended to harm  
the target group” (Quillian, 2006, p. 300). Indeed, many definitions of discrimination 
are—obviously, apparently, or seemingly—build on the prem ise that discrimination is 
unjust or unfair. I intend to find a definition that is useful for empirical social science 
research and, therefore, build my discussion on a rather different prem ise, namely 
that discrimination is not per se unjust or unfair.
2.2.4 Discrimination is Not Inequality
We have already seen that this prem ise is less obvious than it might seem , but since 
“some activists take all inequality among racial groups as discrimination” (Quillian, 
2006, p. 300), I feel the need to stress that, under any useful definition, discrimina­
tion is not the same as inequality. If it were, we wouldn't need a different term  and 
questions on how discrimination and inequality are linked would all be meaningless. 
I shall return  to the relation between discrimination and inequality below in section
2.4.1 when I discuss the distinction between individual discrimination and group dis­
crim ination. In chapter 3, I provide a m ore detailed discussion of how different theo­
ries of discrimination help to explain inequality between groups.
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2.3 Discrimination as Causal Effect
That the question of whether or not discrimination of a particular kind exists, cannot 
be answered by a m ere descriptive approach alone is no recent insight: “Definitions 
of discrimination usually, if not always, [...] require causal inferences” (Blalock, 1967, 
p. 15). But especially since the counterfactual or potential outcome model of causal­
ity became the standard approach to causality in the social sciences, more and m ore 
authors explicitly conceptualized discrimination in term s of causal effects. Blalock 
(1967)'s position is now widely shared in  substantive contributions to the literature on 
discrimination (e.g., Blank et al., 2004; Heckman, 1998; Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Quil­
lian, 2006) as well as methodological contributions to the literature on causality (e.g.,
Greiner & Rubin, 2010; Imai et al., 2013; Pearl, 2001, 2009; Pearl et al., 2016; D. B. Ru­
bin, 1986; M. Sen & Wasow, 2016; VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012; Wang & Sobel, 2013). 
Som e40yearsafterBlalock(1967),B lan k e ta l.(2004,p .88 ),sum m arize :“Establishing 
that[...] d iscrim inationd idord idno toccurrequ irescausalin ference”.
2.3.1 Discrimination as Causal Effect: Foundations
Thew orkingdefin itionofdiscrim inationIgaveinchapter1—nam elythatdiscrim ina- 
tion is the individual-level causal effect of any attribute, behavior, or characteristic of 
an individual on how this individual is treated by another person—builds on various 
conceptualizationsofd iscrim inationasacausaleffec t(e .g .,B lanketa l.,2004;Heck- 
man, 1998; Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Quillian, 2006). However, the definitions given 
bytheseandotherau thorsd ifferatleastsligh tly . T ounderstandbothdifferencesand 
commonalities, I shall briefly recap the concepts of counterfactual causality and po­
tential outcomes as well as the concepts of total, direct, and indirect effects before I 
discuss alternative conceptualizations of discrimination as a causal effect.
Individual-Level Causal Effects
T hecounterfactualorpotentialoutcom efram ew orkisnow them ostw idelyaccepted 
perspectiveoncausality in thesocialsciencesandbeyond(G angl,2010;Im bens& R u- 
b in ,2015;M organ& W inship,2015;P e a r l,2009;P e a r le ta l . ,2016). T hegeneralideais 
tha tacausaleffec tisdefinedasthed ifferenceinou tcom esunderaun it'sfactualsta te  
and one or more counterfactual states or, using potential outcome terminology, the 
difference between two or more potential outcomes under alternative causal states.
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The individual-level causal effect or simply individual causal effect, Jj 1, could then be 
written as
=  yj -  yj , (2-1)
where yj1 isthe  potentialoutcome ofindividual i in th e  treatm entstate, denotedbythe 
right-hand superscript1, andy jj is the potential outcome ofindividual i in  the control 
state, denoted by the right-hand superscript 0. The difference, Jj , is the causal effect 
o ftreatm entd j , which is conceptualized as a variable that takes on atleasttw o differ- 
entvalues to potentially representat least two alternative causal states—e.g., dj =  1 if 
i  is observed in the treatm ent group, and dj =  0 i f i  is observed in the control group. 
Therefore, identifying and estimating a causal effect involves answering a—that is at 
least one—counterfactual question such as this one: W hat would have happened to 
individual i  from the control (treatment) group, had individual i  been in the treat­
m ent (control) group instead? The answer to this question is the total causal effect, 
or simply total effect, Jj from equation 2.1, of the treatment, d, on the outcome, y. 
See section 2.3.1 below for more details on the distinction between total, direct, and 
indirect effects.
Population-level Causal Effects
Ifwe take yjj, yjj, andd j asindividualrealizationsofpopulation-levelrandom variables 
Y j , Y j , and D, respectively, we can define the observable outcome variable Y as
Y =  Yj  ifD  =  1,
Y =  Yj  ifD  =  0.
This can be written as
Y =  DY j  +  (1 -  D)Y j  (2.2)
from which the biggest challenge for the counterfactual approach to causality be­
comes obvious: I tis  simplyimpossible to directlyobserve the effectofdon y, because 
it is logically impossible to observe one and the same individual or any other unit of 
interest in two or more different causal states at the same time. This “Fundamen­
tal Problem ofCausal Inference” (Holland, 1986, p. 947) is the “fundamental realityof 
causalanalysis” (Morgan&Winship, 2015, p. 45) andistypicallyaddressedbydefining 
and estimating some kind of average causal effect through aggregating over—usually,
1 Here, I mainly follow the notation from Morgan and Winship (2015). Elsewhere I also use 
notation from other authors.
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but not necessarily—many individuals sampled from the population of interest.2 The
“broadest possible average effect” (Morgan & Winship, 2015, p. 46) is the average treat­
menteffect (ATE) o fD  on Y:
A T E  = E[öi] = E [J] =  E [Y 1 -  Y 0] =  E [Y 1] -  E[Y 0] (2.3)
Here, the ATE stands for the average over all—possibly heterogeneous—individual- 
level causal total effects o fD  on Y  in the population ofinterest.
Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects
In research on discrimination, the distinction between total, direct, and indirect ef- 
fectsisim portan tandprob lem aticatthesam e time. Itisim portan tbecause discrimi­
nation is often—though notalwaysexplicitly—definedas directeffectof, forexample, 
raceorgenderonanoutcom eofin terestsuchasw agesorh iringdecisions(e.g ., Blank 
etal., 2004;F ixe ta l., 1993;Heckman, 1998;Quillian, 2006). Also, methodologicalcon- 
tributionsonthedistinctionbetw eendirectandindirecteffectshaveuseddiscrim ina- 
tion as an example o fhow to  define, identify, and estimate d irectandindirecteffects 
(e.g., Imai et al., 2013; Pearl, 2001, 2009, 2014; VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012; Wang & 
Sobel, 2013). Itisproblem aticsince “the conceptsofdirectandindirectcausal effects 
are generally ill-defined and often more deceptive than helpful” (D. B. Rubin, 2004, 
p. 162). It is the total effect that “is easiest to interpret, define and estimate” (Pearl, 
2001, p. 411) and, thus, “[f]rom a counterfactual perspective, it is only the total effect 
o fD o n Y  thathas straightforwardcausal content” (Gangl, 2010, p. 28, myemphasis).
Assaidabove in sec tio n 2.3, Ji from equation2.1 isthe  to taleffectofthe treatment, 
d, on the outcome, y . In linear models with no interactions, the total effect, Ji , rep­
resents the change in y  caused bychanging d byone unit.3 Thatm eans th a tth e  total 
effect o f d on y includes both the direct effect o fd on y  as well as all indirect effects 
that mediate the causal effect of d on y . Such a mediation is visualized in panel (a) 
offigure 2.1 in term s ofpopulation-level random variables D , Y , and M  that repre­
sent treatm ent, outcome, and mediator, respectively. Panel (b) of figure 2.1 shows 
a slightly more complex mediation model with an additional mediator, N  . Now, the
2 We might also estimate the individual causal effect or, m ore generally, unit causal effect, 
by observing the same individual or unit in  different causal states over time.
3 When interactions are present or in  the context of non-linear models, things are m ore com­
plicated. However, a discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. My 
arguments concerning the conceptualization of discrimination as causal effect are not af­
fected by keeping things as simple as I do here.
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(a)
Figure 2.1: Panel (a) shows a simple mediation model with a  treatm ent, D , a mediator,
M , and an  outcome, Y . Panel (b) shows a slightly m ore complex mediation 
model with an  additional mediator, N .
appeal of the total effect is this: W hether the model in  panel (a) or the model in  panel 
(b) is assumed to be the correct model does not alter the definition or meaning of the 
total effect. Whatever the mechanism(s) that m ediate the total effect, in both scenar­
ios it is simply the familiar difference between two or m ore potential outcomes under
alternative causal states, d G D, namely E [Y1 ] — E[Y0]. It is this effect—the total 
effect—thatistyp icallyassessed inacon tro lledexperim ent(Pearl,2001,p.411).
In b o th p an e lso ffig u re2.1,th e d ire c te f fe c to fD o n Y isrep resen tedby thearrow  
pointing from D to Y , D Y 4. In linear models with no interactions, it is defined 
and measured simply by the change in Y  that occurs when D is changed by one unit 
w hileholdingconstantallothervariablesinthem odelincludingallinterm ediatevari- 
ables. P u td iffe ren tly ,th ed irec te ffec tis th ee ffec to fD o n Y n e to fth ee ffec tsv iaa ll 
m echanism srepresentedbyinterm ediatevariables. Because,especiallyinnonlinear 
m odels,th ingscangetprettycom plicated ,d ifferen tk indsofd irecteffectsared istin- 
guishedin theliterature: puredirecteffect(R obins& G reenland,1992;W ang&Sobel, 
2013) or natural direct effect (Pearl, 2001), controlled direct effect (Pearl, 2001; Wang 
& Sobel,2013),andtotald irecteffect(R obins& G reenland,1992;W ang& Sobel,2013). 
W hilead iscussionofhow to iden tifyandestim ate thesed ifferen teffec tsisno tfeasi- 
b lea tth isp o in t,itis im p o rtan tto u n d ers tan d th a ta llfo rm so fd irec te ffec tsh av eo n e  
thing in common, namely that their substantive content depends on all other vari­
ables in the model. Two features are of particular importance: First, replacing one 
mediator with another—e.g., M  in panel (a) with M *—changes the substantive m ean­
ing of the direct effect, D Y . Secondly, adding an intermediate or mediating vari­
4 Each panel in  figure 2.1 shows a directed acyclic graph (DAG). For introductions and dis­
cussions of their role in  defining and identifying causal effects in  the social sciences and 
beyond, see, among others, Elwert (2013), Morgan and Winship (2015), Pearl (2009), Pearl 
et a l.(2016), R ohrer(2018)
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able to the model that represents a  mechanism by which D changes Y has the same
consequences—it alters the substantive meaning of the direct effect, D Y . Thus, in 
figure 2.1, D Y differs between panel (a), where it is the effect of D on Y net of M, 
and panel (b), where it is the effectofD  on Y ne to fb o th  M and N.
The intu itionbehindindirecteffectsorm ediatedeffectsisthattheyrepresentthose 
and only those effects ofthe cause, D, on the outcome, Y, thatoperate through inter­
mediate variables, such as M or N  in figure 2.1. In panel (a) of figure 2.1, the path 
D M  Y  constitutes an indirect effect of D on Y via M  since D affects M  and 
M affects Y in turn (Wang & Sobel, 2013, p. 215). In panel (b) there are two indirect 
effects of D on Y, namely D M Y and D N  Y . Quite obviously, there is 
no particular limit to the num ber ofm ediators and, thus, to the indirect effects ofD  
on Y . Also, mediators may affect one another in various ways beyond what is shown 
in figure 2.1 (VanderWeele, 2015, chapter 5). As with direct effects, different—butno t 
exactly the same—types ofindirect effects are m entioned in the literature to account 
for different environments including linear and nonlinear models: pure indirect ef­
fect (Robins & Greenland, 1992; Wang & Sobel, 2013) or natural indirect effect (Pearl, 
2001), and total indirecteffect (Robins &Greenland, 1992;W ang & Sobel, 2013).
2.3.2 Discrimination as Causal Effect of Race, Gender, and Other Attributes
A crucial question with regard to the definition and identification ofcausal effects in 
general and the conceptualization ofdiscrim ination as a causal effectin particular is 
w hatpreciselyare the alternative causal states that—through theirdifference—define 
the causal effectofinterest?5 One seemingly natural and, thus, popular choice in the 
context ofdiscrim ination is to define treatm ent and control as belonging to different 
ethnic, racial, or social groups, or, more generally, possessing versus not possessing 
an attribute or possessing different attributes (cf. Holland, 1986). For the special case 
ofracial discrimination, B lanketal. (2004, p. 79), forexample, say they are interested 
in “the difference between two outcomes: the outcome if the individual were black 
and the outcome if the individual were white.” According to Quillian (2006, p. 302), 
the relevant counterfactual question in research on discrimination is the following: 
“W hatw ouldthe treatm entoftargetgroup mem bershave been iftheyhadbeen  dom­
inant group members?”6
5 See, e.g., Morgan and Winship (2015, pp. 37-43) or Imbens and Rubin (2015, pp. 3-5) for a
discussion on how im portant it is to precisely lay out the different causal states.
6 Other statements in Blank et al. (2004), Quillian (2006) suggest that both are probably not 
in terestedinansw eringthecounterfactualquestionscitedherebutm orenarrow questions
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In  a  study on ethnic discrimination in  German education, the alternative causal
states, d G D, could be defined as being members of different ethnic groups. For 
instance, the treatm ent state, D =  1, would indicate that a student belongs to the 
Turkish ethnic minority, while the control state, D =  0, would indicate that a student 
belongs to the German ethnic majority. With regard to sex discrimination, the alter- 
nativecausalstatescouldbedefinedasbeingagirl, D =  0, orboy, D =  1, respectively. 
However, questions or statements like these have been challenged for various reasons 
(see, e.g., Greiner&Rubin, 2010;M . Sen&Wasow, 2016, forreview softhesedebates): 
First, ithasbeenarguedthatattribu tesingeneralandcharacteristicssuchasrace, sex, 
orim m igrantbackgroundinparticularare“immutable” (Sobel,1998, p. 334;Greiner& 
Rubin, 2010) and, therefore, not manipulable by any intervention (Berk, 2004; Freed­
man, 2004; Holland, 1986, 2003). Secondly, questions or statements such as the above 
cited by Blank et al. (2004), Quillian (2006) are often read as dealing with the total ef- 
fectofattribu tes th a ta re—from an essentialistor biological pointofview  (Greiner & 
Rubin, 2010, p. 776; M. Sen & Wasow, 2016, p. 500)—assigned very early in an individ­
ual's life; sex, for example, can be viewed as being assigned at conception. However, 
the to talcausaleffecto fatreatm entassignedatconcep tionorb irth , thecriticsargue, 
is typ icallynotofin terestto  m anysocial scientists, especiallynotto those examining 
discrimination (Gangl, 2010; M. Sen & Wasow, 2016; VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012). 
Thirdly, the questions and statements from above are criticized for being not precise 
enough with regard to the actual treatm ent and the timing of treatm ent assignment 
and, thus, imprecise with regard to the alternative causal states (Greiner & Rubin, 
2010; D. B. Rubin, 1986). I shall discuss these and other issues as well as proposed 
solutions in the nextsections.
No causation without manipulation?
Probably the most famous—to some maybe: infamous—slogan from the literature on 
causality, “no causation without manipluation”, seem to have first appeared in D. B. 
Rubin (1975, p. 238). According to Holland (1986), who repeats the slogan in capital 
letters (“NO CAUSATION WITHOUT MANIPULATION”, Holland, 1986, p. 959), it was 
coinedbyR ubinandhim selftoem phasizethatnoteverythingcanbeacause. Holland
that would, supposedly, best be answered by some kind of direct effect of, e.g., race on the 
outcome of interest. However, both Blank et al. (2004), Quillian (2006) do not discuss the 
contradiction between these questions and the precise effects they supposedly are after. 
Also, the cited questions make for a good start in  a discussion of different alternative causal 
states in  research on discrimination.
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(1986, p. 946) argues that “[f]or causal inference, it is critical that each unit be poten- 
tiallyexposableto anyoneo fthecauses”. In an o w n sec tio n o n th eq u es tio n “W hatcan 
be a cause?” he puts it this way:
[...] Itaketheposition tha tcausesareon ly thoseth ingstha tcou ld ,inp rin - 
ciple, be treatm ents in experiments. The qualification 'in principle' is im­
portant because practical, ethical, and other considerations might make 
some experiments infeasible, that is, limit us to contemplating hypotheti­
cal experiments. (Holland, 1986, pp. 954-955)
Fortrad itionalconceptualizationsofd iscrim inationasacausaleffectofattribu tesof 
people on the way they are treated (as, e.g., in Blank et al., 2004; Quillian, 2006), this 
position poses a serious problem, since Holland (1986, p. 955) argues that only activ­
ities, e.g., being coached by teacher, but not attributes, e.g., a student's sex or race, 
cou ldbe trea tm entsinexperim ents,no teven inprincip le .H olland(1986,p .955)rea- 
sonsthattheun itso fcausalanalysis—e.g.,individualstudents—cannotbeexposedto  
attributes, since “the only way for an attribute to change its value is for the unit to 
change in some way and no longer be the same unit”. Therefore, according to (Hol­
land, 1986, p. 955), “the notion of potential exposability does not apply” to attributes, 
w hich ,in turn ,ru lesthem outascausalvariab les. Thus,adefinitionofdiscrim ination 
as the causal effect of, for example, sex or race on the way an individual is treated, is 
not feasible.
While Holland (1986) does not discuss the phenomenon of discrimination explic­
itly, Holland (1988, 2003) do. In a comment on Dempster (1988), Holland (1988) ar­
gues that discrimination can and should be conceptualized as causal effect, not as 
causal mechanism—which is what Dempster (1988) suggests. However, Holland (1988) 
changes the question What is discrimination? into What is the effect of discrimination?, 
thereby avoiding a definition altogether. Holland (2003), who says that a counterfac- 
tualquestionsuchas“W hatw ouldyourlifehavebeenhadyourracebeendifferent? is 
so farfrom com prehensib lethatitiseasilyv iew edasarid icu lousquestion” (Holland, 
2003, p. 9), attempts an explicit definition ofdiscrim ination:
[...] d iscrim ination[is]a“statisticalinteraction” betw eena(potential)dif- 
ference in societies and racial categories ofpeople (Holland, 2003, p. 12).
Thisdefinition—thathasneitherbeenexplicitlypickedupbyresearchersw hoaresub- 
stantively interested in discrimination nor by those working in the field ofcausality— 
does not conceptualize discrimination as differential treatm ent or any other form of 
behavior, but as the causal effect of societal, institutional, or systemic variables on 
racial inequality. By doing so, it misses the “the bottom line in all types of discrimi­
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nation”, namely: “someone actually doing something to someone else” (J. R. Feagin 
& Booher Feagin, 1986, p. 25). Since I, too, have argued in  section 2.2 that any useful 
definition of discrimination should refer to some form  of behavior, I can only reject 
Holland (2003)'s conceptualization.
Causation without manipulation? You bet!
One way of solving the problem of how to define discrimination in  term s of causal 
effects of attributes such as sex or race, is to entirely reject the notion that causation 
requires m anipulation (Gangl, 2010; Pearl, 2009; Pearl et al., 2016). Gangl (2010, p. 38), 
for example, argues that “[w]hether nonmanipulable factors such as gender, race, or 
class affect life courses is a perfectly sensible counterfactual question to begin with”. 
Pearl (2009, p. 361) goes even further and argues that “many good ideas have been 
stifled or dismissed from causal analysis” since—and it is obvious that he  wants to say: 
because—Holland (1986) promoted the phrase “no causation without manipulation”. 
Pearl (2009) continues:
Surely we have causation without m anipulation. The moon causes tides, 
race causes discrimination, and sex causes the secretion of certain hor­
m ones and not others. (Pearl, 2009, p. 361)
Pearl (2009) has no problem with immutable characteristics as causes, since his per­
spective on causal effects is built around—potentially unrealistic—counterfactuals in­
stead of m ore or less realistic interventions or manipulations. In  fact, repeatedly, 
he has used the example of discrimination in general and sex discrimination in  par­
ticular to explain his position on how to define and identify total, direct, and indirect 
effects of sex on outcomes such as college admissions (Pearl, 2009) or hiring decisions 
(e.g., Pearl, 2001; Pearl et al., 2016). Therefore, it is all but surprising that Pearl (2009, 
p. 362) advocates a “long-overdue counter-slogan: “Causation without manipulation? 
You bet!””
Indeed, on first sight, it seems perfectly sensible and legitimate to ask a question
such as the following: What would have been the track recommendation at the end ofel- 
ementary school for a girl, had she been a boy instead? However, upon closer inspec­
tion, this question—or, at least, a particular and popular reading of it (cf. D. B. Ru­
bin, 1986)—is probably not of interest to many social scientists (Gangl, 2010, p. 38) 
and certainly not to those investigating discrimination (VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012, 
p. 109). For research on discrimination, this and similar counterfactual questions or 
statements are problematic ifread as  askingfor the total effectofatreatm ent(M .Sen 
& Wasow, 2016; VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012) that occurs rather early in life—e.g., at
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conception (Greiner & Rubin, 2010). Why exactly this is so problematic, I discuss in 
greater detail in  the next paragraph.
The importance of time in defining alternative causal states
That things are a little m ore complex than suggested by Holland (1986), but also than 
they appear in the discussion of discrimination by Pearl (2001, 2009) and Pearl et al. 
(2016) was emphasized very early in  the debate by D. B. Rubin (1986) in his comment 
on Holland (1986). While D. B. Rubin (1986, p. 962) upholds the motto “no causation 
without manipulation” as a “critical guideline for clear thinking in empirical studies 
for causal effects”, he allows attributes of units to be treatm ents in hypothetical exper­
iments as long as units, treatm ents, and outcomes are clearly defined. Maybe D. B. 
Rubin (1986) is simply m ore imaginative than Holland (1986, 1988, 2003) when accept­
ing the statement that a male's life would have been different, had he been born a 
female instead—”whether because of some hypothetical Y to X  chromosome treat­
m ent at conception, or massive doses of horm ones in  utero that would lead to female 
morphology at b irth , or an at birth  sex-change operation, or so forth” (D. B. Rubin, 
1986, p. 961)—as causally meaningful.7 D. B. Rubin (1986) brings up the example of 
sex discrimination in  payment to show that, typically, things are m ore complex: He 
argues that the causal effect of being male instead of being female
[...] has many possible versions ranging from some hypothetical 'at con­
ception X to Y chromosome treatm ent' to replacing an 'F' with an 'M' on a 
job application form . (D. B. Rubin, 1986, p. 962)
While this is—to the best of my knowledge—the first tim e that discrimination is explic­
itly defined as causal effect of a  signal (cf. Greiner & Rubin, 2010; M. Sen & Wasow, 
2016), D. B. Rubin (1986)'s concern is of m ore general nature: D. B. Rubin (1986) and, 
even m ore explicitly, Greiner and Rubin (2010, p. 777) as well as Im bens and Rubin 
(2015, p. 5) make the case for the im portance of timing of treatment assignment that, as 
a primitive of causal inference, is crucial in  defining causal effects.
Figure 2.2 presents a visualization of D. B. Rubin (1986)'s point that timing of treat­
m ent assignment m atters in  general and in  research on discrimination in particular: 
The total causal effect of being m ale instead of being female on the starting wage, Y , 
differs substantially between the two possible treatm ents m entioned by D. B. Rubin 
(1986)—some hypothetical treatm ent that changes the sex-determining chromosomes
7 For the role of imagination in  defining causal effects, also see Imbens and Rubin (2015, 
p. 4).
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Figure 2.2: Building on D. B. Rubin (1986), the stylized DAG in panel (a) shows two 
versions of the causal effect of being male instead of being female—some 
hypothetical treatm ent that changes the sex-determining chromosomes from 
XX to XY at conception, DC  , versus changing a job application so that the 
applicant appears to be male instead of female, DA  —on starting wages, Y .
The total causal effect of DC  on Y is made up of two indirect effects:
D e DA Y  and De M  Y , where M  could be productivity. The total
causal effect of DA on Y is simply the direct effect DA Y . The
chronological order inherent to the DAG is highlighted by time points t1 , t2 , 
a n d t3 . Panel(b)show saslightlym orecom plexscenariow ithanadditional 
covariate, Z , that shares an unobserved common cause with D e  and affects 
M and, thus, Y .
from  XX to XY at conception, D C  , versus changing a job application so that the appli­
cant appears to be m ale instead of female, D A  . The related counterfactual questions
might then be the following: What would have been the starting wage o f a female em­
ployee, had she been a male all her life? in  case we were interested in  the effect of D C  . 
In co n tras t,fo rth ecau sa le ffec to fD A ,th e q u e s tio n m ig h tre a d Whatwouldhavebeen 
thestartingwageofafemaleemployee,hadsheappearedtobeamaleonthejobapplication 
form?
Now that the alternative causal states for the causal effects of both D C  and DA  
arem oreclearlysta ted ,theprob lem ofthefirstquestionbecom esm oreobvious(see  
pane l(a)o ffigu re2.2): U ndertheplausibleassum ptionthatsexisrandom lyassigned
at conception (Sobel, 1998, p. 335; VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012, p. 109; Gangl, 2010, 
p. 38), the effect of DC  on Y is not confounded by any variable such as parental edu­
cation or social class. Because productivity, M , and the information about the appli- 
can t'ssexonthejobapplicationform ,D A ,a reou tcom eso fD C ,w econ tro lfo rneither 
andthetotalcausaleffectofsexisdefinedandidentifiedbythem ereunadjustedw age 
difference between female and male employees. Certainly, this is neither equivalent 
tom yunderstand ingofd iscrim inationnorto theunderstand ingunderly ing thecon- 
ceptualizations in most contributions in the literature. In contrast, the second ques­
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tion, asking about the effect of DA  on Y , requires a  different identification strategy,
since there is an open backdoor path from DA to Y , namely D A D C M  Y  (see 
panel (a)offigure 2.2). Conditioning on M would blockthis backdoor path and, thus, 
identify the effect of DA on Y. Intuitively, the different strategies make sense: The 
estimate of the effect of sex information from the job application on the wage is bi­
ased, iffemale andm ale job applicants actuallyhave differentproductivitylevels that 
also determine their wages. However, when interested in the effect of a sex change 
at conception, any resulting differences in productivity would be part ofthe effect of 
the sex change treatm ent and should not be held constant.
W hether tru ly“immutable” ornot, the problem is virtuallythe same form ostchar- 
acteristics researchers in discrimination are typically interested in, such as race, eth­
nicity, immigrant background, but also measures of social class (background) and 
(parental) socioeconomic status. Since these variables are, in contrast to sex, not 
randomly assigned at conception, but are confounded with each other and further 
variables in determining productivity, the DAG in panel (b) offigure 2.2 is a more ap­
propriate, still highly stylized, depiction ofsuch a scenario. Let's say D C is a person's 
race at conception, DA is a racial signal on the job application—e.g., the applicants 
first name (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004)—, Y is the starting wage, M a person's 
productivity, andZ  am easure ofthe person's social class background. To identify the 
total e ffec to fD C on Y in the scenario in panel (b), Z needs to be conditioned on. As 
in panel (a), the total effect o fD C on Y is mediated through DA and M which is why 
conditioningon either ofthem  would bias the estimate ofthe total effectandis, thus, 
prohibited. However, to identify the effect of DA on Y, two backdoor paths need to
be blocked: DA D C M Y and DA D C <------ + Z  M Y. Blocking both
backdoor paths can be achieved either through conditioning on M or D C .8
Discrimination in education: The role of time in defining causal effects
Applyingthe foregoingdiscussion, stimulatedbyD. B. Rubin(1986), to discrimination 
in education is straightforward: The question What would have been the track recommen- 
dationatthe end of elementary schoolfora girl, had she been aboy instead? mighthave, at 
least, thefollowingreadings. First, itm ightaskforthecausaleffectofbeingconceived 
as aboyversus agirl. In this case, the question m ightbe rephrased word-to-word and
8 Interestingly, conditioning on Z is not necessary in  either case; note that, in  case we con­
dition on M only, we have to be sure that the only path from Z to Y is through M —if not, 
conditioning on Z or the interm ediate variable between Z and Y would be necessary to 
identify the causal effect of DA  on Y .
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read What would have been the track recommendation at the end of elementary school for 
a female student, had she been conceived as a male instead? —or, maybe even m ore vivid: 
What would have been the track recommendation at the end of elementary school for a female 
student, had she been a male all her life instead? Secondly, it might ask for the causal ef­
fect of being perceived as a boy versus a girl—through, for instance, some hypothetical 
and admittedly unrealistic perception changing experiment right before the teacher
forms and gives the track recom mendation. In  this case, the general question might
be rephrased to What would have been the track recommendation at the end of elemen­
tary school for a female student, had she been perceived to be a male student by the teacher 
instead?
Just like in  the example on wage discrimination, the answer to the first question is 
simply the unadjusted difference in  track recommendations between boys and girls: 
Being a boy instead of a girl since conception includes not only being born, but also 
being raised, educated, and socialized as a boy instead of as a girl, which, in  turn, 
possibly results in  different distributions of track recommendations by sex or, for 
that matter, gender. Put differently, conceptualizing discrimination as total causal 
effect of sex, as in  this first question, means to equate discrimination with uncondi­
tional inequality. To answer the second question, a more sophisticated identification 
strategy would be needed: If it is true that boys and girls are raised, educated, and 
socialized differently by their parents, teachers, and society as a whole and that these 
differences—in,e.g.,cognitiveandnoncognitiveskills—affectthedistributionoftrack 
recommendations, conditioning on them  would be necessary to identify the causal 
effectofinterest. In th isscenario ,d iscrim ination is no longerequatedw ith uncondi­
tional inequality but much closer to what is typically m eant by discrimination in  the 
literature (e.g., Blank et al., 2004; Quillian, 2006).
To sum up, simply rejecting the notion that causation requires m anipulation and 
instead defining discrimination as the causal effect of attributes such as sex or race, 
doesnotstrikem easastraightforw ardsolutiontotheproblem ofhow toconceptualize 
discrimination within a framework of counterfactual causality. For sex or gender but 
evenm oresoforrace,im m igrationbackground,orsocialclass,sim plecounterfactual 
questions like “What would have happened to a nonwhite individual if he or she had 
beenwhite?” (B lanke ta l.,2004,p .7 7 )a re  justnotprecise enough—m ainlysince they 
ignore the issue of timing of treatm ent assignment—and, thus, do not seem to be so 
“perfectlysensible” (Gangl,2010)aftera ll. Therefore,Iw illnotadoptsuchdefinitions 
in  this study.
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Ceteris paribus terminology
Sometimes, some kind of ceteris paribus terminology is used in  defining discrimina­
tion as causal effect. Take, for example, Quillian (2006, p. 302)'s definition of racial 
discrimination:
Discrimination isthe  causal effect of race on an outcome w ithother factors 
held constant. (Quillian, 2006, p. 302)
Or, as another and even m ore prom inent example, take Heckman (1998), who refers 
to the special cases of racial and gender discrimination:
[...] discrimination is said to arise if an  otherwise identical person is treated
differently by virtue of that person’s race or gender, and race andgender by them­
selves have no direct effect on productivity. Discrimination is a causal effect 
defined by a hypothetical ceteris paribus conceptual experiment—varying 
race but keeping all else constant. (Heckman, 1998, p. 102)
While the ceteris paribus-like phrases are probably m eant to clarify things, they really 
don't. First, they do not solve theproblem  ofcarefully describing the alternative causal 
states. In fact, both definitions are perfectly compatible with sex o rrace  being m anip­
ulated at conception or birth but also with the notion of manipulating signaled or per­
ceived sex or race. Secondly, ceteris paribus-like phrases might have several meanings 
(Hausman, 1988): Adding ceteris paribus might m ean to convey that SUTVA holds or 
that except for the treatm ent, other things (ceteris) are assumed to be equal (paribus) 
at the time of treatm ent assignment—but not, of course, thereafter (for discussions of 
the asymmetric nature of the ceteris paribus phrase see, e.g., Hausman, 1988, p. 313; 
Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 12, 205). In this case, the phrase is redundant, since this is pre- 
ciselyhow individualtotalcausaleffectsaredefined. Alternatively,Quillian(2006)and  
Heckman (1998) may just want to stress that they are interested in the direct effect, not 
the total effect, of race and gender or sex. While this would be a rather vague way of 
doing so and might not be why Heckman (1998), Quillian (2006) use these phrases, I 
do indeed suggest that both are interested in conceptualizing discrimination as a di­
rect effect. Before I discuss the problems of such conceptualizations below, I take a 
closer look at Heckman (1998)'s definition, since it features a noteworthy constraint: 
The effect of race or gender on productivity is assumed to be zero.
This is reflected in figure 2.3, where there is no arrow from  D, representing race or 
gender, on P , representing productivity. This way, Heckman (1998) provides a very 
narrow definition of discrimination—m ore narrow are only those definitions that re­
strict discrimination to acts that intentionally harm  individuals or groups (Quillian,
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Figure 2.3: A DAG visualizing Heckman (1998,  p . 102)'s definition of discrimination: Race
or gender, D , directly affect how the individual's wage, Y , is set by the 
employer. Race and gender have no direct effect on productivity, P , that, of 
course, determines the wage.
2006, p. 300). Heckman (1998) probably—but not explicitly—seeks to rule out statisti- 
caldiscrimination(see, e.g., Aigner&Cain, 1977) andlim ithisdefin itionto  what, since 
Becker (1957/1971), is known as taste discrimination (also see Heckman & Siegelman, 
1993, forasim ilarposition). Heckm an(1998) surelyknow sthatthere are directeffects 
of both race and gender on productivity, or—at the very least—confounding variables 
that induce an association of race and gender with productivity. Therefore, I read his 
definition as an analytical statement, n o tan  empirical one. However, as afoundation 
for further efforts in identifying and estimating discrimination, such a strategy does 
notappear very useful to me and, thus, I will notadoptH eckm an (1998)'s definition.
Discrimination as direct effect
One potential solution to the problem of conceptualizing discrimination as total ef­
fect of variables that are assigned very early in life—e.g., sex at conception—is to de­
fine discrimination as the direct effect of such variables. Based on the legal definition 
of discrimination in the US, Pearl (2001, 2009, 2014), Pearl et al. (2016), for instance, 
conceptualize discrimination explicitly as direct effect. Pearl et al. (2016) put it this 
way:
Suppose, forexample, we w anttoknow w hetherandto  w hatdegreeacom - 
panydiscrim inatesbygender(X )initshiringpractices(Y ). Suchdiscrim- 
ination would constitute a direct effect of gender on hiring, which is illegal in 
many cases. However, gender also affects hiring practices in other ways; 
often, for instance, women are more or less likely to go into a particular 
fieldthan men, o rto  have achievedadvanceddegrees in thatfield. So gen­
der may also have an indirect effect on hiring through the mediating vari­
able of qualifications (Z). (Pearl e ta l., 2016, p. 76, my emphasis.)
Obviously, this definition suffers from the same imprecision in articulating the alter-
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(a)
Figure 2.4: The DAG in panel (a) shows the model by Pearl et al. (2016): Gender, X ,
affects hiring, Y , directly but also indirectly through qualifications, Z . The
direct effect, X  Y , is what constitutes discrimination according to Pearl
et al. (2016). The DAG in panel (b) shows a slightly more complex mediation 
model with an additional mediator, W  . Adding W  to the model changes the 
substantive content of the direct effect of gender on hiring, X Y, and, thus,
thedefin itiono fd iscrim inationasg ivenbyP earle ta l.(2016).
native causal states as the definitions in  the section above: It is not clear what the 
treatm ent is supposed to be exactly and when it is meant to occur—maybe “some hy­
pothetical 'at conception X to Y chromosome treatm ent”' (D. B. Rubin, 1986, p. 962)? 
But then sex would have been the m ore appropriate term  than gender, wouldn't it? We 
are certainly not talking about “replacing an  'F' with an 'M' on a job application form” 
(D. B. Rubin, 1986, p. 962), since such a m anipulation, obviously, does not affect the 
actual qualifications. Now, to be fair, Pearl et al. (2016) do not intend to contribute sub­
stantively to the literature on discrimination. I discuss their definition mainly because 
it is—in sharp contrast to the definitions in  most substantive contributions—rather ex­
plicit about the direct effect conceptualization of discrimination.
In  principle, figure 2.4 features the same setup as figure 2.1 above. The simple 
mediation model depicted in  panel (a) of figure 2.4 shows the conceptualization by 
Pearl et al. (2016, figure 3.11): Gender, X  , affects hiring, Y , directly but also indirectly
through qualifications, Z . The direct effect, X  Y , is what constitutes discrimina­
tion according to Pearl et al. (2016). However, such a definition is problematic, be­
cause the substantive meaning ofdirect effects depends on all other variables in the 
model. First, changing Z changes the substantive meaning of X  Y and, thus, the 
definitionofdiscrimination. W ithregardto discrimination in hiring, Z m ightalso be 
productivity. W ithregardtodiscrim inationintrackrecom m endationsattheendofel- 
ementaryschool, X  m ightbethesocialclassbackgroundofthestudents, andZ could  
be educational achievement. But since the definition of Pearl et al. (2016) does not 
provide any general rule for choosing Z appropriately in different contexts, it might 
as well be argued to be something else.
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Secondly, adding a mediating variable to the model also changes X  Y . Let's say, 
W  in panel (b) of figure 2.4 is job interview performance. Then, the direct effect of 
X  on Y  no longer captures but is conditional on the differences between men and 
women in job interview performance. This might actually be seen as a more appro­
priate definition of discrimination in hiring, but without a general definition of what 
is m eant by discrimination, it is not clear how to argue in favor of changing the defi­
nition from X Y in panel (a) to X  Y in panel (b). The same problem occurs in a 
study on social class discrimination in education. Say, we add to educational achieve­
ment, Z, parental support, W , then we face the same problem: We have no general 
definition of discrimination and, hence, no general rule to decide whether parental 
support should be hold constant or not. So, while we might accept the DAG in panel 
(a)o ffigure2 .4asausefu ldefin itionofgenderorsexd iscrim ination inh iring ,itdoes 
notprovideanansw erto thequestionofhow todefinediscrim inationm oregenerally  
nordoesitprovideasolu tion to theproblem ofhow todefinediscrim ination inpartic- 
ular situations other than hiring discrimination—for instance, discrimination in track 
recom m endationsorgradingattheendofelem entaryschoolinG erm any.
In conclusion, a definition of discrimination as direct effect is only as general as 
the description of what constitutes the indirect effect(s). The most widely suggested 
general concept for such a definition is merit—similar, but certainly neither equiva­
lent to qualifications or productivity nor to educational achievement without further 
arguments. Definitions of discrimination as unequal treatm ent conditional on merit 
Id iscussbe low insec tion2.4.4. Theyhaveseveralproblem sandlim itations;them a- 
jorproblem isthatthey ,too ,cannotbedevelopedw ithoutreferencetocontexts—e.g., 
laborm arket,educationsystem s—andd ifferen tvariab lesthatm ayorm ayno tbepart 
of merit in particular and of the model in general. For all the reasons given in this 
section,Iw illnotadoptconceptualizationsofdiscrim inationasdirecteffect.
2.3.3 Perceptions, Beliefs, Information, and Signals
To circumvent the problems associated with causal effects of seemingly immutable 
characteristics such as race or sex when defining discrimination, some authors have 
turned to perceptions of (Fienberg & Haviland, 2003; Greiner & Rubin, 2010), beliefs 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009, p. 5) and information (Berk, 2004, p. 96) about, or signals (M. 
Sen&W asow,2016)sen tby thecharacteristicso fin terest.
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Manipulability & well-defined causal questions
While I find D. B. Rubin (1986) to be the first to suggest that sex discrimination could 
be conceptualized as causal effect of an  information or signal by “replacing an 'F ' with 
an 'M' on a job application form” (D. B. Rubin, 1986, p. 962), Greiner and Rubin (2010, 
p. 776) credit Fienberg and Haviland (2003) with being the first to explicitly discuss 
discrimination as causal effect of perceptions. In  a section of their comm ent on Pearl 
(2003) entitled “What is discrimination?”,  Fienberg and Haviland (2003) write:
Discrimination is usually taken to m ean the differential treatm ent of indi­
viduals based on a perceived characteristic or group m embership. (Fien- 
berg & Haviland, 2003, p. 319)
Fienberg and Haviland (2003) turn  to perceptions and information for defining dis­
crimination as a causal effect, since only at this level, so they argue, seemingly im­
mutable characteristics, also called “concomitant variables” (Freedman, 2004, p. 283; 
Fienberg & Haviland, 2003, p. 319), such as sex or race are manipulable—be it through 
randomly allocated perceptions of different characteristics or by making information
about a particular characteristic available versus not available.9
Berk (2004, pp. 82-84, 90-97), too, requires causes to be manipulable variables that 
can be changed by intervention and does not see attributes such as race or gender as 
such variables. His solution is essentially the same as in D. B. Rubin (1986), Fienberg 
and Haviland (2003), namely
[...] to reformulate the intervention so that causal effects make sense. In 
the case of race, for instance, one can manipulate information aboutrace, 
ifno trace itself. Thus, ajob applicationcouldbe doctoredtoshow thatthe 
job applicant was white or black. (Berk, 2004, p. 96)
In a similar vein, Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 5) define discrimination as causal ef­
fects of beliefs to enable precise causal questions that could potentially be answered 
by an experiment:
[T]he issue economists care m ostaboutin  the realm ofrace andsex, labor 
market discrimination, turns on whether someone treats you differently 
because they believe you to be black or white, male or female. (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009, p. 5, their emphasis)
9 For the question who is to credit with with what exactly, it seems noteworthy that Fienberg 
and Haviland (2003) cite a working paper version of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) from 
2003 as an  example of such a strategy; they do not cite D. B. Rubin (1986).
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In  their introduction to Counterfactuals and Causal Inference, Morgan and Winship 
(2015) rely on perceptions in their definition of discrimination, to show that objec­
tions to the counterfactual approach are often misguided:
[I]f discrimination is the topic of study, the attributes of individuals do not 
need to be manipulated, only the perception of them  by potential discrim­
inators. (Morgan & Winship, 2015, p. 440)
Also in  Pearl et al. (2016) can be found an account of defining discrimination as the 
causal effect of perceptions. The authors discuss an example of discrimination in 
hiring on the basis of sexual orientation in which “Y stands for Mary's hiring, and X 
stands for the interviewer's perception of Mary's sexual orientation” (Pearl et al., 2016, 
p. 114). They then stress that
[X ] is the interviewer's perception of Mary's sexuality orientation, not the 
orientation itself, because an  intervention on perception is quite simple in 
this case—we need only to imagine that Mary never m entioned that she is 
gay. (Pearl et al., 2016, p. 114, their emphasis)
In sum, straightforward manipulability and well-defined causal questions are the two ar­
guments brought forward most often by authors from the causal effects literature to 
turntoperceptionsorbeliefsindefiningcausaleffectsofso-calledim m utablecharac- 
teristics such sex or race in general and in defining discrimination in particular (An- 
grist & Pischke, 2009; Berk, 2004; Fienberg & Haviland, 2003).
However, both arguments have their downsides: First, it has been argued that the 
manipulability of perceptions might not be so straightforward after all. Indeed, per­
ceptions and beliefs are within the mind of the perceiver and, thus, neither directly 
observable nordirectlym anipulable (Greiner&Rubin, 2010, p.779;M .Sen&W asow, 
2016, p. 509). Relatedly, manipulations of perceptions do not always seem to be more 
realistic than manipulations of, for example, chromosomes. Therefore, M. Sen and 
Wasow (2016) suggest to turn  away from perceptions to cues and signals—instead of, 
for instance, “perceived race”, they suggest to investigate the causal effects of racial 
cues or signals.
Secondly, well-defined questions, or, synonymously, the fine articulation of causal 
states (Morgan & Winship, 2015, p. 38) does not hinge upon defining discrimination 
as the causaleffectofperceptions, beliefs, orsignals, fo rtha tm atter. Infact, concep­
tualizations that rely on interventions at conception may be very precise—albeit un­
realistic. So, straightforward manipulability and well-defined causal questions alone 
do not warrant a turn  to either perceptions and beliefs or signals (M. Sen & Wasow, 
2016).
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Essentialist versus constructivistic views
A slightly less technical but m ore substantive argument in  support of a tu rn  from “im­
mutable characteristics” such as sex or race to perceptions of such variables in  defin­
ing discrimination, is that the “immutable characteristics” view of race or sex would 
imply a “biological definition” (Greiner & Rubin, 2010, p. 776) of or a “primordialist 
or essentialist” (M. Sen & Wasow, 2016) perspective on these characteristics. M. Sen 
and Wasow (2016), who focus on race, contrast this view with a  constructivist frame­
work “in which race is conceptualized as a complex, socially constructed identity with 
many mutable facets” (M. Sen & Wasow, 2016, p. 500). They argue that a  constructivist 
perspective is superior to an essentialist perspective since
Conceptualizingrace and ethnicity in constructivistterm sallowsrace to be 
disaggregated into constitutive elements, some of which can be m anipu­
lated experimentally or changed through other types of interventions. (M.
Sen & Wasow, 2016, p. 500)
This way, the constructivist approach would, in  contrast to the essentialist approach, 
allow to integrate seemingly immutable characteristics into the potential outcomes or 
counterfactual model of causality.
I agree with some im portant qualifications: While, of course, one has to allow that 
race is signaled and perceived in  ways that allow prejudice, stereotypes, and other 
cognitive and affective mechanisms to work on the perception, it is by no m eans nec­
essary to ignore or deny biological or genetic differences between hum an races (e.g, 
in skin pigmentation)—unless, of course, the definition of “race” refers to social and 
cultural dimensions only. Also, asking for the causal effect of an  intervention at con­
ception does not imply the assumption that cultural and social forces do not affect 
the outcome of interest, including the social construction and perception of a group 
of people. Note that both the discussion and my critique do apply for sex or gen­
der, respectively. However, social class, a  dimension of stratification and inequality 
I also care about in this study, is different and while it does not make any sense to 
conceptualize social class as a  biologically fixed entity, it is, conversely, by no means 
necessary—and, actually, rather uncomm on—to exclusively ask for the causal effect 
of perceptions of social class.
Total versus direct effects
That defining discrimination via perceptions may also solve the total effect problem 
discussed above is also an  argum ent made in several contributions (Greiner & Rubin,
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2010; M. Sen & Wasow, 2016; VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012). Unfortunately, most au­
thors do notspecify the kind ofeffect—total or direct—ofperceived characteristics or 
signals when defining discrimination. Since it is the default causal effect, I suppose, 
most o fthem  mean the total effect o fan  intervention that changes the signal or per­
ception. Interestingly, VanderWeele andH ernan (2012), forexample, explicitlydefine 
discrimination as direct effect ofperceptions:
Discrimination, on the other hand, is essentially the direct effect of sex 
controlling for all other variables at the time in which sex is perceived. 
(VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012, pp. 109-110)
However, adirecteffectconceptualizationofperceptionsseem stobeevenm ore prob­
lematic than direct effect conceptualizations of attributes treated as immutable. In 
case ofperceptions, astraightforward question to askandexam ine would be whether 
the perceivers'prejudices orstereotypes mediate the effectofperceptions on the out­
come. Now, ife ither or both variables would be included in such an analysis—to con­
trol for “all other variables” (VanderWeele & Hernan, 2012, p. 110)—the remaining 
direct effect of perceptions on whatever outcome would be net of the effect that is 
mediated by these variables—but would this direct effect really be an unbiased esti­
mate of what we think of as discrimination? Probably not. In general, all arguments 
against direct effect conceptualizations from above apply and, therefore, I will cer- 
tainlynotdefine discrimination as the directeffectofperceptions, beliefs, or signals, 
respectively.
Conclusion or towards a useful definition of discrimination as a causal effect
While definitions of discrimination that rely on perceptions and beliefs are a con­
siderable improvement over more traditional and imprecise definitions, they, too, 
have limitations. In fact, it could be argued that their major limitation resembles the 
manipulability problem the traditional definitions are accused of suffering from. If 
perceptions and beliefs are conceptualized as treatments, the relevant treatm ent lies 
within the mind ofthe perceiver and is, thus, neither directlyobservable nor directly 
manipulable (Greiner & Rubin, 2010, p. 779; M. Sen & Wasow, 2016, p. 509). This is 
not true for signals or, more generally, information. Another limitation of defining 
discrimination viaperceptions or beliefs butalso signals andinform ation is thatsuch  
definitions do not by themselves assure that they make more substantive sense than 
traditional definitions relying on so-called immutable characteristics. For example, 
direct effect conceptualizations ofdiscrim ination as causal effect ofperceptions, be-
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liefs, signals, or information suffer from the the same problem as other direct effect 
conceptualizations.
However, there are im portant advantages: While I think that the manipulability 
problem of so-called immutable characteristics could in  many cases be solved by a 
little m ore imagination, the argum ent that causal effects of perceptions, signals, and 
the like, are easier to define is certainly true. This is particularly true for signals and 
information. Now, the major advantage of definitions of discrimination that rely on 
perceptions, beliefs, signals, or information is that they are substantively meaningful 
definitions even whenconceptualized in term s of the preferred total effect. To m e, this 
is the key argument for preferring definitions that feature perceptions, beliefs, signals, 
or information as treatm ents over traditional definitions relying on direct effects of 
so-called immutable characteristics or rather imprecise definitions such as those by 
Blank et al. (2004) and Quillian (2006) cited above. For reasons given above, I prefer 
definitions of discrimination that conceptualize signals or information as treatm ent 
over those that rely on perceptions and beliefs.
Based on the discussion in  section 2.3, I propose the following general definition of 
discrimination: Discrimination is the causal effect of an information about or a signal sent 
out by an individual on how this individual is treated by another individual. Obviously, 
based on this definition, any hum an decision that distinguishes between individuals 
or groups of individuals constitutes discrimination. While this seems to be a limita­
tion, it really is not. Certainly, the general definition can only be a starting point of any 
study of discrimination; what the researcher has to do, is to specify which information 
or signal is of interest and, thus, which special type of discrimination is under study. 
In the present study, I am  interested in discrimination by teachers based on infor­
mation about students' ethnicity, social class, and sex—also known as ethnic discrim­
ination, social class discrimination and sex or gender discrimination. Defining these 
special forms of discrimination requires to adapt the general definition accordingly.
In the case of ethnic discrimination, the definition would read: Ethnic discrimination
is the causal effect o f an ethnic information about or an ethnic signal sent out by an individ­
ual on how thisindividual is treated byanotherindividual. As soon as there is a causal 
effect of an ethnic signal on the treatm ent of an  individual by another individual, for
example the treatm ent of a student by a teacher, there is ethnic discrimination. 
Above I frequently referred to counterfactual questions as a tool to understand
causal effects. My general definition of discrimination requires the following coun­
terfactual question to be answered: How would an individual, i,  have treated another 
individual, j, had an information about or a  signal s sent by individual j been different? 
To establish discrimination, this question needs to be answered with “differently”,
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which only highlights how general the definition is. To establish a  particular type of 
discrimination, it has to be specified which information or signal s is of interest and 
which are the alternative causal states under investigation. In  case of ethnic discrimi­
nation, the general question might be rephrased as follows: How would an  individual, 
i, have treated another individual, j,  had signal s sent by individual j signaled a  Turkish 
background instead of German background? Note further that under this definition 
any special form of discrimination cannot occur in  the absence of the corresponding 
information or signal and such a form of discrimination cannot be established with­
out variation in  s.  Ethnic discrimination, for example, cannot occur in  the absence of 
an  ethnic information or signal and it cannot be established without variation in the 
ethnic nature of the signals sent by individuals.
I would like to conclude with an  example from  discrimination in education and a 
rem inder: Decisions by teachers that disadvantage a single student or a  group of stu­
dents of particular ethnic background in  the aggregate are not necessarily an example 
of ethnic discrimination. Instead, this may very well constitute social class discrimi­
nation, for example, or, really, discrimination based on m erit, achievement, or per­
formance. That these different forms of discrimination are judged rather differently 
in  contemporary societies should be obvious. How to judge these and other forms of 
discrimination cannot be answered using m ethods empirical social scientists have at 
their disposal.
2.4 Other Conceptualizations of Discrimination in the Social Sciences 
and Beyond
2.4.1 Discrimination at the Individual Versus Group Level
In  chapter 1 I have argued that there are two major reasons for studying discrimina­
tion: First, many forms of discrimination—for instance, by virtue of a person's race 
or ethnicity, gender, or social class—“violate our society's sense of fairness” (Holzer 
& Ludwig, 2003, p. 1148). Secondly, discrimination is often motivated as a potential 
explanation for disparities and inequalities between different societal groups. I ar­
gue that these motivations relate to a distinction highlighted mainly by economists, 
namely the distinction between discrimination at the individual level and discrimination 
at the group level (Heckman, 1998, p. 102).
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Becker (1957/1971): Individual versus market discrimination
Heckman (1998) credits Becker (1957/1971) with being the first to observe that indi­
vidual discrimination does not necessarily aggregate to what has been called market
discrimination (Becker, 1957/1971, pp. 17-18, 43-45, 84-100):
It was Becker's (1957) insight to observe finding a discriminatory effect of 
race or gender at a randomly selected firm does not provide an accurate 
measure of the discrimination that takes place in the market as a whole. 
(Heckman, 1998, p. 102)
W hether and to what extent individual preferences of, for instance, employers turn 
into discriminatory behavior and aggregate to market discrimination against a par­
ticular group of minority workers, in turn, depends on multiple market forces and 
conditions. According to Becker (1957/1971), the most im portant factors are the size 
ofthem inoritygroupandthedistributionandthevalenceofem ployers'preferences— 
not the preferences “of an average or 'representative' employer” (Becker, 1957/1971, 
p. 43). Becker (1957/1971)'s arguments are nicely summarized by Heckman (1998):
The impact of market discrimination is not determined by the most dis- 
crim inatoryparticipantsin the market, oreven bythe average levelofdis- 
crimination among firms, but rather by the level of discrimination at the 
firms where ethnic minorities or women actually end up buying, working 
and borrowing. (Heckman, 1998, p. 102)
While this might seem to be a trivial insight, it is fundamental for designing, conduct­
ing, and analyzing data from audit and correspondence studies—but usually ignored 
(Heckman, 1998).
Note that Becker (1957/1971)'s discussion is not concerned with the conditions of 
how individual preferences turn into behavior. The insight that prejudice and dis- 
crim inationare two d ifferentth ingsandthatprejudicedactorsdo notnecessarilydis- 
criminate according to their prejudices is much older (LaPiere, 1934; Merton, 1949) 
(also see section 2.2.1). What Becker (1957/1971) adds is a systematic and formal dis­
cussion of discrimination in the market as a whole. For this, he certainly deserves 
credit. I will talk about Becker (1957/1971)'s theory of taste discrimination and how 
it applies to education in more detail below in chapter 3. How the insights by Becker 
(1957/1971) affect the design of experimental studies on discrimination I discuss in 
chapter 6.
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Individual and group discrimination in models of statistical discrimination
In  contrast to Becker (1957/1971), who argues that not every actor who would discrimi­
nate in principle also gets the opportunity to do so, Aigner and Cain (1977) show that in 
some models of statistical discrimination individual discrimination that actually takes 
place does not aggregate to group discrimination, which
.. .in labor markets is evident when the average wage of a group is not pro­
portional to its average productivity. (Aigner & Cain, 1977, p. 178)
Now, following statistical discrimination theory, employers lack perfect knowledge 
aboutthe true productivity, q ,o fa  candidate and,therefore,constructaw eighted av­
erage of observed individual performance, y, and group productivity, a, to come up 
with an estimate, q:
q =  (1 -  Y)a +  Yy (2.4)
Ifthe observedperformance, y, isindeedan im perfec tm easureofthe  true productiv­
ity, q—i.e., ifY <  1—andadiffersbetw eentw ogroups, AandB, sothat, e.g., a A  >  a B , 
candidates who are (or, as I would like to add based on the discussion in section 2.3.3, 
appearto be) members ofgroup Bwill estim atedto be oflow erproductivitythan had 
they been (or appeared to be) members of group A. Clearly, this is an account of dis­
crimination as an individual-level causal effect by virtue of membership in group A 
versus B.
However, note that both groups, A and B, will—on average—be paid according to 
average productivityas longasthe  decisionm akergets a A and a B right and some ad-
ditionalassum ptionshold(Aigner&Cain, 1977), sinceE[(1-Y )a+Y y] =  a. Thatis, as 
longasdecision m akersrelyoncorrectbliefsaboutaverage groupproductivity, there 
is no group discrimination in the sense of Aigner and Cain (1977). So, even if every 
individual member ofgroup B suffers from individual discrimination in the sense of 
acausal effectas describedabove, the group as awhole will no tbe disadvantaged.
While to some, this result might still be counterintuitive and the assumption that 
employers hold correct beliefs about the average productivity of different groups 
might seem strong, the discussion in Aigner and Cain (1977) shows that it is not nec­
essary to turn to market forces to find that individual discrimination is not equiva- 
lentw ithgroup discrimination—thatis, adisadvantage on the group level. Therefore, 
Aigner and Cain (1977)'s discussion certainlyadds to Becker (1957/1971)'s insightthat 
explaininginequalitythroughdiscrim inationiseverythingbutstraightforward. Ipro- 
vide a more elaborate discussion of different models of statistical discrimination in 
section 3.1.2.
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Group discrimination or inequality?
I find the distinction between individual discrimination and group discrimination to 
be crucial for all researchers who study inequality between groups. To explain in­
equality through discrimination, it is necessary that individual discrimination aggre­
gates to group discrimination. However, group discrimination should not be confused 
with inequality. These phenom ena, albeit related, are not equivalent and the exis­
tence or direction of one of them  does not say anything about the existence or direc­
tion of the other. Obviously, it is possible that there is no group discrimination but 
inequality between groups. This is just a different way of stating the obvious: There 
are other causes of inequality between groups than discrimination.
Maybe less obvious on first sight is that group discrimination does not necessar­
ily lead to inequality between groups. An example for such a scenario would be a 
successful affirmative action policy, where group discrimination against group A off­
sets inequality that initially existed to the disadvantage of group B but wasn't due to 
discrimination against group B. Following the same logic, it is certainly also possible 
that there is group discrimination against group A but inequality to the disadvantage 
of group B. This happens, for instance, when affirmative action policies that discrimi­
nate against group A are not successfully equalizing the disadvantage of group B that, 
again, was not due to discrimination against group B.
2.4.2 Definitions of Discrimination Based on Group Membership
Defining discrimination as differential treatm ent of individuals based on their group 
m em bership instead of their individual characteristics is quite common. Take this 
definition by Levin and Levin (1982, p. 51):
Discrimination can be defined as differential or unequal treatm ent of the 
m em bers of some group or category on the basis of their group member­
ship rather than on the basis of their individual qualities.
In the same vein, Allport (1954, pp. 51-52) explicitly rules out individual qualities as 
causesofdiscrim ination: “D ifferentialtreatm entbasedonindividualqualitiesproba- 
b lyshouldnotbeclassedasdiscrim ination”. M oreexam plesofdefinitionsofdiscrim - 
ination in reference to group membership can be found in Allport (1954), Dovidio et 
al. (2010), Fishbein (2002), Nelson (2006), and others.
While, again, conceptualizations of discrimination often refer to group member­
ship, I suggest that such an approach is actually not very helpful. The key argument 
here is that “[a]ll individual characteristics define groups” (England & Lewin, 1989,
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p. 241). This also applies to characteristics that determ ine or are correlated with what 
is called, among others, m erit, productivity, or achievement—e.g., test scores (Aigner 
& Cain, 1977; England & Lewin, 1989). Proponents of definitions of discrimination 
based on group m em bership typically see such characteristics as individual. How­
ever, and as England and Lewin (1989) argue, individuals with the same or similar 
“individual” characteristics could always be grouped according to this characteristic. 
An individual student that scores beyond average on a  particular achievement test be­
longs to the group of students that score beyond average on that test. An individual 
student that has completed a  particular extracurricular activity in  school belongs to 
the group of students that completed this extracurricular activity. And so on. But not 
only do all individual characteristics define groups, also can all group characteristics 
be reduced to individual characteristics—just take the examples of skin color and reli­
gion, which are, under such definitions of discrimination, typically considered to be 
group characteristics: As a m atter of fact, the color of an individual's skin is this indi­
vidual's skin color as the religious beliefs of an individual are this individual's religious 
beliefs. And so on.
However, I am  not arguing that the act of discriminating between two individu­
als based on whatever characteristic is unrelated to the distinction of individual and 
group. In  fact, I suggest that both the act of discriminating and research on discrimi­
nation alike rely on this distinction and, in  particular, on the group concept or, m ore 
broadly, the concepts of category and categorization. I discuss different mechanisms 
of why and how people discriminate in  general and on particular grounds in  particu­
lar in m ore detail in  chapter 3. Here, I only want to briefly point to the importance of 
the act of categorizing or grouping people for how they are treated: Stereotypes and 
prejudice, key determ inants of discriminatory behavior and connected to groups of 
people by definition, are themselves—i.e., their contents as well as their application— 
influenced by the perception of whether or not we see ourselves and others as part 
of particular groups or not (see, e.g., Bless et al., 2004; Bless & Schwarz, 2010; Fiske, 
1993b; Fiske et al., 1999; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986, among many other contributions from research in  social cognition).
Put differently, how individuals are categorized based on the characteristics they 
possess determines how they are treated. This is, because, according to the research 
in  social cognition cited above, the hum an brain links these categories to knowledge 
and expectations, that is, stereotypes, schemata, scripts—as well as to affects and emo­
tions, that is, prejudice. And while virtually all theories of discrimination rely on the 
notion of group m em bership, the definition of the phenom enon that they seek to ex­
plain does not have to—and, as I argue, m ust not—rely on this concept.
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On the omnipresence of group information
One might even go so far as to doubt that any act of treating a person can be purely in­
dividual. While the input and, thus, the values on the variables used by the actor might 
only stem  from the target—i.e., no group averages or other aggregated information is 
used as a variable—the question of how to weight the different input factors seems 
virtually impossible to address without referring to group information or information 
that is aggregated over individuals, respectively.
Imagine, a  teacher wants to track students based on a calculation of success prob­
abilities on different secondary school tracks. Imagine further that the teacher has 
all the information at hand that, theoretically, would suffice to (almost) perfectly pre­
dict future success on different tracks. Now, the question is how the teacher weights 
the different factors or variables to calculate the probability. To m e it seems impos­
sible to do so without drawing on either personal experience with other students or 
other teachers' experiences with other students or other more or less correct knowl­
edge about what students that are similar or different to the student in question are 
capable of. Technically speaking, any model—be it a statistical model set up by a re­
searcher or an  unconscious m ental algorithm an actor's brain relies on—that is m eant 
to predict any outcome has to rely on data of m ore than just one unit to infer how data 
from individual level variables should be weighted. In  fact, formal models of discrim­
ination, such as statistical discrimination models (e.g., Aigner & Cain, 1977) are a nice 
case in  point: Decision makers only know when to turn  down group m eans and, thus, 
selecting candidates on “individual” information only, when they have information 
on the individual information's reliability that, in  tu rn , can only be calculated from 
group level or aggregate level data. In sum, the problem of imagining a judgment that 
does not contain any knowledge about groups is yet another reason, why—in a defi­
nition of discrimination—the distinction of individual and group characteristics does 
not seem very useful to m e.
But even if one does not share this fundamental skepticism laid out in the last para­
graphs, I think that the point against definitions of discrimination based on the dis­
tinction between individual and group characteristics has been convincingly made by 
England and Lewin (1989). Of course, sociologists that study discrimination are and 
will be interested in  discrimination by virtue of characteristics that form groups that 
are of societal or political relevance such as immigrants, racial or ethnic groups, social 
classes, or m en and women. This is because the analytical focus of sociology is on the 
collective level or m acro level, respectively. This, however, is no good reason to build 
a definition of discrimination around the group concept. In  sum , based on England 
and Lewin (1989), I argue that a definition of discrimination that relies on the dis-
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tinction between group characteristics and individual characteristics is meaningless 
and, thus, I will neither adopt such definitions, nor will I conceptualize discrimination 
based on this distinction.
2.4.3 Definitions of Discrimination Based on the Distinction Between 
Ascription and Achievement
Some authors tu rn  to the concepts of ascription and achievement to distinguish be­
tween non-discriminatory behavior and discriminatory behavior. England and Lewin 
(1989), for instance, call a treatm ent discriminatory if and only if it is based on “ascrip- 
tive group memberships” (p. 239) or “ascriptive statuses” (p. 241). Studies on discrim­
ination in German education have also built their definitions around the concept of 
ascription (Diehl & Fick, 2016; Kalter, 2003; Kristen, 2006a).
The history of the term s ascription and achievement dates back to Linton (1936) 
who coined them  in his anthropological “Study of Man”. He distinguished between 
“two types of statuses, the ascribed and the achieved” (Linton, 1936, p. 115):
Ascribed statuses are those which are assigned to individuals without ref­
erence to their innate differences or abilities. They can be predicted and 
trained for from  the m oment of birth . The achieved statuses are, as a min­
im um , those requiring special qualities, although they are not necessarily 
limited to these. They are not assigned to individuals from birth  but are 
left open to be filled through competition and individual effort. (Linton,
1936, p. 115, his emphasis)
The distinction was quickly picked up by sociologists—it became central to Parsons 
(1940, 1950)'s scheme and analysis of stratification, for example. Young (1958), to 
whom I will return  in  the next section, saw the turn  from  rewarding ascription to 
rewarding achievement as one major symptom and mechanism of the “Rise of the 
Meritocracy” in  the industrialized and m odern world.
Even though many sociologists have adopted it, I suggest that the distinction be­
tween ascription and achievement is not very fruitful in  research on discrimination 
and that definitions of discrimination should not be based on it. I think that the dis­
tinction does not clarify but rather confuse the situation: What does the distinction 
add to the general definition of discrimination I proposed above in  section 2.3.3? Typ­
ically, researchers would—using either definition—specify on the basis of which char­
acteristic or signal discrimination is m eant to occur. Using the general definition I ad­
vocate in  the present study, the researcher can just carry on, once this has been stated. 
However, the researcher that conceptualizes discrimination as differential treatm ent
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by virtue of ascribed characteristics only, has to make sure that the characteristic in 
question is truly ascribed. But which characteristic is truly ascribed, I would argue, is 
not always clear. Remarkably, most authors neither explain the distinction between 
ascribed and achieved characteristics nor do they cite a source that does—typically, ex­
amples of ascribed characteristics are provided (e.g., England & Lewin, 1989; Reskin, 
2003).
Take the example of attractiveness: In  the labor market there are certainly jobs for
which there are positive returns for attractiveness (e.g., Hamermesh & Biddle, 1993;
J^ger, 2011; Lopez Boo et al., 2013; Wong & Penner, 2016): A more attractive person 
m ightbe preferredoveralessattractive person inah iringprocesssince the employer 
know sthaton the positiontobe filledabeautifulpersonw ill, ceterisparibus, be more 
productive—e.g., because customers prefer to buy from more attractive sellers. Now, 
differencesinattractivenessarecertainlypartly“innatedifferences” andcanpartlybe 
achieved though individual effort—both are named by Linton (1936) as mechanisms 
of how achieved statuses are assigned. Also, the hiring process is competitive. Does 
that mean that attractiveness is an achieved characteristic? If yes, should this really 
be the reason for not calling this hiring process to constitute an example of discrimi­
nation by virtue of attractiveness in a particular labor market? What if attractiveness 
is not related to productivity but used by employers to distinguish among candidates 
nevertheless? Does that make it an ascribed characteristic? Or is it an ascribed char­
acteristic because i t i s “assignedto individuals from birth” (Linton, 1936), w hichis the 
definition ofascribedstatus thatm ightsim plybe usedto  define ascribedcharacteris- 
tics?
It seems clear to me that the term s ascription and achievement are typically used 
to suggest that some kind of inequality—for example, unequal treatm ent—is unfair or 
unjust because it is based on so called ascriptive characteristics. In contrast, differ­
ential treatm ent that is based on so called achievement is not called discrimination 
since it is considered fair, just, or at least not bad. However, quite obviously, such 
judgm entsare normative and, hence, shouldbe avoidedinan empiricalstudy. Incon­
clusion, I th in k th a tth e  distinctionbetweenascription andachievem entaddsnothing 
to the definition orem piricalstudyofdiscrim ination atall. Whywe studydiscrimina- 
tion on the basis of some characteristics more often than on the basis of others might 
certainly be linkedto value judgments in the society andtheir understanding of what 
constitutes fair and unfair processes or outcomes. However, to build a definition of 
discrimination around this distinction makes no sense to me.
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2.4.4 Definitions Based on Merit
Defining discrimination as unequal or differential treatm ent conditional on merit has 
a long history in  anti-discrimination law (DeSario, 2003; McCrudden, 1998) and has 
also found its way into the empirical social science literature (e.g., Driessen et al., 
2008). However, conceptualizing discrimination in  such a way bears the problem of 
having to define m erit. But how should m erit be defined? In  principle, this question is 
no different to thequestionofhow  to definediscrim ination. T hereisnotruedefinition 
of m erit, although, of course, there are historical and famous examples of what is 
m eant by m erit.
Young (1958), who is typically credited with coining the term  meritocracy, defined 
m erit as intelligence plus effort: “Intelligence and effort together make up m erit (I  +  
E  =  M )” (Young, 1958). But is this a complete definition? And how should m erit be 
distinguishedfrom, say, productivityinthelaborm arketorthelikelihoodofsuccessin 
the education system? Is the parental support that students from higher social classes 
receive to a greater extent and that makes them  m ore likely to pass exams with good 
grades part of their merit? According to Young (1958, p.94), probably not. Hence, for 
identifying discrimination defined as inequality conditional on m erit, we would have 
to condition on parental support, wouldn't we? Based on the approach I have taken 
and discussed extensively in  section 2.3 that focuses on the causal effect of behavior: 
Certainly not. However, other approaches might give affirmative answers. One is the 
institutional discrimination approach that I discuss in  greater detail in section 2.4.7 
below.
So, I second A. Sen (1999) in  his description of the problems of the term s m erit and 
meritocracy:
The idea of meritocracy may have many virtues, but clarity is not one of
them. The lack of clarity may relate to the fact [...] that the concept of 
“merit” isdeeplycontingenton our view sofa good society. (A. S en ,1999, 
p. 5)
This is a major problem that makes the term  m erit and, thus, a definition of dis­
crimination that is based on it, susceptible to redefining it for ideological and polit­
ical reasons—w hichispreciselyw hatpeople,includingscholars,tendto  do (Quillian, 
2006; Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). In conclusion, I object to definitions of discrimina­
tion based on m erit for the same reasons I object to definitions of discrimination as 
unfair treatm ent: They require normative judgments and facilitate normative inter- 
pretationsoffindingson discrimination. Such definitionsIw ill notadopt.
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2.4.5 Differential Treatment Versus Differential Impact
In their widely cited report, Blank et al. (2004) define discrimination as follows:
(1) differential treatment on the basis of race that disadvantages a  racial group 
and (2) treatment on the basis of inadequately justified factors other than race 
that disadvantages a racial group (differential effect). (Blank et al., 2004,
39, their italics)
Blank et al. (2004, pp. 39-42) further explain that both components of their definition 
a re“basedonbehaviorortreatm entthatdisadvantagesoneracialgroupoveranother” 
(p. 39). However, racial discrimination in the sense of the first component—i.e., differ- 
entialtreatment—”occursw henam em bero foneracia lg roup istreated lessfavorab le  
thanasim ilarlysituatedm em berofano therracialg roupandsuffersadverseornega- 
tiveconsequences” (p. 40). “Intentionaldiscrim inationofthiskind”,B lan k e ta l.(2004, 
p. 40) add, would typically be unlawful in the US in many areas such as employment, 
housing, and education.
The first component of this definition has similarities with definitions discussed 
above, namely the conceptualization of discrimination as ceteris paribus causal ef­
fect (Heckman, 1998), and also with the definition of racial discrimination as causal 
effectofraceinthecounterfactualsense—w hichisalsodiscussedbyB lanketal.(2004, 
chapter 5). However, I have issues with this first component and the way Blank et al. 
(2004) describe it. First, the authors confuse individual and group level, when they de­
pict discrimination as “differential treatm ent on the basis ofrace thatdisadvantages 
a racial group”, suggesting that a treatm ent does not count as discrimination when 
it does not disadvantage a group—as a whole or on average. As discussed in 2.4.1, 
however, discrimination on the individual level does not readily aggregate into dis- 
crim inationonthegrouplevel. In theircom m en tafte rw ardsthey referto“am em ber 
ofoneracialgroup” (p. 40)that“suffersadverseornegativeconsequences” (p. 40)but 
no longer to the whole group. Also, from their discussion ofstatistical discrimination 
(pp. 61-63) and discrimination as a causal effect (pp. 77-81), I conclude that they— 
in contrast to their definition—do not really restrict discrimination to treatm ent that 
necessarily results in a disadvantage on the group level.
Secondly,B lanketal.(2004)re ferto th e firs tco m p o n en to fth e ird e fin itio n as“[i]n- 
tentional discrimination” (p.40). Obviously, such a restriction would rule out many 
forms of discrimination that are unintentional in the sense that they are rooted in 
unconscious or implicit cognitive or motivational processes the actor is not aware of. 
However, when they discuss similarities and differences of their definition with the 
conceptualization of disparate treatm ent in US law and jurisprudence, they say that
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subtle forms of discrimination that are “perhaps unintentional” would “fall within the 
scope” of their definition (Blank et al., 2004, p. 41).
The second component—called differential effect discrimination by Blank et al. (2004, 
p. 39)—is related to what is known as disparate impact discrimination in  US law. I find 
this second component even m ore problematic than the first component, mainly for 
a reason discussed above in  section 2.2.3 and other sections: there is no scientific 
m ethod to determ ine what inadequately justified factors are—or, for that matter, what 
adequately justified factors are. Also, from  the discussion in  Blank et al. (2004) it is not 
clear to m e, what they suggest these factors are.
With regard to the second component, my conclusion from a social science per­
spective is that there are two alternatives of how to proceed: First, we dismiss the 
condition of “inadequately justified factors” and, thus, conceptualize differential ef­
fect discrimination as treatm ent on the basis of any factor other than the factor in 
question—e.g., race in  a study on racial discrimination; gender in  a study on gen­
der discrimination—that disadvantages a  m em ber of the group in  question (individ­
ual discrimination) or the group as a whole (group discrimination). Note that such 
a conceptualization would inevitably lead to a situation in which every employment 
or tracking decision would be an  instance of discrimination. Whatever m echanism  is 
implemented, discrimination would be the result as long as mem bers of a  particular 
group are preferred over m em bers of another group—for instance, because they per­
form better on a standardized test. Note that I have argued that this is indeed the most 
general conceptualization of discrimination—but not of racial discrimination—and, in 
fact, a  very useful point to start a discussion on how to conceptualize discrimination. 
However, it is not a  good point to end such a discussion. It is not, because, defined in 
this way, discrimination would not be different from  inequality between groups.
Secondly, we could forget about differential effect discrimination altogether and 
examine such processes under the label inequality. Eventually, from a  social science 
perspective, it really does not matter, whether we study such processes under the la­
bel discrimination or under the label inequality, since definitions “do nothing but in­
troduce new arbitrary shorthand labels; they cut a long story short” (Popper, 1945). 
However, it is in the long stories where our research interests lie.
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2.4.6 Disparate Treatment Versus Disparate Impact
To study the social scientific 
definition of discrimination, one 
must attend to  the legal 
definition of discrimination.
(Lucas, 2008)
The two components of the definition proposed by Blank et al. (2004)—differential
treatm ent and differential effect discrimination—discussed in  section 2.4.5 are based
on the concepts of disparate treatment discrimination and disparate impact discrimina­
tion as developed in US law and jurisprudence.
Section 703 of title VII of the Civil Rights Act from 1964 declares it “an unlawful 
employment practice” ...
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
term s, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ­
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would 
deprive o rte n d to  deprive anyindividual ofem ploym entopportunities or 
otherwise adverselyaffecthisstatusasanem ployee,because o fsu c h indi- 
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Disparate treatment discrimination in US law
US jurisprudence and legal scholars from the US have interpreted this section as 
declaring unlawful two different forms ofdiscrim ination, namely disparate treatment 
discrimination and disparate impact discrimination. The former, disparate treatm ent 
discrimination, has typically been interpreted by US courts as intentional discrimi­
nation that the defendant engages in consciously. Green (2003) summarizes what he 
calls “traditional disparate treatm ent theory” as follows:
Disparate treatm entdoctrine haslongbeenunderstoodto  require ashow- 
ing of intentional discrimination,  often defined in term s of conscious moti- 
vationtodiscriminate.  (G reen,2003, 113,myitalics)
In a similar vein, Krieger and Fiske (2006) summarize the underlying assumptions of 
antidiscrimination laws and the related jurisprudence as follows:
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In  num erous ways, antidiscrimination law reflects and reifies a common- 
sense theory of social perception and judgment that attributes disparate 
treatm ent discrimination to the deliberate, conscious, and intentional ac­
tions of invidiously motivated actors. (Krieger & Fiske, 2006, p. 1028)
These unrealistic assumptions about hum an cognition in  general and about the mech­
anisms of how stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination work in  particular have 
given rise to critique from social scientists and legal scholars alike (Greenwald & 
Krieger, 2006; Krieger, 1995; Krieger & Fiske, 2006; Oppenheimer, 1993). I second this 
critique, because neither social science nor legal definitions of discrimination should 
be based on false premises (also see my discussion in  section 2.4.5).
Disparate impact discrimination in US law
Disparate impact discrimination has been even m ore controversial than disparate treat­
m ent discrimination. Sometimes, sentence 2 cited above has been “identified as the 
source of the theory of disparate impact” (Rutherglen, 1987, p. 1300).
Disparate impact discrimination theory recognizes indirect or subconscious forms 
of discrimination that are not directly linked to an  employee's individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin but have nevertheless adverse consequences for em­
ployees with such characteristics. In  the 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the 
Supreme Court of the United States established the disparate impact doctrine that un­
der which it is prohibited to apply “facially neutral employment practices with a dis­
proportionately adverse effect on protected groups, even in the absence of discrim­
inatory intent” (DeSario, 2003, p. 480), “unless [the employer] can show a  business 
justification for those practices” (Peresie, 2009, p. 776).
Rutherglen (1987, p. 1297) sees disparate impact discrimination as “the single most 
im portant judicial contribution to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” and praises 
it—compared to a theory of intentional discrimination, that is disparate treatm ent 
discrimination—as “an objective theory of discrimination” (Rutherglen, 1987, p. 1298). 
Concerning the differential impact definition of discrimination by Blank et al. (2004), 
I have argued exactly the opposite in  section 2.4.5 above and will stick to my inter­
pretation. Rutherglen (1987) argues differently, since he compares disparate impact 
discrimination to disparate treatm ent discrimination in  the sense of intentional and 
conscious discrimination that “requires a finding about the defendant's state of mind” 
(p.1298). However, I have already rejected this reading of disparate treatm ent dis­
crimination as ignoring the reality of discriminatory treatm ent and I also cannot see 
how practices that have adverse effects can objectively be justified through methods
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available to empirical social scientists. Even legal scholars struggle over the question 
which practices are justified and which are not (see, e.g., DeSario, 2003, for a discus­
sion on different conceptualizations of meritocracy that are used to justify such prac­
tices). Thus, from  a social science perspective, I cannot follow Rutherglen (1987) in 
his praise.
For a  m ore thorough discussion of legal definitions and conceptualizations of dif­
ferent forms of discrimination based on US law from a  social science perspective, see, 
e.g., Blank et al. (2004), Greenwald and Krieger (2006), Krieger (1995), Krieger and 
Fiske (2006), Lucas (2008).
Discrimination in European and German law
A similar distinction has been introduced to European law by the Amsterdam Treaty 
and directive 2000/43 ([2000] OJ L180/22), sometimes called Racial Equality Directive 
(Bell, 2008, p. 36) or Race Directive (Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016), and directive 2000/78 
([2000] OJ L303/16), sometimes called Employment Equality Directive (Bell, 2008, p. 36). 
The two directives call for a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of racial or eth­
nic origin as well as religion o r belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation in  em­
ployment and vocational training Bell (see, e.g., Bell, 2008).
The directives have been implemented into German law: Section 1 of the German 
General Act on Equal Treatment (dt. Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG, 
2006, §1, my italics), says:
The purpose of this Act is to prevent or to stop discrimination on the 
grounds of race or ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation.
It then distinguishes between direct discrimination and indirect discrimination (AGG, 
2006, §3, my italics):
(1) Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated 
less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in  a  compa­
rable situation on any of the grounds referred to under Section 1.
(2) Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an  apparently neu­
tral provision, criterion or practice would put persons at a particular dis­
advantage compared with other persons on any of the grounds referred to 
under Section 1, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the m eans of achieving that aim  are ap­
propriate and necessary.
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In  general, the argum ents I brought forward against US law as a basis of a social sci­
ence definition of discrimination also apply to European and German law. Note that, 
interestingly, the word “discrimination” (dt. Diskriminierung ) does not appear once 
in  the original German text of the AGG (2006). With or without explicitly mentioning 
the word discrimination, definitions of discrimination based on antidiscrimination 
laws as currently implemented in the US, the EU, and Germany are not very useful for 
social science research.
2.4.7 Institutional, Structural, and Systemic Discrimination
The conceptualizations of discrimination I discuss in this section, characterize forms 
of discrimination according to the societal level on which causes or mechanisms of dis­
crimination are theorized to lie. This is different to the distinction of individual and 
group discrimination from  section 2.4.1 that relates to the level on which the effects of 
discrimination are m easured.
Also, institutional discrimination, structural discrimination, and systemic discrim­
ination are typically introduced as theoretical approaches that are supposed to help 
explain discriminatory treatm ent and persisting inequality between societal groups. 
However, the present chapter is not about theories and their mechanisms. Here, I 
will just briefly discuss the different conceptualizations of these forms of discrimina­
tion. As theories, I will discuss institutional, structural, and systemic discrimination 
in  chapter 3. In  this discussion I will also address the question, whether these theories 
can really be called proper theories.
In  my discussion in  the following section, I  focus on the institutional form of dis­
crimination (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and the original, m ore widely used, but 
also—in this m ore general study on discrimination in  German education—less applica­
ble term , namely institutional racism (e.g., Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967; J. M. Jones, 
1972; L. L. Knowles & Prewitt, 1969) that I start my discussion with.
Note that some authors discuss institutionalized discrimination (e.g., Berard, 2008; 
J. R. Feagin, 1977; J. R. Feagin & Booher Feagin, 1986) and institutionalized racism 
(C. P. Jones, 2000). The term s institutional bias (e.g., Henry, 2010) and, much less often, 
institutionalized bias (e.g., Sundstrom, 1990) are also in use. Also note that, sometimes, 
the term s institutional, structural, and systemic are used interchangeably (e.g., J. R. 
Feagin & Bennefield, 2014).
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Institutional racism
The activist Stokely Carmichael and the scholar Charles V Hamilton Carmichael and 
Hamilton (1967) are typically credited with having coined the term  “institutional 
racism”—a term  much more widely used than “institutional discrimination”—to con­
trast it with “individual racism” that was suggested to “consist of overt acts by individ­
uals, which cause death, injury or the violent destruction of property” (Carmichael & 
Hamilton, 1967, p. 4). Institutional racism, in  contrast, was introduced as
[...] less overt, far more subtle, less identifiable in term s of specific indi- 
vidualscom m ittingtheacts. B u titisno lessdestructiveo fhum an life . [It] 
originates in the operation of established and respected forces in the so­
ciety, and thus receives far less public condemnation [ . ] .  (Carmichael & 
Hamilton, 1967, p. 4)
While this description is both too vague and too empirical to be a useful definition for 
social science research, it conceptualizes institutional racism rather clearly as origi- 
nating in theoperationofestab lishedandrespectedforcesin thesociety—th a tis ,in a  
society's institutions.
Theconceptofinstitutionalracism w asthenpickedup,developed,andinvestigated 
further by L. L. Knowles and Prewitt (1969), who unfortunately fail to provide a clear 
definition. In contrast to Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), L. L. Knowles and Prewitt 
(1969, p .15)explicitlydiscussbothunintentionalandintentionalform sofinstitutional 
racism. The widely cited definition by J. M. Jones (1972) is more clear, but introduces 
a normative connotation by referring to inequities instead, for instance, to the more 
neutral term s inequalities or disparities:
Institutional racism can be defined as those established laws, customs, 
andpracticesw hichsystem aticallyreflectandproduceracialinequitiesin  
American society [ . ]  whether or not the individuals maintaining those prac­
tices have racist intentions. (J. M. Jones, 1972, p. 131, his emphasis)
Sim ilartoL .L .K now lesandPrew itt(1969),heallow sinstitu tionalrac ism tobe“either
o v erto rco v ert[.]an d e ith e rin ten tio n a lo ru n in ten tio n a l” (J.M .Jones,1972,p .131).
Institutional discrimination
T h atth e te rm “institutionalracism” becam em orepopu larthan theterm “institutional 
discrimination” in the US literature and, thus, in the English speaking literature as a 
whole, is not surprising, given the history ofand the, therefore fully comprehensible,
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focus on race relations in  the US American society. However, the term  “institutional 
discrimination” seems to be older (e.g., Myrdal, 1944, pp. 606, 629, 631; Greene, 1938, 
p. 211)10 1. That discrimination may be institutionalized and, thus, may become itself 
an  institution—not an  organization—but also embedded in other institutions, e.g., the 
law, was also recognized by Antonovsky (1960).
However, accounts of explicit definitions of institutional or institutionalized dis­
crimination are younger. As one would expect, definitions of institutional discrim­
ination are typically broader in  the sense that they apply not only to race but other 
dimensions such as social class or gender and m ore narrow in the sense that they 
focus on treatm ent and behavior and leave beliefs and attitudes aside. Studies on Ger­
m an education therefore usually use the term  institutionelle Diskriminierung instead 
of institutioneller Rassismus11.
An in-depth discussionand explicitdefinitionsof tw oform sof institutional discrim­
ination is provided by J. R. Feagin and Booher Feagin (1986):
[...] direct institutionalized discrimination refers to organizationally-prescribed 
or community-prescribed actions which have an intentionally differential 
and negative impact on m em bers of subordinate groups. (J. R. Feagin & 
Booher Feagin, 1986, p. 30)
[...] indirect institutionalized discrimination refers to practices having a  neg­
ative and differential impact on minorities and women even though the or­
ganizationally prescribed or community-prescribed norm s or regulations 
guiding those actions were established, and are carried out, with no prej­
udice or no intent to harm  lying immediately behind them . (J. R. Feagin & 
Booher Feagin, 1986, p. 31)
Obviously, the m ain difference between the two forms is that one refers to intentional 
and the other to unintentional behavior. Less obvious is what is m eant by differential 
and negative impact in  both definitions. However, from the discussion in J. R. Feagin 
and Booher Feagin (1986) but also in J. R. Feagin (1977), J. Feagin and Eckberg (1980) 
it is clear that the authors are interested not only—and, in  fact, not even foremost— 
in discrimination in  the sense of a causal effect of a signal of some sort, as defined 
in  section 2.3.3, but in  inequality m ore generally. Interestingly, according to both 
definitions, only “subordinate groups” and “minorities and women” may suffer from 
discrimination.
10 Note that, in  some parts in  the book, Myrdal (1944) uses the term s discrimination and seg­
regation synonymously and discusses “institutional segregation” throughout the book.
11 Institutionelle Diskriminierung and institutioneller Rassismus are the literal German transla­
tions of institutional discrimination and institutional racism, respectively.
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As for a  final example let's have a look at a rather simple, more general, and, thus 
m ore useful definition of institutional discrimination. In  their study on discrimina­
tion in US education, Meier et al. (1989) state:
Institutional discrimination occurs when the norm s, procedures, and 
rules of an  organization discriminate against certain individuals. (Meier 
et al., 1989, p. 30)
Here, institutional discrimination is neither explicitly nor obviously equated with in­
equality. However, note that as long as it is not clear what is m eant by discrimination, 
we cannot judge how useful such a  definition really is. From the discussion in  Meier 
et al. (1989) it seems that, indeed, discrimination in  education is equated with inequal­
ity of educational opportunity based on race and social class. Note further that in this 
definition, institutional discrimination is a phenom enon occurring within organiza­
tions.
Contributions to the German literature
The contributions on the topic published in  German tend not to provide definitions 
that are m ore useful—if they provide own self-contained definitions at all: Gomolla 
and Radtke (2010), the most widely cited study on institutional discrimination in  Ger­
m an education, for instance, doesn't. In  fact, the definitions provided in the German
literature reflect the problems of their international counterparts: First, while it is not
always specified what exactly is m eant by institutionell or Institution, some define insti­
tutionelle Diskriminierung more generally as institutionalized or embedded in institu­
tions in ageneral sense (Ditton &Aulinger, 2011, p.102), some restric titto  processes 
within organizations (Gomolla, 2016, p. 2; Hasse & Schmidt, 2012, p. 886).
Secondly, all of them  share an approach that defines discrimination through out­
comes on the group level and tend to conflate discrimination with inequality—either 
conditional inequality, such as inequality of opportunities, but, quite frequently, also 
unconditional inequality, that is, inequality of outcomes. So, all too often, institu- 
tionaldiscrim inationisconceptualizedasaneffectonbetw een-groupinequality(D it- 
ton & Aulinger, 2011; Gomolla, 2016), not on discrimination as phenomenon of in- 
terindividualbehaviorin thesenseIadvocatein thisstudy(seesection2.3.3). Remark­
ably, eventhose p roponentsofinstitutionaldiscrim inationintheG erm andebate that 
recognizethisapproachasproblem atic, d o notadapttheirdefinitionaccordingly(e.g., 
Gomolla, 2016, p. 12).
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How useful are definitions of institutional discrimination?
In  this section I will briefly summarize the issues I have with the definitions of insti­
tutional racism and discrimination. Remember that these issues are of conceptual 
and methodological nature, not of theoretical nature, and concern the usefulness for 
empirical research.
My first issue with many, not all, definitions of institutional racism or institutional 
discrimination is that they lack clarity regarding key term s. With regard to institu­
tions, all too often it is unclear whether the term  refers m ore generally to the “the 
rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 2) as in  J. R. Feagin (1977), J. M. Jones 
(1972), or to tangible organizations as in  Meier et al. (1989), or to both as in  J. Feagin 
and Eckberg (1980). With regard to discrimination, it is often not quite clear what is 
discriminatory about institutional discrimination.
The second and, maybe, biggestissue Ihave with conceptualizations of institutional 
discrimination, is that many, if not all, definitions of institutional racism or institu­
tional discrimination equate or conflate discrimination with inequality in  some way 
(see, e.g., Williams, 1985, p. 330; Pincus, 1996). In  fact, the idea that institutions, poli­
cies, and regulations do not discriminate among or against individuals by virtue of a 
particular characteristic but, nevertheless, lead to inequality between societal groups 
that can be distinguished according to the characteristic in  question is at the heart of 
the institutional discrimination literature.
Also, many definitions of institutional discrimination or racism unnecessarily re­
strict the roles particular groups can play in  all of this: Then, by definition, only mem­
bers of or institutions set up by m em bers of “dominant” (Pincus, 1996, p. 186; Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999, p. 127; J. Feagin & Eckberg, 1980, pp. 9, 12) groups may discriminate 
against m em bers of “subordinate” (J. R. Feagin & Booher Feagin, 1986, p. 30; J. Fea- 
gin & Eckberg, 1980, p. 12; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 127) or “minority” (J. R. Fea- 
gin & Booher Feagin, 1986, p. 31; Pincus, 1996, p. 186) groups. Now the question is: 
What characterizes dom inant groups and what characterizes subordinate groups? Ob­
viously, the distinction would be redundant if the group that discriminates or set up 
the institution that discriminates against another group simply denotes the dominant 
group because of that. If this is not necessarily the case, one and the sam e behavior 
could possibly be labeled discrimination if committed by one group but not if com­
m itted by another.
Finally, considering the tight connection of early contributions to the institutional 
racism literature and the US civil rights movement, it is not surprising that many con­
tributions on institutional racism and institutional discrimination implicitly but often 
also explicitly morally judge and condemn discrimination against particular societal
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groups. Take J. R. Feagin and Booher Feagin (1986), for example, whose “discussion 
assumes that race and sex discrimination are unjust and should be remedied” (J. R. 
Feagin & Booher Feagin, 1986). Or take the German literature on institutional dis­
crimination that highlights the normative nature of contributions to the institutional 
discrimination literature and advocates the explicit integration of the concept of insti­
tutional discrimination and research on justice and equity (e.g., Gomolla, 2016, p. 18). 
Particularly noteworthy in  a chapter on how to define discrimination are definitions 
that feature built-in normative judgments such as the one by J. M. Jones (1997) cited 
above. Such definitions are not useful for empirical social science research, which is 
why I will certainly not adopt them .
Investigating the institutional and organizational determ inants of discrimination— 
in the sense of causal effects of institutional and organizational level variables on dis­
crimination as defined in  section 2.3.3—is certainly of great interest to social science 
researchers and the public. However, I am  not sure that the existence of such effects 
need to be nam ed in  a  particular way. Put differently, the term  institutional discrimi­
nation is certainly not needed to study these effects, even if I do not fully object whole­
heartedly. However, given this long list of drawbacks from  above, I will not make use 
of the concept of institutional discrimination in  this study. Since it is a widely cited ap­
proach that claims to be able to explain discriminatory behavior and between group 
inequality and, as such, has been applied to German education, I will nevertheless 
briefly return  to it in chapter 3, where I discuss its explanatory power as a theory.
Structural and systemic discrimination
The term s structural racism or structural discrimination and systemic racism or sys­
temic discrimination are muss less used than their institutional counterparts. Also, 
sometimes, they are used synonymously to institutional racism or discrimination or 
some variant of it: Pincus (1996, p. 186), for example, defines structural discrimina­
tion in a way that equals others' understanding of institutional discrimination and 
J. R. Feagin and Bennefield (2014, p. 7) introduce systemic racism as synonymous 
with institutional racism. In  the German literature on discrimination in general and 
discrimination in education in particular, these term s are used rarely and, if so, of­
ten interchangeably (Gomolla, 2010; but cf. Gomolla, 2016, where institutionelle and 
strukturelle Diskriminierung are explicitly distinguished).
I will not go into details on these term s, but merely summarize briefly why I don't 
see any use for them  in  this study: Many contributions to this literature do not provide 
a clear and self-contained definition at all (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 1997; J. R. Feagin, 2006).
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Also, even m ore so than institutional forms, structural and systemic racism or dis­
crimination are essentially conceptualized as not m ore or little m ore than “pervasive 
racial disparities” (Reskin, 2012, p. 18). Additionally, structural and systemic forms of 
racism or discrimination are typically conceptualized in  a rather narrow way so that 
they tend to apply to one country—typically the US—and mostly to race relations, not 
other intergroup relations (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 1997; J. R. Feagin, 2006; Reskin, 2012). 
The contributions to this literature usually contain normative languageand judgments 
(especially see J. R. Feagin, 2006; J. R. Feagin & Bennefield, 2014) that I, as laid out in 
chapter 1, wish to avoid wherever possible.
2.5 Summary and Conclusion
Progress in  science comes not from coining new term s. It comes from using estab­
lished term s in  a logically consistent way to explain old and new phenom ena by means 
of making explicit the mechanisms that are at work in  bringing these phenom ena 
about. To argue in favor of a  logically consistent and useful definition of discrimi­
nation is what I have sought to contribute by m eans of this chapter. I have argued that 
discrimination is best understood as the causal effect of an information about or a sig­
nal sent out by an individual on how this individual is treated by another individual. 
I have argued that this general definition is the m ost useful starting point for defin­
ing discrimination, since it avoids unnecessary constraints that are hard to justify and 
since it avoids normative judgments that have to be or are likely to be m ade along the 
way of specifying the definition. In  the present study, I am concerned with discrim­
ination by teachers based on information about students' ethnicity, social class, and 
sex or gender, respectively—also known as ethnic discrimination, social class discrim­
ination and sex or gender discrimination.
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3 Theories of Discrimination
To be able to  measure [...] 
discrimination of a particular 
kind, it is necessary to  have a 
theory [...] of how such
discrimination might occur and 
what its effects might be.
(Blank et al., 2004)
In  this chapter I am  concerned with theories, models, or m ere hypotheses that claim 
to be able to help explain discrimination. As with definitions, explanations of discrim­
ination abound. I focus on—but do not limit my discussion to—contributions that have 
been applied to discrimination in  education and that fulfill two general criteria: The 
first criterion is that I accept as a theory only those contributions that seek to provide 
a causal explanation for discrimination, which requires that a mechanism of some sort 
has to be provided (Elster, 1989). The second, additional criterion, added by m ethod­
ological individualism (see section 1.5.1), is that the mechanism provided by the the­
ory has to refer to individual behavior in  some way.
3.1 Economic Theories of Discrimination
Economic theories of discrimination are often said to fall into one of two camps (for 
this distinction see, e.g., Charles & Guryan, 2011, p. 495; Black, 1995; Kristen, 2006a): 
Theories in the first camp are built on the seminal work by Becker (1957/1971), who 
introduced what he called “a  taste for discrimination” (Becker, 1957/1971, p. 14). This 
taste is part of an  actor's utility function, often equated with prejudice (e.g., Altonji 
& Blank, 1999; J. Knowles et al., 2001), sometimes m ore generally treated as a  prefer­
ence (Guryan& Charles, 2013, p. 418), but virtually always contrastedwith information 
(e.g., Guryan & Charles, 2013; J. Knowles et al., 2001; Levitt, 2004). We will see that in 
Becker (1957/1971) these distinctions are not perfectly clear.
The second camp is hom e to theories of statistical discrimination (Aigner & Cain, 
1977; Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972). These models rest on the notion of imperfect in­
formation or information asymmetries. This way, they circumvent the problem of 
introducing preferences that are external to the m arket. While it is straightforward 
to explain individual discrimination using these models, discrimination on the group
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level and, thus, inequality cannot—without further qualifications—be explained by all 
models of statistical discrimination (Aigner & Cain, 1977).
3.1.1 Taste Discrimination
Becker (1957/1971), who provides the first extensive treatm ent of the economics of dis- 
crimination12, seeks to explain why there are differences in  labor market outcomes— 
mainly wages and employment rates—between various groups of workers in  the mar­
ket against the backdrop of rational actors. To this end, Becker (1957/1971) general­
izes conventional theory and extends the utility function of market actors—employers, 
employees, and consumers—beyond money. He introduces the concept of a  taste for 
discrimination that he conceptualizes as follows:
If an  individual has a “taste for discrimination”, he must act as if he  were 
willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced in­
come, to be associated with some persons instead of others. (Becker, 1957/
1971, p. 14)
The operationaldefinitionofthis tastefordiscrim inationisthe socalled discrimination 
coefficient, often abbreviated DC and denoted d in formal expressions. Becker (1957/ 
1971)'s ingenious and rather uneconomic idea was to distinguish between money costs
and net costs of a  transaction and use the DC as a  bridge between them  (Becker, 1957/
1971, p. 14). Formally speaking, instead of merely considering the money wage rate n 
of an employee, an employer i with DC di acts as if n(1 +  di ) were the net wage rate.
Mechanics of taste discrimination
Obviously, if di > 0 toward a particular group, the net costs, n(1 +  di ), would be higher 
than the money costs, n, for any transaction with a m em ber of that group. According 
to Becker (1957/1971), this case is w hatconstitutes discrimination, since
[d]iscrimination is commonly associated with disutility caused by contact 
with some individuals. (Becker, 1957/1971, p. 15)
It is through this mechanism that a taste for discrimination turns into differential be­
havior towards members of different groups. The reverse case of di <  0 toward a 
particular group yields lower net costs than money costs and, according to Becker 
(1957/1971, p. 15), constitutes nepotism.
12 This, “The Economics of Discrimination”, is also the title of his book.
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Note, however, that Becker (1957/1971) explicitly contradicts Allport (1954) and ac­
knowledges that “the social and economic implications of positive prejudice or nepo­
tism are very similar to those of negative prejudice or discrimination” (Becker, 1957/ 
1971, footnote 3). I agree with Becker (1957/1971), whose position is perfectly compat­
ible with the definition of discrimination as a causal effect proposed in chapter 2 (see 
section 2.3.1 in particular): Since a  causal effect is always defined via the difference 
of at least two causal states, an  advantage for m em bers of group A is equivalent with a 
disadvantage for m em bers of group B—and vice versa—if only these two groups exist 
in  a  given market. If there are m ore than just two groups, things get a little m ore com­
plicated since there is not just one but multiple differences between different causal
states that have to be considered. Social psychologists, too, have realized that nepo­
tism or ingroup-favoritism may be as or even more likely the cause of discrimination 
as outgroup-derogation (Brewer, 1999; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986). I will return to these mechanisms and related theories from social 
psychology below in section 3.3.
Before I show how Becker (1957/1971) explains inequality between groups and be­
fore I discuss how to apply his theory to the German education system below, let's 
haveacloserlookattheproposedm echanism andthedeterm inantsoftheD C .E ssen- 
tially and as stated above, Becker (1957/1971) suggests that rational actors discrimi­
nate against individual employees because they seek to maximize their utility. To this 
end, actors ask for compensation in the form o fa  wage prem ium  when surrounded 
by people they dislike, that is, people that negatively contribute to the actors' utility. 
Alternatively, actors are willing to forfeit income in order to be surrounded by people 
they like, that is, people that positively contribute to the actors' utility. These contri­
butions to the actors' utility functions are captured by the discrimination coefficient, 
DC.
Now, what are the determinants of the DC? In fact, Becker (1957/1971) gives sev­
eral examples for such determinants, including the social and physical distance be­
tween an individual and a particular group, their relative socioeconomic status, and 
the num ber of members from the group in question (Becker, 1957/1971, p. 16). In­
terestingly, Becker (1957/1971, pp. 16-17) also explicitly discusses ignorance as a de­
term inant of the DC—a fact largely ignored in the literature (but cf. Hunkler, 2014). 
However, even though Becker (1957/1971) demands that “the amount of knowledge 
available m ustbe includedasadeterm inan toftastes”, h isdiscussionsuggeststhathe 
takes prejudice—that he also uses synonymously with preference—as the major ingre- 
d ien to fthe  DC:
Ignorance may be quickly eliminated by the spread ofknowledge, while a
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prejudice (i.e., preference) is relatively independent of knowledge (Becker, 
1957/1971, p. 16)
Also, neither the DC nor any other param eter in  Becker (1957/1971)'s model captures 
knowledge or ignorance about one single candidate. Put differently, dij  only varies 
between different employers, i, or actors more generally, and target groups, j  .  That 
Becker (1957/1971) allows knowledge about groups as a whole to be incomplete but as­
sumes knowledge about individuals to be perfect, strikes m e as contradictory: Either 
the information about individual productivity is perfect, then information about the 
group should not determ ine tastes and should, in  fact, play no role in the model at all, 
or information about individuals is more or less imperfect, then, however, we would 
want to know how to combine knowledge about the group and about the individual to 
arrive at the net cost of this individual.
However, from  the discussion and formal model provided by Becker (1957/1971) it 
is rather clear that his models mainly rests on prejudice, or, m ore generally, prefer­
ences, and does not acknowledges varying degrees of knowledge about single candi­
dates depending on situational constraints. Note that this is a crucial difference to 
models of statistical discrimination that explicitly contain a param eter to capture the 
reliability of information available about a single candidate in  a given situation.
Taste Discrimination and inequality
In order to explain group discrimination and, thus, inequality between groups, Becker 
(1957/1971, p. 17) introduces a market discrimination coefficient, abbreviated MDC and 
defined as
Y (A) Y0 (A)m dc s n A _  n A (3.1)
Y (B ) Y0(B)
where n A and n B  are the observed equilibrium wage rates, while and n B  are their 
counterfactuals without discrimination. Y (A) and Y (B ) are the actual incomes of A 
andB ,w hileY 0(A )andY 0(B )areincom esw ithoutdiscrim ination.13
Obviously,them agnitudeoftheM D Cand,thus,them agnitudeofw agedifferentials 
between A and B, depend on the magnitude of individual DCs (Becker, 1957/1971, 
p. 18). So, when all employers feature the same taste for discrimination againstgroup 
B—i.e., when di  is constant across all i—members of group B either have to accept 
a wage rate of n(1 — dj ) or will not be hired. In such a scenario, the causal effect of
13 Note that Becker (1957/1971)'s notation nicely corresponds to that used in  the literature on 
counterfactual causality and potential outcomes (e.g., Gangl, 2010; Imbens & Rubin, 2015; 
Morgan & Winship, 2015; Pearl, 2009).
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being m em ber of group B instead of A is negative for all in B .  Also, all mem bers of 
B  earn less then expected based on their productivity. Inevitably, this aggregates to 
group discrimination and, thus, inequality.
However, Becker (1957/1971)—who is credited to be the first to realize and theorize 
this (Heckman, 1998, p. 102)—argues that such a scenario is not realistic and, hence, 
the assumption that the MDC only depends on individual DCs is mistaken. Indeed, 
Becker (1957/1971, p. 43) shows that while it is necessary to know the tastes of an  aver­
age or “representative” employer to assess market discrimination, it is not sufficient. 
Analyses of discrimination in labor markets, for example, have to take into account 
processes of self-selection of employees on particular employers. In  education pro­
cesses of self-selection might or might not be of less relevance; for elementary school 
in  Germany they should be less relevant, since in  most federal states binding school 
districts limit school choice considerably. But, also in German education it is not sim­
ply the taste of an  average teacher that determines discrimination in  the education 
system. See already my discussion in  section 2.4.1. I will return  to this discussion in 
chapter 6 in which I present an experiment that gives credit to Becker (1957/1971)'s 
insights.
Application to the German education system
It has been suggested that not only actors in  labor m arkets but also teachers feature 
a taste for discrimination and Becker (1957/1971)'s theory has been applied to differ­
ent educational settings in  different countries (e.g., Hanna & Linden, 2012; Kristen, 
2006a; van Ewijk, 2011). With regard to tastes or prejudices of German teachers we 
know very little, indeed. I discuss the most enlightening of the few quantitative stud­
ies in chapter 4 before I present my own analyses on teachers' prejudices towards 
different ethnic groups. What we know and I find confirmed in  my analyses is that 
teachers hold negative prejudices towards Turks. I find that less teachers in  Germany 
hold negative prejudices about Eastern Europeans and virtually none hold negative 
prejudices against Italians. Just about nothing is known about teachers' attitudes to­
wards different social classes or m en and women or boys and girls, respectively.
With regard to the application of Becker (1957/1971), I am  m ore skeptical than oth­
ers (e.g., Kristen, 2006b): Recall the key m echanism  that motivates actors to discrimi­
nate, namely “disutility caused by contact with some individuals” (Becker, 1957/1971, 
p. 15) that actors seek to avoid or demand to be compensated for. However, for both 
grading and recommending tracks teachers typically cannot alter their own utility by 
discriminating against students. In contrast to the labor market, where employers
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profit when paying lower wages to employees from  particular groups or simply not 
hiring them , teachers may only punish students with bad grades or recommendations 
for lower tracks. Usually, this should not affect the teacher's utility. Therefore, the 
prediction derived from Becker (1957/1971) for teacher behavior in  these situations 
should be to expect no discrimination in grading or track recommendations, no m at­
ter what d is towards the group in  question. Of course, there are situations in  which 
Becker (1957/1971)'s mechanism should result in  discrimination: Imagine the teacher 
groups students according to ability or achievement within tracks and continues to be 
the teacher for one of the created groups, say the advanced group. Following Becker
(1957/1971) we would expect this teacher to group students not in accordance to their
true ability or achievement n but in such a way that his or her utility is maximized by 
excluding some students from groups towards whom he or she has a “taste for dis­
crimination”.
3.1.2 Statistical Discrimination
The basic idea of statistical discrimination theory (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; 
Phelps, 1972) is that, in a situation of imperfect knowledge about the true productiv­
ity of an employee, rational employers use observable characteristics such as race or 
sex insofar as they carry information about productivity to estimate the unobserved 
productivity of an individual employee.
Here, I focus on Aigner and Cain (1977), who provide a review of several models 
of statistical discrimination including an important critique of Phelps (1972). Some 
sim pleform alnotationhelpstofullyappreciateitsim plications: Sinceemployerslack 
perfect knowledge about the true productivity, q, of a candidate, they have to rely on 
an indicator or signal of productivity, y. However, y measures q with error, u:
y =  q +  u (3.2)
where q ~ N (a ,a q) and u ~ N (0, ct„ ). It is assumed that employers know this relation 
andthe distributionsofq a n d u . Therefore,em ployersknow thattheycanconstructa 
weighted average of observed individual performance, y , and assumed group ability, 
a, to come up with an estimate, q:
q =  E (q|y) =  (i -  y )a +  yy (3-3)
where y is the reliability of the measure, test, or signal.
Explaining individual discrimination using equation 3.3 is straightforward: Let's
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say we are interested in  discrimination conceptualized as the causal effect of signal­
ing m em bership in  group B instead of A. Following the m ost simple model by Phelps 
(1972), employers use equation 3.3 to estimate the productivity of a  candidate or an
employee from  one of two groups, A and B. In  this simple model, employers know
that y < 1 and that average productivity differs between groups so that, e.g., a A  > a B . 
Then, obviously, candidates that appear to be m em bers of group B will estimated to 
be of lower productivity than had they appeared to be members of group A. Clearly, 
this is an account of discrimination as an individual-level causal effect by virtue of 
m embership in group A versus B. This scenario is visualized in the left panel offigure 
3.1.
A second ,stillra thersim p lem odeltha tisa lsodescribed inP help s(1972),allow sy 
to vary between groups. Such a scenario with equal means, a A  =  a B , but different 
reliabilities,yA  > y B ,isv isu a lized in th e rig h tp an e lo ffig u re3.1. Ifw ew ritey a s
V a r  (q )y =  , 
V a r  (q ) +  V a r  (u)
(3.4)
where q is the true ability and u the m easurem ent error in y, there are two ways that 
lead to yA  > yB  . First, groups A and B have ability distributions with same variances, 
V ar(qA ) =  Var(qB ),b u tth e te s tu se d b y th e e m p lo y e rm e a su re sy le ssp re c ise ly fo r 
g roupB ,i.e ., V ar(uA ) < V ar(uB ). T h a tre su lts in y A  > yB ,w h ic h m e a n s th a tth e  
test has a higher (conditional) reliability for group A than for B. The second case 
arises from equal error variances, V ar(u A )  =  V ar(u B ), but different (conditional) 
variances, V ar(qA ) < V ar(qB ), yielding yA  > yB  again. The consequences can be 
seen in therigh tpane lo ffigu re3.1: theslopefo rA (dashed)issteeperthan theonefo r 
B  (dotted). Individual discrimination by virtue ofsignaled group membership occurs 
forallyexceptw heretheslopesin tersect. H ow ever,notethatin th isscenario thesign  
of the causal effect changes depending on whether y > y * or y < y *, where y* is the 
point in which the slopes intersect.
What's the evidence?
Evidenceinfavorofdifferentm odelsofstatisticaldiscrim inationabounds—evidence 
isfound inm anyd ifferen tcoun triesfo rd iffe ren tsec to rso fsoc ie tyandd iffe ren tac- 
tors usingdifferentm ethodologies (forreviews see, e.g., Altonji &Blank, 1999; Cain, 
1986; Charles & Guryan, 2011; Guryan & Charles, 2013). Even the arguably most coun­
terintuitive result, namely thatgroups with lower y  are favored and, thus, profitfrom  
discrim inationforlow ervaluesofy hasbeenbackedupbyem piricalevidence(Scha-
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Figure 3.1: Predictions of ability, q =  E (q|y), by group and test score, y. The bisectrix
(solid line) visualizes the case of y =  1. The dashed line shows the 
relationship for group A, the dotted line for group B . The left panel shows 
two parallel lines indicating y A = y B , and a A  > a B : qA  =  (1 — YA )a A + YA y- 
The right panel shows the opposite constellation with equal means, a A  = a B , 
but different slopes, YA > YB.
effer et al., 2016). Teachers also seem  to act in accordance with statistical discrimina­
tion theory (e.g., Hanna & Linden, 2012; van Ewijk, 2011).
With regard to German teachers, we know very little about their general or subject- 
specific stereotypes about different groups of students—that is, their beliefs about
group-specific a —, which is why I examine teachers' stereotypes towards different
groups of students in  chapter 5. Lorenz et al. (2016), however, find that teachers have
systematically lower expectations towards students with a Turkish background, stu­
dents from families of lower socioeconomic status, and boys, even conditional on 
relevant controls. This way Lorenz et al. (2016) provide indirect evidence for corre- 
spondingstereotypes. M yresultsform ore directm easures ofteachers' stereotypes in 
chapter 5 largely confirm the findings ofLorenz e ta l. (2016).
Evidence on y comes from studies on accuracy of teacher judgments. The six
German studies included in the meta-analysis by Südkamp et al. (2012) find correla­
tion coefficients between teachers' estimates and actual performance o f r  =  .34 and 
r  =  .59, suggesting that teachers are far from perfect in predicting student perfor­
mance. W hileteachersoverallevaluationsm ightbem oreprecise, notethattaskssuch 
asrecom m endingtracksatthe endofelem entaryschoolinvolve predictionsaboutfu- 
ture development that might be more more difficult.
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Statistical Discrimination and Inequality
As already m entioned in  section 2.4.1, models of statistical discrimination have been 
used to distinguish between individual discrimination and market or group discrim­
ination, respectively, without referring to market forces. In fact, the discussion by 
Aigner and Cain (1977) starts off as a critique of the model by Phelps (1972), that, ac­
cording to Aigner and Cain (1977), is not able to explain inequality between groups as 
a consequence of discrimination. Put differently, the mechanism Phelps (1972) sug­
gests, only accounts for individual discrimination, not group discrimination.
Recall the two simple models from  above, visualized in  figure 3.1. If the assump­
tions hold that q ~ N(a, aq) and u ~ N (0, au) and that employers or teachers, for 
that matter, know these distributions, neither model can explain discrimination on 
the group level, if interest lies in average effects, that is in E(q), on the group level. This 
is because for both models Aigner and Cain (1977) show that, on average, employers 
or teachers, are getting it right, so that E(qA ) = a A , E(qB ) =  a B , E(qA ) = a A , and 
E (qB ) =  a B . Group discrimination, expressed as a difference-in-difference, then, 
equals zero:
GD A - B  = (E(qA ) -  E(qA )) -  (E(qB ) -  E(qB ))
= (aA  -  a A ) -  (aB  -  a B )
= 0
That is, as long as teachers' beliefs about group means, a , are correct and the test or 
teachers' perception of individual performance, y, is not systematically biased, indi­
vidual discrimination does not aggregate to group discrimination.
Now, under which conditions does statistical discrimination lead to group discrimi- 
nationand, thus, helpstoexplaininequality? Thereare severalscenariosunderw hich 
thestatisticaldiscrim inationm echanism from equation3.3leadstogroupdiscrim ina- 
tion. One suchscenario thatA ignerandC ain(1977)discuss, featuresriskaverse deci­
sion makers, who seekto minimize the riskofunderestim atingthe abilityofworkers 
or students. As a consequence employers or teachers apply a higher risk penalty to 
groups with lower 7. This may result in group differences in wages or track recom­
mendations conditional on ability and, thus, group discrimination. There is indeed 
evidence that teachers in Germany are risk-averse when recommending tracks: They 
tend to recommend the lower out of two tracks in ambiguous situations—when, for 
instance, children have a grade point average in between two cutpoints (Maaz et al., 
2008).
Another class ofscenarios in which individual discrimination aggregates to group
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discrimination gives up the assumption of being interested in  m eans only and the of 
normally distributed outcome variables only. An im portant case in point for research 
on discrimination in  the German education system is that the outcome of interest 
might not be normally distributed but a categorical variable, such as school tracks.
If interest, for example, lies in  the highest track to which students may only go when
y > y *, where y* is a cutoff point somewhere in the distribution of y, then members 
of group B will suffer from group discrimination when ya > yb as in the right panel 
offigure 3.1.
G roupdiscrim inationm ightalsoariseifthekeyassum ptionofcorrectbeliefsabout 
a, that is, correct stereotypes, is violated. Thus, in case teachers' stereotypes are 
biased to the disadvantage of a group, this group would suffer from group discrim­
ination. England and Lewin (1989) explicitly discuss this model that they call “error 
discrimination”. Bohren et al. (2019) refer to the same phenomenon as “inaccurate 
statistical discrimination” and show that ignoring the possibility of incorrect stereo- 
typesm ayleadtoaconfusionofinaccuratestatisticaldiscrim inationw ithotherform s 
of discrimination, such as taste discrimination. I will provide evidence for biases in 
teachers' stereotypes in chapter 5.
Application to the German education system
Aswithtastediscrimination, thequestionisw hetherornotthem echanism ssuggested 
by models ofstatistical discrimination can be meaningfully applied to German educa­
tion and which general hypotheses can be derived from applying them.
W ithregardtotrackrecom m endationsattheendofelem entaryschoolinG erm any, 
Kristen(2006b)andothers(e .g .,T .S chneider,2011)suggestthat,fo llow ingm odelsof 
statistical discrimination, we should not expect discrimination—i.e., neither individ­
ual nor group discrimination—to occur, since teachers would possess perfect or al- 
m ostperfectknow ledgeaboutindividualstudentsafterteachingthem foryears. How­
ever, teachers face the task of predicting future performance at different tracks they 
typicallyw illnotknow ingreatdetailsothatIseeroom forstatisticald iscrim inationto  
slip in teachers' track recommendations14. Concerning grades, especially grades for 
written exams, I would expect little to no discrimination, as observed performance 
shou ld typ icallyprovidetheteacherw ithallre levantinform ationand,thus,y should 
be close to one.
Note that statistical discrimination—and the contrast with taste discrimination—is
14 I have made this point earlier in  my diploma thesis (Wenz, 2009). It is also made in  Diehl 
and Fick (2016).
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a great example for how micro-mechanisms matter, even when the interest of the re­
searcher only lies on institutional-level variables. As I will discuss in some m ore detail 
below in section 2.4.7, contributions to the institutional discrimination literature have 
not only failed in  providing but also in  merely explicitly using a  mechanism of hum an 
behavior as a  microfoundation. Imagine we would be interested in  the question of 
whether or not it makes a  difference for the degree of discrimination by virtue of eth­
nic or social background of the student, when elementary school lasts longer. What 
we would need to know is not only how the conditions change under which teachers 
make their decisions, that is, in  which ways the logic of the situation changes, but also 
how, in  general, teachers act or behave, for that matter, that is, we need to know the 
logic of selection.
Concerning the logic of the situation, the institutional change of tracking students 
two years later would certainly m ean that students are older and, thus, m ore devel­
oped with regard to cognitive and non-cognitive skills. The institutional change might 
also m ean that teachers have taught the same students for a  longer period of tim e and, 
thus, know them  better, but teacher turnover might interfere with this consequence.
Now, for the hypothesis what this institutional change m eans, it makes a crucial 
difference whether teachers behave in  accordance with Becker (1957/1971)'s model of 
taste discrimination or in  accordance with a model of statistical discrimination such 
asgiven in  equation3.3. If only tastes determ inediscrim inatory judgm entsand behav­
ior, the degree of discrimination against any group should not be affected by such an 
institutional change. However, when students are older or when teachers know their
students for a  longer tim e, teachers might perceive observed student performance as
more reliable, so that 7 increases. Following equation 3.3 we would expect that the 
institutional change leads to less individual discrimination in teachers' track recom­
mendations and, since the outcome is categorical, also to less group discrimination.
3.2 Sociological Theories of Discrimination
Sociological contributions to the study of prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup 
relations more generally have a long history (e.g., Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 
1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bogardus, 1925, 1933, 1958; Myrdal, 1944; R. E. Park, 
1924; Quillian, 1995, 2006; Sumner, 1906). However, the only theoretical perspective 
thathas been appliedto education repeatedlyin both international and German liter­
ature, seems to be the perspective of institutional racism or institutional discrimina­
tion, respectively.
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3.2.1 Institutional, Structural, and Systemic Discrimination
At the end of chapter 2, I have discussed several definitions of institutional racism and 
institutional discrimination. Here, I will briefly comment on institutional, structural, 
and systemic discrimination as theories. As in  section 2.4.7, I focus on the literature 
on institutional racism and discrimination. The problems of structural and systemic 
racism and discrimination approaches are virtually the same—if anything, they are 
greater.
As a theory, I am  even m ore critical towards contributions to the institutional 
racism and institutional discrimination literature than towards the attempts to de­
fine the phenom enon. In  fact, I think that it is justified to say that there really is no 
institutional racism or institutional discrimination theory—not to m ention a theory. 
I think so, since the contributions to this literature have not managed to provide a 
clear and comprehensible mechanism that actually helps to explain how institutions— 
conceptualized in  whatever way—affect discrimination or at least disparities between 
groups. This lack of explanatory power has even been recognized from  advocates of 
institutional racism and discrimination (e.g., Gomolla, 2016; Troyna & Williams, 2012; 
Williams, 1985). However, little progress has been m ade towards overcoming this gap 
(Gomolla, 2016, p. 7).
While I second the critique of those who demand a microfoundation of institutional 
discrimination approaches (e.g., by incorporating social psychological mechanisms; 
Berard, 2008), note that there are others who criticize the institutional discrimination 
literature for quite the contrary, namely for falling back on micro-mechanisms and 
falling short of providing more detailed descriptions of macro-level or institutional- 
level mechanisms (e.g., Troyna & Williams, 2012; Wight, 2003). All this is not to say 
that nowhere in this literature can be found suggestions on mechanisms in general 
and mechanisms of individual hum an behavior in  particular that might carry a  causal 
effect of institutions on discriminatory individual behavior. Remarkably though, such 
ideas can be found m ore often in  earlier contributions: J. R. Feagin and Booher Feagin 
(1986), for instance, wrote:
[...] whatever the scale of the organizational context all discrimination in­
volves individual actors. The “bottom line” in  all types of discrimination 
is someone actually doing something to someone else. Large corporations 
and bureaucracies do not act except in  some metaphorical sense; the peo­
ple in  them  do act, even though they may be routinely carrying out re­
quired regulations inherited from some dusty past. (J. R. Feagin & Booher 
Feagin, 1986, p. 25, their emphasis)
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While this short paragraph can certainly be read as a plea for a microfoundation of 
institutional discrimination and while the reference to routine behavior might have 
been a helpful starting point, J. R. Feagin and Booher Feagin (1986) explicitly provide 
neither a microfoundation, nor a m echanism  m ore generally. Unfortunately, later 
contributions to the institutional discrimination literature have moved even m ore 
towards structural and systemic approaches and away from  individual mechanisms 
(e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 1997; J. R. Feagin, 2006; J. R. Feagin & Bennefield, 2014).
As for an application to the German education system or really any education sys­
tem , the study of causal effects of institutions on discrimination by virtue of charac­
teristics such as race or ethnicity, social class, and sex or gender is certainly a relevant 
one. It is of interest to the scientific community as it allows indirect tests of different 
theories of discrimination including their micro-mechanisms. And it should be of in­
terest to a  broader audience as it carries policy implications, if, for example, it can be 
shown that the magnitude of ethnic or social class discrimination in teachers' recom­
mendations at the end of elementary school can be reduced by tracking students at a 
later age, when teachers can predict m ore precisely the students' development in the 
coming years.
3.3 Social Psychological Theories of Discrimination
From single hypotheses over theoretical models to more complex theories, the dis­
cipline of social psychology has produced m ore evidence on stereotypes, prejudice, 
and discrimination than any other. However, a closer look reveals that many findings 
from  social psychological studies from  the last decades have focused m ore on stereo­
types and prejudice rather than on discrimination. In this section I discuss three of 
the most im portant approaches and models that I deem  useful to explain discrimi­
nation and applicable to education. Also, the theories and models discussed in  the 
present section are among the most widely cited and applied in  recent decades.
3.3.1 Social Identity Theory
It is no recent observation (e.g., Allport, 1954; Sumner, 1906) that hum ans tend to hold 
negative stereotypes and prejudices about outgroup m em bers, hold positive stereo­
types and prejudices about ingroup m em bers, and discriminate among people by 
virtue of the distinction between ingroup and outgroup. One of the most prominent 
social psychological theories that tries to explain why this is, is social identity theory 
(SIT; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It provides a  clear micro-mechanism for why
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stereotypes, prejudices, and discriminatory behavior should be biased in  favor of in­
groups and ingroup members.
SIT: Its mechanics and evidence
Its basic assumptions are the following (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 16): Humans have a 
need for self esteem and a  positive self-concept. Self-esteem and self-concept, in  tu rn , 
depend on both personal and social identity, which is why hum ans strive for positive 
personal and social identities. While the personal identity influences self-esteem via 
evaluations of personal achievements, the social identity or identities of a person can 
influence self-esteem via the evaluations of groups we do or think o r feel we belong 
to. Key to understanding how social identity theory explains biased stereotypes, prej­
udice, and discrimination is that what counts for a positive self-concept is the rela­
tive evaluation of groups with reference to other groups. Thus, there are two mecha­
nisms that provide an alternative route to affect self-esteem: Ingroup-favoritism and 
outgroup-derogation. Hence, one major prediction of social identity theory is that 
we tend to think better of m em bers of our own group and our ingroup as a whole 
and derogate m em bers of groups we do not belong to, that is, outgroups, in  order to 
achieve higher self-esteem or compensate for low self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997). 
We might think of people from  our own group as m ore sympathetic and sm art and of
people from other groups as unappealing and stupid.
The key hypothesis of social identity theory is the self-esteem hypothesis, that can be 
split into two parts: First, behavior through which a person favors ingroups or dero­
gates outgroups as a whole, or respective group members, should enhance a person's 
self-esteem. Secondly, the higher the need for self-esteem, the higher the likelihood 
that a person engages in discriminatory behavior that favors ingroups or derogates 
outgroups. Fein and Spencer (1997)'s classic study, for example, provides evidence 
for both mechanisms: Participants whose self-esteem had been lowered by negative 
feedback evaluated a woman more negatively when she was (supposedly) Jewish than 
when she was (supposedly) Italian. Those among the negative-feedback candidates 
giventheopportunitytobelittletheJew ishw om anshow edapost-experim entincrease 
in self-esteem.
Byandlarge, literature reviews(Abrams&Hogg, 1988;M .Rubin& Hewstone, 1998) 
suggest that the evidence of numerous empirical studies is in favor of social identity 
theory and the self-esteem hypothesis. However, the self-esteem hypothesis seem to 
be more applicable to “specific, social, and state forms of self-esteem than to global, 
personal, andtraitform s” (M.Rubin&Hewstone, 1998, p.50). W ithregardto ingroup
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favoritism versus outgroup derogation, the evidence suggests that stereotypes, preju­
dice, and discrimination are mainly motivated “by the desire to promote and m aintain 
positive relationships within the ingroup rather than by any direct antagonism toward 
outgroups” (Brewer, 1999). Recall, however, that when ingroup and outgroup serve as 
groups of comparison, that is, the potential outcomes of being treated as an ingroup 
m em ber compared to being treated as an outgroup m em ber are of interest, the differ­
ence does not matter.
Application to the German education system
Applying social identity theory to the situation of teachers in  German education is 
straightforward. Recall that actual group achievements contribute to a  person's social 
identity, which, in  turn , satisfies the need for self esteem. The crucial point about 
the situation at the end of elementary school in  Germany is that it enables teach­
ers to actually influence the educational achievement of different groups of students. 
Take Turkish students, for example, that are outgroup m em bers for teachers with a 
German background. Besides the possibility of favoring students of German back­
ground over students with Turkish background by holding m ore positive stereotypes 
and prejudices about the Germans compared to the Turks, teachers may favor German 
students over Turkish students when grading exams or recommending a secondary 
school track. For the difference between these groups of students it is, obviously, ir­
relevant whether this pattern arises due to students of Turkish origin receiving lower 
grades or recommendations than they deserve or students without immigrant back­
ground receiving higher grades or recommendations than they deserve.
In  conclusion, social identity theory (SIT) seem s to be a useful complement to the­
ories such as Becker (1957/1971)'s theory of taste discrimination or theories of statisti­
cal discrimination (e.g., Aigner & Cain, 1977) because it helps to explain preferences 
against particular (out-)groups or stereotypic beliefs about a  group's m ean ability level 
or other characteristics. Last but not least and in  addition to being a  complement 
to other theories, SIT is a powerful alternative—in particular to Becker (1957/1971)'s 
model of taste discrimination—as it can be used to derive predictions about discrimi­
nation in grading or tracking more directly, as I have shown in this section.
3.3.2 The Continuum Model
Dual process models were invented by social psychologists and cognitive psychologists 
in  the 1980s to account for seemingly contradictory or inconclusive findings in  empir­
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ical research on stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination that m ore simple models 
or mechanisms had trouble explaining (see, e.g., Gawronski & Creighton, 2013, for a 
review). For a study on discrimination, maybe the most im portant motivation for the 
development of dual process models was the question of how to explain the moderate 
correlation of attitudes and behavior:
By shifting the focus from asking “Do attitudes guide behavior?” to the ques­
tion, “How do attitudes guide behavior?” dual process theorizing provided 
im portant insights into the conditions under which attitudes do or do not 
influence behavior. (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013, p. 286)
The continuum model: Its mechanics
Here, I focus on the continuum model (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), one of 
the earlier and rather popular models that is also rather general and covers affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral outcomes—that is, prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimina­
tion, respectively. The continuum model starts from  the observation that automatic 
and immediate categorization of others is a  general and basically inevitable process 
of social cognition that enables individuals to quickly distinguish between ingroup 
and outgroup mem bers (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Zarate & Smith, 1990) . Thus, it sug­
gests categorization as default cognitive process in person perception. To explain and 
predict when people engage in  the default process of a category-based response and 
when in a  piecemeal-based response, the model relies on “two prim ary factors: the 
available information and the perceiver's motivation” (Fiske et al., 1999, p. 232).
Only if the target is of m inimal interest or relevance for the perceiver in  the very 
m oment of categorization, perceivers are motivated to allocate attention to individ­
uating information and move down the continuum  from category-based judgments 
toward a “piecemeal integration” (Fiske et al., 1999, p. 233) of individual attributes. 
This process of recategorization and, eventually, piecemeal integration may only be 
started if the available information is rich enough and the perceiver has the tim e and 
the cognitive capacity to take it into account. Put differently, only if motivation is high 
and information rich enough, can we expect that discrimination on the basis of prej­
udices and stereotypes does not occur.
What's the evidence?
Overall, social psychological dual process theories, including the continuum model, 
have received support from  num erous empirical studies (Gawronski & Creighton,
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2013, p. 294). In  particular, both Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Fiske et al. (1999) 
provide plenty of evidence for the core prem ises of the model including the role of 
information available and motivation to overcome simple category-based responses. 
However, the assumption that category-based responses are the default over all situ­
ations has been challenged (Chun & Kruglanski, 2006).
Application to the German education system
While teachers may be motivated to overcome category-based judgment when dealing 
with their students, the information available might not always suffice depending on 
the situation. W hen grading a manifest performance, for example, sufficiently moti­
vated teachers should not show any discriminatory biases. However, when the same 
teachers need to predict future development of students when recommending tracks 
at the end of elementary school, the information at hand might not be rich enough to 
move down the continuum all the way to a “fully individuating impression” (Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990, p. 1). Thus, it might be necessary for the teacher to combine individ­
uating characteristics with category-based information such as stereotypical beliefs. 
In  such a  situation, the continuum model would predict a causal effect of the teachers' 
stereotype on the behavior towards the student and, thus, discrimination by virtue of 
the category the student was assigned to.
3.3.3 Aversive Racism
Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) developed the aversive racism approach to explain why 
discrimination against blacks in  the US continued even though support for openly 
racist stereotypes, prejudices, and policies had been in  decline for many years. While 
other approaches—including symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2005), m odern racism 
theory (McConahay, 1983, 1986), and ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001)— 
were developed with similar aims (for concise reviews see, e.g, Dovidio et al., 2017; 
Nier & Gaertner, 2012), I chose to discuss aversive racism over these other approaches 
since these alternatives are concerned m uch m ore with the content and valence of 
prejudice and stereotypes towards racial minorities such as blacks, and women. They 
are less concerned with explaining discrimination, which might be the reason for why 
they lack explicit mechanisms of hum an behavior. Put differently, it largely rem ains 
unclear under which conditions which beliefs or attitudes are overtly expressed or 
acted out.
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Mechanics of Aversive Racism
The aversive racism approach is built on the idea that while explicit and blatant stereo­
types and prejudice against blacks and other m inorities might have declined, implicit 
and m ore subtle beliefs and attitudes might still be held by many if not all m em bers of 
the white majority in  the US. In fact, the theory explicitly targets the beliefs, attitudes, 
and behavior of so-called “aversive racists”, who
[...] sympathize with the victims of past injustice; support public poli­
cies that, in principle, promote racial equality and ameliorate the conse­
quences ofracism; identifym ore generallyw ithaliberal political agenda; 
regard themselves as nonprejudiced and nondiscriminatory; but, almost 
unavoidably, possess negative feelings and beliefs about blacks. (Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 1986, p. 62)
That is, instead of a “taste for discrimination” (Becker, 1957/1971) or otherwise con­
sistent attitudes that favor ingroups over outgroups, individuals may hold rather in- 
consistentandam bivalentattitudes. N ow ,DovidioandG aertner(2008),G aertnerand  
Dovidio (1986) reckon that, for understanding and predicting behavior, “[o]ne key el- 
em en tis the  nature ofthe situation” (Dovidio & G aertner,2008,p .45 ).
The o therkeyelem ent,ofcourse,isam echanism : Aversive racism theorysuggests 
that individuals are motivated to sustain a positive self-image, so that, in situations 
where the corresponding social norms are salient and behavior is overt and identi­
fiable, individuals who explicitly endorse egalitarian values and see themselves as 
nonprejudiced, would not discriminate. In situations, however, in which the corre­
sponding norms are not salient enough to trigger the explicit egalitarian attitudes, in 
which behavior can be acted out more covertly, or in which discriminatory behavior 
to the disadvantage of, say, Blacks, can be rationalized on the basis of another factor 
than race, the same individuals would, indeed, discriminate on the basis ofrace and, 
thus,follow theirim plicitandunconsciousracistattitudes(D ovidio & G aertner,2008, 
pp. 45-46).
How useful is Aversive Racism as a theory?
O bviously,thestartingpointofaversiveracism theoryisrootedinphenom enaandob- 
servationsataparticu larp laceandtim e involvingparticulargroupsinspecificroles— 
some but not all Whites as “aversive racists”, Blacks as victims. However, the gen­
eral mechanism—i.e.,the motivation to uphold apositive self-image as unprejudiced 
nondiscriminator—is applicable to other places, times, and groups ofpeople. Since it
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clearly focuses on individual behavior, aversive racism theory satisfies the criteria I 
put up in the beginning of this chapter.
But what's the evidence that people actually work this way? With regard to the 
m ore general m echanics, there is plenty of evidence in favor of aversive racism the­
ory: First, it is well documented that implicit m easures of beliefs and attitudes do not 
perfectly coincide with explicitly reported beliefs and attitudes (Cameron et al., 2012; 
Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 2002; Greenwald et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2005; Nosek, 
2007). Secondly, we know that people are indeed motivated to m aintain a positive self­
image (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Baumeister et al., 1989)—see also the contributions to 
the literature on social identity theory above in section 3.3.1.
I have also introduced aversive racism as an explanation for discrimination in  ed­
ucation, since its key mechanisms seem  to be perfectly compatible with m ore or less 
wide rational choice models of hum an behavior (see, e.g., Kroneberg & Kalter, 2012). 
That individuals do not openly express negative stereotypes and prejudices and do not 
engageindiscrim inatorybehaviorinan“eraofcontestedprejudice” (Lucas, 2008),can 
certainly be understood as sanction-avoiding behavior and, thus, behavior that max­
imizes subjective expected utility. But even without external sanctions, in  a  wider 
rational choice model, internalized egalitarian and liberal norm s could be expected 
to lead to the behavior predicted by aversive racism theory. Also, in later publications 
(e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008), the model was explicitly linked to the distinction be­
tween implicit and explicit cognition and, therefore, might very well be integrated into 
general dual process models of action, such as the model of fram e selection, a recent 
sociological contribution that integrates rational calculating behavior with automatic 
spontaneous behavior (Esser, 2001; Kroneberg, 2010; Kroneberg & Kalter, 2012; Kro­
neberg et al., 2010).
Application to the German education system
Conditions and mechanisms suggested by aversive racism theory are readily applied 
to the German education system and German teachers. With regard to the situations 
of interest in  this study—i.e., grading and track recommendations—I have already ar­
gued in this chapter (see, mainly, section 3.1.2) that both the grade for a single as­
signment as well as a final grade leave room for interpretation, especially in  German 
elementary school, where standardized testing and grading are rare. In many states 
teachers also have a fair amount of leeway when recommending secondary tracks at 
the end of elementary school, but regulations differ and in several states recommen­
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dations depend m ore or less perfectly on grades that, themselves, however, are given 
by teachers.
I have also argued above in this chapter that teachers in German schools, while cer­
tainly holding explicit negative stereotypes and prejudices, probably hold less nega­
tive explicit prejudices against students with a Turkish background as well as against 
students with a lower social class background than the general public. Since we do 
not know much about it, I take a closer look at the explicit attitudes of teachers in 
Germany in  chapter 4. However, a hint on what to expect comes from Hachfeld et al. 
(2011), who report the results of a study with teacher candidates and educational sci­
ence students, who turn  out to score low on explicit m easures of prejudice but high on 
explicit m easures of both multicultural and egalitarian beliefs (Hachfeld et al., 2011, 
p. 992).
That, at the same tim e, teachers in  Germany hold negative implicit attitudes about 
certain groups also seems plausible: First, that people hold negative implicit atti­
tudes about outgroups in  general and racial or ethnic m inorities in  particular or at 
least implicitly prefer ingroup over outgroup m em bers is a  well documented global 
phenom enon (see, e.g., Axt et al., 2014; Cunningham et al., 2001; Greenwald & Ba- 
naji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al., 2007). Secondly, Glock and Karbach 
(2015) report the results of an experimental study, in  which German preservice teach­
ers showed implicit preferences of ethnic majority students over ethnic minority stu­
dents, based, in part, on negative implicit attitudes towards ethnic minority students.
3.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed several popular theories of discrimination. I have 
started with two theories from economics, Becker (1957/1971)'s theory of taste dis­
crimination and statistical discrimination (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 
1972). I have argued that, while there is evidence that both are im portant theories 
to understand discrimination in  many different contexts, the mechanism underyling 
Becker (1957/1971)'s theory is barely applicable to two key situations in German edu­
cation, namely grading and recommending tracks at the end of elementary school. In 
contrast, I deem  statistical discrimination models and the proposed mechanism  ap­
plicable and m ore helpful in  potentially explaining discrimination than others (e.g., 
Kristen, 2006b; T. Schneider, 2011). It is applicable to both grading situations and 
track recommendations. Also, several models that built on the statistical discrimina­
tion m echanism  may not only explain discrimination on the individual level but also 
on the group level and, thus, inequality between groups.
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From the sociological contributions to discrimination, I have focused on the institu­
tional discrimination perspective since it has repeatedly been applied in  international 
and German studies on discrimination in  education. However, I am  rather skepti­
cal that institutional discrimination provides us with an enlightening perspective on 
discrimination in education as the contributions to this literature lack both theoret­
ical mechanisms in general and a  microfoundation in  particular. Remarkably, this 
has been recognized as a problem but not properly addressed in the literature on in­
stitutional racism and discrimination (e.g., Gomolla, 2016; Troyna & Williams, 2012; 
Williams, 1985).
More fruitful are models from social psychology. I discussed social identity the­
ory (SIT; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the continuum  model (Fiske et al., 1999; 
Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008; Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 1986). These models are all useful theoretical models and readily applied to 
education, since they offer micro mechanisms that causally explain why discrimina­
tion by virtue characteristics such as ethnicity, social class, or gender should occur. 
However, the models rely on quite different mechanisms that, applied to education, 
should lead to rather different predictions about discrimination in  different situations 
such as gradingor recommending tracks. While SIT relies on a  mechanism linking the 
social identity of a person and, thus, m em bership in  social groups with individual well 
being and needs, both continuum  model and aversive racism explicitly theorize the 
role of imperfect information and situational ambiguity for the likelihood of engag­
ing in  overt discrimination. Last, but not least, the models from social psychology do 
not explicitly distinguish and, thus, do not explicitly theorize the distinction between 
individual discrimination and group discrimination. Because all at least incorporate 
prejudice or ingroup-favoritism in some way—even though m oderated by situational 
influences in  case of the continuum  model and aversive racism—they are potentially 
able to explain group discrimination.
I return  to these theories and their predictions in particular in  chapter 6, when I 
present an experiment I conducted to examine discrimination by teachers in differ­
ent situations. Taken together, the theories discussed in  the present chapter highlight 
the im portance of the two major determ inants of discriminatory behavior, namely 
prejudice and stereotypes. I examine the prejudices of German teachers towards dif­
ferent groups in  chapter 4 and their stereotypes towards different groups of students 
in  chapter 5.
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4 Prejudices of German Teachers
Two words, to the wise
researcher, should be sufficient: 
Study prejudice.
(Fiske, 1998)
Prejudice has been conceptualized as or related to attitudes (e.g., Blalock, 1967; 
Brown, 2010; Ehrlich, 1973; J. M. Jones, 1997; Simpson & Yinger, 1972), evaluations 
(Correll et al., 2010), emotions (Brown, 2010; Simpson & Yinger, 1972), affections (Cor­
rell et al., 2010; D. J. Schneider, 2004), or preferences and tastes (Becker, 1957/1971). 
In  what is known as tripartite model of attitudes or, m ore generally, tripartite perspec­
tive on category-based reactions towards groups or individuals, prejudice is typically 
describedas theaffective component, while stereotypes are seen as the cognitive com­
ponent, and discrimination as the behavioral component (Correll et al., 2010; Fiske, 
1998; Zanna & Rempel, 1988).
Studying prejudice in  m ore detail in  a study of discrimination in  education has both 
theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, prejudice is a major determ inant of 
discrimination and, as discussed in  section 2.4.1 and chapter 3, plays a key role in 
explaining both individual and group discrimination and, hence, inequality between 
groups. Recall from the discussion in  chapter 3 that a major difference to stereotypes 
and beliefs is that, theoretically, prejudice is expected to lead to discrimination on 
both individual and group level when applied or acted out towards individuals.
As it turns out, prejudice is indeed the better empirical predictor of discriminatory 
behavior than stereotypes and it seems that there is no better predictor of discrim­
ination by virtue of variables such as race, sex, or class than prejudice—except the 
intention to discriminate. In  a meta-analysis of 53 studies, published between 1930 
and 1993, Schütz and Six (1996) investigate 60 effect sizes, reporting an  average corre­
lation of r  =  .37 between prejudice and intended discrimination, of r  =  .49 between 
intended discrimination and actual discriminatory behavior, and of r  =  .29 between 
prejudice and actual discriminatory behavior. Although Schütz and Six (1996) do not 
explicitly compare the predictive power of prejudice with other constructs such as 
stereotypes, they conclude that “all of these are less useful than prejudice” (Schütz & 
Six, 1996, p. 457). Such a  comparison was undertaken by Talaska et al. (2008), who 
report 136 effect sizes from 57 studies that appeared in  54 publications from 1950 to 
2002. The authors report the highest median correlations with discriminatory behav­
ior for m easures of behavioral intentions (r =  .39), emotions and emotional preju­
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dice (r =  .35), and combinations of overall valence and emotion (r =  .32). While 
the m edian correlation of discrimination with stereotypes is reported to be r  =  .26, 
correlations with other belief- and stereotype-related m easures are reported to range 
from r  =  .24 to r  =  .08. In  a regression model controlling for possible confounders 
of the effect size differences between attitudinal m easures and m easures of beliefs, 
Talaska et al. (2008) find support for the claim that prejudice is a stronger predictor
of discrimination than stereotypes. In fact, on average and controlling for relevant
covariates, the correlation of prejudice and discrimination is ß = .32 units higher 
than the correlation of stereotypes and discrimination (Talaska et al., 2008, p. 282). 
Taken together, theoretical and empirical reasons substantiate Fiske (1998, p. 373)'s 
invitation to researchers in intergroup relations: “Study prejudice.”
Therefore, in this chapter, I investigate teachers' prejudices towards different 
groups of students. As throughout this dissertation, my main interest lies with the 
s tu d en tso fT u rk ish o rig in .B u t,fo rth esak eo fco m p ariso n an d in itso w n rig h t,Iam  
also in terestedinotherethnicgroupsasw ellasstudentsofdifferentsocialclassesand 
ofdifferentgender.
4.1 Conceptualizing Prejudice
In this chapter and throughout this dissertation I conceptualize prejudice as an atti­
tude toward a particular group or category of people (see also, e.g., Correll et al., 2010; 
Ehrlich, 1973; J. M. Jones, 1997; D. J. Schneider, 2004). Since I understand attitudes as 
“general evaluations of people, objects, and issues” (Fazio & Petty, 2008, p. 1), preju- 
d ice issim p lyanevalua tiono fag roupo rca tego ryo fpeop le . Especiallyolder,tradi- 
tiona ldefin itionso fp re jud iceare lessgenera l.In therem aindero fth issec tion ,Iw ill 
b rieflyd iscusssom eoftheseo lderbu ta lsosom em orerecen tdefin itions. Ifocuson  
problems that make—especially the older definitions—much less useful for empirical 
research than thedefin ition Ichose. H ow ever,Ialsopresentdefin itionsthatIlargely  
agree with and, thus, builton .
4.1.1 Less Useful Perspectives on Prejudice
One of the first and certainly the most widely cited definition of prejudice is the one 
by Allport (1954):
Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible gener­
alization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group
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as a  whole, or toward an  individual because he is a m em ber of that group. 
(Allport, 1954, p. 9)
I have several issues with Allport (1954)'s definition (see Brown, 2010, for a similar 
critique). First, defining prejudice as an  antipathy rules out that there are positive 
or sympathetic prejudices. However, defined as an attitude, “logically, prejudice can 
take both positive and negative forms” (Brown, 2010, p. 4). Also, in  light of my general 
definition of discrimination in chapter 2 and the insights from different theories of 
discrimination such as Becker (1957/1971)'s taste discrimination or mechanisms such 
as ingroup-favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1999), it is evident that positive 
evaluations of some groups—but not others—are, in  effect, just as problematic as neg­
ative evaluations. Put differently, if all groups are evaluated positively, but some are 
evaluated m ore positively than others, m em bers of groups that are evaluated m ore 
positively than others might receive preferable treatm ent only because they are mem­
ber of the positively evaluated group, which constitutes discrimination under almost 
any definition out there, including the one I proposed in  chapter 2.
Thus, it seems wise to not restrict prejudice to be negative by definition, but to 
allow for both negative and positive prejudice to exist in  principle. Unfortunately,
conceptualizing prejudice as having negative valence has been very common (e.g.,
Levin & Levin, 1982, p. 65; J. M. Jones, 1972, pp. 2-4; Fishbein, 2002, pp. 4-5; Ameri­
can Psychological Association, 2006). Surprisingly, Brown (2010), too, holds on to this 
perspective—even though he tries to water it down a little bit, by referring to preju­
dice as an attitude “which directly or indirectly implies some negativity or antipathy 
towards that group” (Brown, 2010, p. 7).
M ysecondissuew ithA llport(1954)'sdefinitionisthatitconceptualizesprejudiceas 
faultyorbasedonsom ethingfaulty . Ijo inB row n(2010)in re jec tingsucharestric tion  
mainly because it implies that the correctness of prejudice or its foundation could be 
assessed. However, defined as an attitude, it can itself neither be true nor false as 
it does not contain—in contrast to stereotypes or beliefs (see chapter 5)—factual or 
empirical statements. Of course, prejudices and, thus, evaluations of groups are—at 
least in part—built on stereotypes and beliefs (Crandall et al., 2011) that themselves 
might very well be false but could also be pretty accurate. Also, negative prejudices 
canbebuiltonaccuratestereotypesandviceversa. N otethattheideathatstereotypes 
andprejudicesasw ellasdiscrim inationareinterrelatedconceptsisheldbym anyand 
som etim escalledthe tripartitem odelofcategory-basedresponsesorattitudes(Fiske, 
1998, pp. 357, 372; C orrelletal., 2010, pp. 45-46; Cuddyetal., 2007), to which Ire tu rn  
briefly below.
Last, notleast, A llport(1954)'sdefinitionim pliesthatprejudicesareinflexible, hard
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to change, constructs. While this might be the case empirically, prejudices should not 
be conceptualized this way. Otherwise empirical research on this question is either 
ruled out or findings of not so hard to change attitudes would be evidence that the 
attitude in  question would not be a prejudice. Also, what does hard to change or in­
flexible, for that matter, m ean, anyway? Note that this qualification, too, has been 
picked up by others and used to define prejudice (e.g., Simpson & Yinger, 1972, p. 24).
4.1.2 More Useful Perspectives on Prejudice
Especially recent but also some older definitions of prejudice are m ore useful than 
Allport (1954)'s and others' definitions that I have criticized above. Take, for example 
the definition by Ehrlich (1973) that is virtually the same as the one I proposed above:
Prejudice can then be defined as an attitude toward any group of people. 
(Ehrlich, 1973, p. 8)
However, since Ehrlich (1973) conceptualizes attitudes m ore broadly and, essentially, 
in a  tripartite m anner with “cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions” (Ehrlich, 
1973, p. 4), his understanding of prejudice seems to be broader than m ine. Other gen­
eral conceptualizations of prejudice include the widely cited definition of J. M. Jones 
(1997):
Prejudice is a positive or negative attitude, judgment, or feeling about a 
person that is generalized from attitudes or beliefs held about the group to 
which the person belongs. (J. M. Jones, 1997, p. 10)
Note that, in  contrast to J. M. Jones (1972), J. M. Jones (1997) allows prejudice to be 
both negative and positive.
Beforecontrastingprejudice w ithrelated constructsin thenextsection, I shouldsay
that I conceptualize prejudice as individual attitude, not any form of socially shared
attitude (Brown, 2010, pp. 8-11). Of course, in no way does this rule out societal forces 
determiningindividual attitudes and, thus, prejudices (e.g., Blumer, 1958;Bobo, 1999; 
Bobo&Fox, 2003;Crandall &Stangor, 2005;Quillian, 1995). In fact, followingmethod- 
ological individualism as outlined in section 1.5.1, both the determinants and conse­
quences ofindividually held prejudices may lie on the societal level.
4.1.3 Prejudice and Related Constructs
Understood as an attitude, prejudices are evaluations. In contrast, stereotypes, un­
derstood as beliefs, lack any evaluative component. Thus, the key difference is that,
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while stereotypes can be correct or m ore or less incorrect, prejudices cannot. An eval­
uation is positive or negative but neither false or inaccurate nor true or accurate, re­
spectively. However, stereotypes—sometimes referred to as the cognitive component 
of prejudice (Dovidio et al., 2010, p. 5; Fiske, 1998, p. 357)—may serve as justifications 
for prejudice (Crandall et al., 2011), so that it is not surprising that stereotypes and 
prejudices correlate empirically (Dovidio et al., 1996). Since, analytically, stereotypes 
and prejudices are orthogonal concepts, both positive and negative prejudices can be 
built on m ore or less biased and, thus, incorrect stereotypes as well as on unbiased 
and, thus, correct stereotypes about any target group. Teachers' stereotypes about 
different groups of students I will examine in chapter 5.
That prejudice is not discrimination I put forth as a prem ise in  chapter 2: While 
prejudice is an attitude, discrimination is about behavior. Knowing about somebody's 
prejudice is not equivalent to knowing about their discriminatory behavior. How the 
concepts of prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are linked and associated has 
to be addressed by both theory (see chapter 3) and empirical studies (see the discus­
sion in the beginning of the present chapter).
4.2 Previous Research
There is not a lot of quantitative empirical research on prejudices of teachers in  Ger­
many or m ore generally their attitudes towards towards different ethnic or social 
groups. The few studies that do exist are—with regard to the research question raised 
in  the beginning of this chapter—limited or biased due to the following reasons: First 
and foremost, they are often based on geographically limited convenience samples of 
students (Glock & Karbach, 2015; Hachfeld et al., 2015; Hachfeld et al., 2011; Hachfeld 
et al., 2012). As an example, I quantify the bias in Hachfeld et al. (2011) in  section 
4.4.1, where I return  to the issue of biased and otherwise restricted samples in  studies 
of teachers' attitudes and beliefs. Secondly, most published studies are limited due 
to the fact that their findings or reported descriptive num bers—if such num bers are 
reported at all—cannot either be interpreted in  a meaningful absolute way or allow 
to compare relative biases towards students from different ethnic or social groups. 
Thirdly, not all studies that claim to investigate teachers' prejudices do so in  the sense 
of the conceptualization above in  section 4.1 but define or operationalize prejudice 
in  a different way (see, e.g., Hachfeld et al., 2012, who, according to my definitions, 
m easure stereotypes and beliefs instead).
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4.2.1 Explicit Attitudes of Teachers in Germany
As the first in  a  series of studies by Axinja Hachfeld and colleagues, Hachfeld et al. 
(2011) report the results of a study with N =  340 teacher candidates and educational 
science students in Berlin, who turn  out to score low on explicit m easures of prejudice 
(M =  1.76, SD  =  .57; 5-point-scale, higher scores m ean m ore negative prejudice) but 
high on explicit m easures of both multicultural (mc) and egalitarian (eg) beliefs (mc: 
M =  4.91, S D  =  .78; eg: M =  4.95, SD  =  .87; 6-point-scales, higher scores m ean be­
liefs that are m ore multicultural and egalitarian) (Hachfeld et al., 2011, p. 992). How­
ever, both the items assessing prejudice and the items assessing multicultural and 
egalitarian beliefs are hard to interpret in an  absolute way and do not allow to com­
pare attitudes toward different ethnic groups or groups of immigrants. Furthermore, 
making inferences from  a  student sample about the population of teachers in  Ger­
many would certainly be a bold move. In  fact, I show below in section 4.4.1 that this 
sample indeed provides downwardly biased estimates of teachers' level of negative 
prejudice towards foreigners.
From the perspective of this chapter, the other studies by Hachfeld and colleagues 
have similar limitations. Hachfeld et al. (2012), for example, study various ex­
plicit attitudes and beliefs using a sample of N =  433 trainee teachers (German: 
Lehramtsstudierende or Lehramtsanwärter/innen) with and without immigrant back­
ground. However, what Hachfeld et al. (2012) call prejudice, is what I and many oth­
ers (e.g., Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Ehrlich, 1973; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; D. J. 
Schneider, 2004) call stereotypes or beliefs (see chapter 5). The items Hachfeld et al. 
(2012) use to m easure what they call prejudice really investigate the respondents' be­
liefs about the interest, attention, thirst for knowledge, effort, and knowledge of stu­
dents with immigrant background (Hachfeld et al., 2012, table 2). These statements 
can be m ore or less correct because they contain or make empirical statements about 
the reality of students with immigrant background. The results are a good case in 
point: Respondents with and those without immigrant background differ the least on 
these items while differing the most on items that are—among those implemented by 
Hachfeld et al. (2012)—probably closest to m easuring prejudice, namely statements 
about whether or not respondents would enjoy teaching students with an  immigrant 
background and students of different cultural background (Hachfeld et al., 2012, table 
2). Taken together, Hachfeld et al. (2012)'s findings do not help to answer the questions 
raised in  the beginning of the chapter.
There are other quantitative studies that implement explicit measures to measure 
teachers' prejudice that I have not discussed here since they, too, do not provide any
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evidence with regard to the questions raised in  the beginning of this chapter (e.g., 
Hachfeld et al., 2015; Wagner et al., 2001).
4.2.2 Implicit Attitudes of Teachers in Germany
Recently, a  few studies have also investigated implicit attitudes of teachers in  Ger­
many. They, too, are often based on samples of students in education and not actual 
teachers. Glock and Karbach (2015), for example, report the results of an  experimen­
tal study using three different implicit procedures (Affect misattribution procedure 
[AMP], Affective priming task [APT], Implicit Association Test [IAT]) on N =  65 Ger­
m an preservice teachers from  two German universities. Respondents showed implicit 
preferences of ethnic majority students over ethnic minority (Turkish) students in  all 
three measures (effect sizes: AMP: d =  .55, APT: d =  .91, IAT: d =  .93). Differences 
were due to both negative implicit attitudes towards ethnic minority students (out­
group derogation) and positive attitudes towards ethnic majority students (ingroup fa­
voritism). While the student sample is an obvious limitation of the study, it provides 
some evidence for implicit negative prejudice towards Turkish students of German 
teachers in  general.
In  a study with n  =  82 elementary and n  =  82 secondary school teachers that makes 
use of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), Glock and Klapproth (2017) investigate im­
plicit prejudice towards ethnic minority students—that is, again, students of Turk­
ish origin—of different gender. The results relevant for the present study are as fol­
lows: First, according to their reactions towards Turkish first names that were used as 
stimuli, both elementary and secondary school teachers show negative implicit prej­
udices to the disadvantage of Turkish students. IAT-effect sizes range from  D =  .31 
to D  =  1.1215. Secondly, the interaction effect of school type and students' gender 
is statistically significant. Its closer inspection reveals that while elementary school 
teachers show an implicit bias to the disadvantage of male compared to female eth­
nic minority students, secondary school teachers show the opposite pattern—that is a 
bias to the disadvantage of female compared to m ale students of Turkish origin. This 
result is mainly driven by the fact that elementary school teachers are m ore biased 
against male students of Turkish origin than secondary school teachers (difference: 
d =  .82, p <  .001). The implicit attitudes between both groups of teachers differ less
15 D is computed by dividing “the difference between test block means by the standard devi­
ation of all the latencies in  the two test blocks” (Greenwald et al., 2003,  p. 201). Hence, its 
definition and interpretation is virtually the sam e as Cohen (1977)'s d that is usually calcu­
lated using the pooled standard deviation.
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for female students (difference: d =  .39, p =  .08). Thirdly, the m ain effect of students' 
gender is far from any conventional significance levels (p =  .74); thus, teachers are 
not prejudiced to the disadvantage of either girls or boys.
That the study is based on a sample of 164 teachers, not students, is an im portant 
advantage over other studies (Glock & Karbach, 2015; Hachfeld et al., 2015; Hachfeld 
et al., 2011; Hachfeld et al., 2012). However, that the sample is a convenience sample 
for which teachers were “recruited by undergraduates of the university”16 by contact­
ing “schools they were familiar with” (Glock & Klapproth, 2017, p. 80), is a limitation 
that should be kept in  m ind when interpreting the results. Another even m ore impor­
tant limitation of the study by Glock and Klapproth (2017) is that the German nam es 
used in  the IAT (male: Lukas, Finn, Niklas, Jonas, Tim, Paul; female: Leonie, Han­
nah, Julia, Emma, Marie, Sophie) probably carry a  social class connotation that affects 
the results in an  undesirable way. The names used may not simply signal an  ethnic 
German background but a  German upper middle class background instead, since the 
names are probably not an unbiased representation of the typical German student— 
students from lower or working class families tend to have other names. The nam es 
chosen may not only confound ethnic background with social class background but 
even exacerbate the socioeconomic differences that exist between the typical German 
student and the typical Turkish student. I will return  to this point in  chapter 6 in  which 
I describe an  experiment I conducted that also uses names as stimuli and that was de­
signed to explicitly address this problem. Despite the limitations of their study, Glock 
and Klapproth (2017) provide additional evidence in  favor of implicit biases of teach­
ers in  German schools against immigrants of Turkish origin.
4.3 Data
Especially through an ever increasing num ber of international and national studies 
in education, there are plenty of data sets available to the scientific community that 
contain variables on teachers in  Germany. However, studies such as PISA, TIMSS, or 
PIRLS/IGLU do not contain m easures of prejudice or attitudes towards immigrants in 
general o r different ethnic group in particular. Also, when assessing prejudice in  a 
study on education, teachers are probably aware that they are surveyed as teachers, 
which should make their professional role and identity salient to them , which, in  tu rn , 
arguably increases the likelihood for answers that are socially desirable in  the context
16 Probably from Wuppertal University, but this is not specified. The authors work at different 
institutions.
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of education. This way, explicit m easures of prejudice might underestim ate teachers' 
true level of negative prejudice towards different ethnic or social groups. General so­
cial surveys, on the other hand, should not trigger the same mechanisms and, thus, 
should provide m easures of prejudice that are less biased. Certainly, the sample size 
needs to be large enough to contain a sufficient num ber of teachers.
Therefore, I turned to data from  general social surveys covering Germany, such
as the German General Social Survey (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwis­
senschaften,  ALLBUS), the European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Study 
(EVS),the International Social SurveyProgramme (ISSP),andthe WorldValues Study 
(WVS). Except the ALLBUS, none of the studies assesses attitudes towards particular 
ethnic groups but instead measures negative prejudice, stereotypes, and other atti­
tudes towards racial or ethnic minorities more generally. Such questions mostly aim 
at “foreigners”, “foreign workers” (EVS/WVS), or “immigrants” (EVS/WVS), and some- 
tim esm ore m arginalizedgroupssuchas “gypsies” (EVS/WVS).ThisiswhyImake use 
of the ALLBUS for the analyses in this chapter.
4.3.1 The ALLBUS
In addition to more general questions on immigrants and foreigners similar to those 
asked in ESS, ISSP, and EVS/WVS, the ALLBUS asks several questions that assess the 
social distance of the respondent towards Italians, Eastern Europeans of German de­
scent, asylum seekers, Turks, and Jews. The corresponding questions were asked in 
1996, 2006, and 2016. Since 2006 is closer to the data collection for the experiment 
discussed in chapter 6, I will use the data from ALLBUS 2006 for the analyses in this 
chapter.
4.3.2 Social Distance: A Global Measure of Prejudice
Social distance measures were among the first and have been among the most pop­
ular explicit global measures of prejudice (see Correll et al., 2010; Ehrlich, 1973, for 
overviews). The concept of social distance was introduced to the study of racial atti- 
tudesandracere la tionsbyR .E .P ark(1924),w hodefined itas“thegradesanddegrees 
of understanding and intimacy which characterize personal and social relations gen- 
erally” (R .E .Park ,1924,p.339). P rejudice,R .E .Park(1924,p.339)suggested,w asthe 
“more or less instinctive and spontaneous disposition to maintain social distances”.
Bogardus (1925) operationalized the social distance concept and empirically tested 
it using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. However, based on pretest
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results for 60 items, Bogardus (1933) suggested a core of seven equidistant social sit­
uations, each represented by one item, along which social distance towards various 
ethnic or social groups is reported by respondents. The social situations vary accord­
ing to their degree of intimacy and range from “(1) would m arry” over “(4) would have 
several families in  my neighborhood” to “(7) would have live outside my country” (Bog- 
ardus, 1933). Since then the measure has been used—in its original form or adapted 
forms—in many studies in  different countries (e.g., Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bogar- 
dus, 1958; Böltken, 2000; Ganter, 2003; Hill, 1984; Kleinert, 2004; Parrillo & Donoghue, 
2005, 2013; Smith & Dempsey, 1983; Stangor et al., 1991; Steinbach, 2004; Storm et al., 
2017; H. C. Triandis & Triandis, 1960, 1962).
Social distance in the ALLBUS 2006
In the ALLBUS 2006, social distance is m easured towards the following groups: Ital­
ians, EasternEuropean immigrants of German descent(“deutschstämmigerAussiedler 
aus Osteuropa”), Asylum seekers, Turks, and Jews17. For each group, two of the seven 
core items from Bogardus (1933) are administered:
■ How pleasant or unpleasant would it feel to you to have members of the following 
groups as neighbors? How pleasant or unpleasant would it feel to have ...
■ an Italian as neighbor?
■ an Eastern European immigrant of German descent as neighbor?
■ And what if a m em ber of one of these groups were to m arry into your family? To 
w hatextentw ouldthisfeelpleasantorunpleasanttoyou? Tow hatextentw ouldit 
feel pleasant or unpleasant to you, .
■ if an Italian were to m arry into your family?
■ if an Eastern European immigrant of German descent were to marry into your 
family?
The response scale ranges from - 3  (“very unpleasant”) over the unlabeled midpoint 
o f0 to + 3 (“verypleasant”)forbo thquestions.
Of the various groups I will investigate social distance of teachers in Germany to­
wards Turks, because they are the ethnic group I mainly focus on in this study ofdis- 
crimination in German education. Mainly to have meaningful standards of compar­
ison, I will also investigate teachers' social distance towards Italians and Eastern Eu­
17 In order of appearance in  questionnaire.
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ropean immigrants of German descent, henceforth simply “Eastern Europeans'. Both 
asylum seekers and Jews I will leave aside. The group of asylum seekers is a very small, 
heterogeneous, and a  quickly changing group so that I think not much is learned by 
including them  here. Jews in  Germany are also a small group and social distance to­
wards them  tap on different dimensions than the three ethnic groups I have selected 
for comparison.
4.4 Analytic Strategy18
4.4.1 Identifying Teachers in Data from General Social Surveys
In  data from  general social surveys, such as the ALLBUS, teachers—just like any other 
occupational group—can be identified using the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO). While the most recent classification schem e is ISCO-08, the 
ALLBUS 2006 features the version that was up-to-date at the time, ISCO-88 (Inter­
national Labour Organization, 1990). ISCO-88 distinguishes ten major groups,  two of 
which contain teachers and other educators. Teachers or educators that hold tertiary 
degrees are classified as “professionals” in  major group 2 that “includes occupations 
whose m ain tasks require a high level of professional knowledge and experience in 
the fields of physical and life sciences, or social sciences and humanities” (Interna­
tional Labour Organization, 1990, section “Summary of Major Groups”). This applies 
to all regular teachers in  German elementary and secondary schools and, of course,
lecturers, readers, and professors at universities. These “teaching professionals” are
classified as sub-major group 23.
Teachers oreducators th a td o  not hold tertiary degrees fall into major group 3 that 
comprises occupations “whose m ain tasks require technical knowledge and experi- 
ence” (International LabourOrganization,1990,se c tio n “Sum maryofM ajorGroups”)
in the same fields as above. In  Germany, teachers and educators without a tertiary 
degree include educators in preschool and kindergarten—the m ain institutional ed­
ucation and care settings for children below the age of 6. These “teaching associate 
professionals” are classifiedassub-majorgroup33. Educationrelatedoccupationsare 
also classified in sub-major groups 12, 13, and, 51.
The next level below the sub-major group level in ISCO-88 is the minor group. The 
last and, thus, finest level is the unit on which 390 occupational groups are uniquely 
identified by a 4-digit code. Typically, these groups consist of more than  one occu­
18 Syntax to replicate all empirical analyses in  this chapter is available at https://osf.io/dqtkg/.
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pation (International Labour Organization, 1990, section “Design and Structure”). I 
describe the operationalization of the teacher variable in  the next section.
Operational definitions
This study focuses on discrimination in  elementary education. Therefore, investigat­
ing the attitudes of elementary school teachers would be a priority over m ore gen­
eral operationalizations of what a teacher is. However, in  the ALLBUS 2006 there are 
only N  =  7 teachers that can clearly be identified as elementary school teachers (see 
appendix B). So, to reliably learn about teachers' attitudes towards different ethnic 
groups, I operationalize teachers in  a  broader way and look at the attitudes of school 
teachers.  This operationalization results in  a variable that equals 1 for all respondents 
generically classified as teachers holding a tertiary degree as well as all respondents 
classified particularly as secondary and elementary school teachers as well as those 
working in  special education and 0 for everybody else. The table in  B shows the oper­
ationalization and the num ber of observations per ISCO-88 unit. In sum, I can identify 
N =  51 respondents as school teachers in  the ALLBUS 2006. School teachers are be­
tween 25 and 65 years old (M =  47.7, SD  =  9.74), a majority of 68.7% is female and 
12.5% is from  East Germany19.
I assess the sensitivity of my results by also looking at the attitudes of an even larger 
group of respondents: I construct a variable that—in addition to school teachers—also 
equals 1 for those teaching at colleges or universities, those that work as teachers but 
only hold a secondary degree, as well as those who work in  preschool and kinder­
garten and hold either a tertiary o r secondary educational degree. In  fact, of the 25 
respondents I gain in  this second operationalization 20 work in  pre-primary education 
(ISCO-88 units 2332 and 3320, see appendix B). Therefore, the group of all educators 
(N =  76) comprises those respondents who personally teach, educate, or take care 
of children or students of different ages in institutional settings. Respondents in  this 
group are between 23 and 65 years old (M =  46.1, S D  =  10.69), a majority of 74.1% is 
female and 20.4% is from East Germany20.
While both operationalizations have less observations than we might wish for, note 
that quantitative studies in  education that focus on variables on the level of teach­
ers often feature similar or even lower num bers of teachers. Recent examples of
19 Means, standard deviations, and proportions are calculated using weights to account for 
oversampling of respondents living in  East Germany.
20 As for school teachers, means, standard deviations, and proportions are calculated using 
weights.
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small-N studies on teachers come from different lines of research and include stud­
ies on teachers' implicit attitudes (Bergh et al., 2010; Glock & Karbach, 2015; Glock 
& Klapproth, 2017), studies that investigate teachers' expectations as self-fulfilling 
prophecies(Lorenzet al., 2016), researchonteachers' diagnostic competence (Artelt & 
Rausch, 2014; Karing et al., 2011), and, last but not least, studies that experimentally 
and, thus, more directly investigate discrimination in education (Sprietsma, 2013). 
Note that m ost of these studies not only investigate simple summary statistics but of­
ten conduct m ore or less complex multivariate analyses on these samples, meaning 
that the num ber of observations per cell and, therefore, statistical power is reduced 
further.
A key reason for the relatively small num ber of observations in  these studies is that 
it is rather difficult and, thus, costly to draw probability samples of teachers. A possi­
ble solution is to investigate beliefs or attitudes of pre-service or beginning teachers 
that are still enrolled as students or educational science students m ore broadly and 
to use regional convenience samples (e.g., Hachfeld et al., 2015; Hachfeld et al., 2011; 
Hachfeld et al., 2012). This way, samples of N >  100 observations can be achieved 
m ore easily. However, while such samples might be considered appropriate for test­
ing the reliability and validity of new instrum ents, they are a  severe limitation if in­
terest lies in  quantifying the num ber of prejudiced teachers. This is, because these 
samples are biased with regard to variables that are known to determ ine the valence 
of attitudes. These variables include age, gender, and region of residence. Note that it 
is all the m ore astonishing that some of the small-N studies cited above are also con­
ducted using samples that are restricted in  these ways—for example, featuring stu­
dents only (e.g., Glock & Karbach, 2015).
The bias of convenience samples
To assess the bias of geographically limited convenience samples of students com­
pared to probability samples of teachers I exploit the fact that Hachfeld et al. (2011, 
study 2) implement four items from an item-battery repeatedly used in the ALLBUS 
to assess prejudice against “foreigners”. The original German item  wordings and a 
translation into English can be found in  appendix A. The sample of Hachfeld et al. 
(2011) comprises N  =  340 students (233 women) from  a German university of which 
“79% (n =  254) were of German nationality and 21% (n =  68) had an  immigrant 
background” (Hachfeld et al., 2011, p. 992)21. Participants were 19 to 55 years old
21 I quote Hachfeld et al. (2011), since the two categories—being of German nationality and 
having an  immigrant background—are, of course, not mutually exclusive.
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(M =  25, SD  =  5) and were either teacher candidates (n =  266, 81%) or students 
of educational science (n =  62, 19%).
Because Hachfeld et al. (2011) changed theoriginal 7-point scale into a 5-point scale, 
I cannot directly compare the m ean (M =  1.76) and standard deviation (SD =  .57) re­
ported by Hachfeld et al. (2011) to the m ean and standard deviation of school teachers 
in the ALLBUS 2006 (M =  2.82, SD  =  1.10; weights apply). Higher num bers stand 
for m ore negatively prejudiced attitudes towards foreigners. To compare the m ean 
responses of participants in  Hachfeld et al. (2011) and the school teachers identified 
in the ALLBUS 2006, I calculate Cohen (1977)'s d by taking the difference of m ean to 
scale midpoint divided by the sample standard deviation for the respective group22. 
This calculation yields an effect size of d =  (3 -  1.76)/.57 =  2.18 for the num bers re­
ported in  Hachfeld et al. (2011). That is, students that participated in  Hachfeld et al. 
(2011) lie over 2 standard deviations away from the scale midpoint towards the less 
prejudiced pole of the scale. For the school teachers identified in  the ALLBUS 2006, 
the corresponding calculation yields d =  (4 -  2.82)/1.10 =  1.07, which is about half 
the size into the same direction from the scale midpoint.
In  summary, the results of the calculation above suggest that, as expected, geo­
graphically limited convenience samples of students are selective samples that should 
not be trusted as an unbiased source of evidence on the distribution and valence of 
teachers' attitudes or beliefs.
4.4.2 Absolute and Relative Measures of Prejudice
I construct and calculate both absolute and relative measures of prejudice. Absolute 
m easures of social distance are meaningful since they provide an estimate for the va­
lence and distribution of negative prejudices towards different ethnic or social groups. 
However, relative m easures are even m ore im portant because, strictly speaking, only 
the relative distances between different groups allow us to hypothesize about discrim­
ination understood as causal effect of, say, ethnicity, in the counterfactual sense. 
Therefore, it could be argued—and I have (see, e.g., chapter 3)—that absolute mea­
sures of prejudice, too, are only relevant for the study of discrimination relative to 
m easures of prejudice towards other groups or an assumed baseline of negative or 
positive prejudice towards the ethnic majority or teachers' in-group.
Recall (or see section 3.1.1 again) the discussion of Becker (1957/1971)'s taste for
22 Cohen (1977, p. 20) defined the effect size d as the m ean difference of two groups or pop­
ulations divided by the standard deviation of either group or population that are assumed 
equal.
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discrimination, d, that, if di  >  0 toward a particular group, increases the net costs of 
employing a worker from  that group for employer i. However, to understand what a 
positive taste for discrimination against a particular group m eans for an employer's 
behavior—or teacher's behavior, for that matter—towards mem bers of this group, we 
need to be explicit about the reference group—that is, the counterfactual causal state— 
and the corresponding di  for that group. Note further that similar argum ents can be 
derived from social identity theory and other approaches resting on both ingroup fa­
voritism and outgroup derogation that may vary in  intensity between different in- and 
out-groups. The im portance of relative distances between groups including the ethnic 
majority or other ingroups is also acknowledged in implicit m easures such as the IAT, 
where the valence of prejudice against outgroups is operationalized as difference (in 
differences) to a  reference group.
Absolute measures
As a  meaningful absolute m easure of teachers' negative prejudice towards the differ­
ent ethnic groups—that is, Turks, Eastern Europeans, and Italians—I calculate two in­
dicators: First, I calculate the proportion of respondents that finds it either unpleasant 
if a m em ber of the ethnic group in  question were to m arry into their family or unpleas­
ant having m em bers of the respective group as neighbors. This is achieved by creating 
a dummy variable that is 0 for those respondents who report to be either indifferent 
(0 on the response scale) or to feel pleasant (+1/+2/+3 on the response scale) towards 
both social situations, and 1 for everybody else.
As a m ore conservative absolute estimate of negative prejudice, I calculate, sec­
ondly, the proportion of respondents that reports to find both situations unpleasant: 
a m em ber of the respective group m arries into the respondents family and mem bers 
of the respective group are neighbors of the respondent. The corresponding dummy 
variable is 0 for all respondents who report to be either indifferent (0 on the response 
scale) or to feel pleasant (+1/+2/+3 on the response scale) towards either social situ­
ation, and 1 for everybody else. Clearly, respondents that score 1 on this m easure 
have stronger negative prejudice against the respective group than the respondents 
that score 1 on the measure above. Thus, the proportions of teachers and educators 
holding negative prejudice should be lower according to this m easure. Also, since the 
scale by Bogardus (1933) was set up as a Guttman scale, it can be expected that those 
who feel unpleasant about having a m em ber of a particular group as neighbor, would 
most likely also feel unpleasant if a m em ber of the same group were to m arry into
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their family. Since my interest is more of substantive than of technical nature, I will
not investigate this further.
From bothdum m yvariables, I calculatetheproportions of three groups of respondents— 
school teachers, educators, and all respondents—reporting negative prejudice against 
the different ethnic groups using weights that correct for the oversampling of East 
Germans.
Relative measures
I propose three relative measures of negative prejudice: First, I will simply take the 
differences in proportions of negative prejudice towards different groups as operational­
ized above. I will test whether these differences are statistically significant. Weights 
will be applied to address the oversampling of respondents living in  East Germany.
For the two remaining measures, I construct a sum  score of prejudice towards each 
ethnic group by adding the responses to the two social distance questions asked about
eachgroup. Thisyieldsaprejudicesum scorew ithcorrespondingm ean(M ), standard
deviation (SD), and Cronbach's alpha (a) per ethnic group—that is, Turks, Eastern 
Europeans, Italians—and respondent group. Based on these sum scores, secondly, 
I calculate t-tests to obtain mean differences with p-values and confidence intervals. 
Here, too, I apply weights.
Thirdly, also based on the sum scores, I calculate effect sizes for mean differences 
in teachers' prejudice towards different groups to enable comparisons “free of our 
original m easurem ent unit” Cohen (1977, p. 20). Cohen (1977) suggested the effect 
size d, defined as the mean difference of two groups or populations divided by the 
standarddev iationofeithergrouporpopulation thatareassum edequal. Iestim ated  
following Cohen (1977, pp. 66-67) as
d = Xl  — X2 (4.1)
where
s = (n 1 — 1)s 12 +  (n 2 — 1)s 2 
n 1 +  n 2 — 2
(4.2)V
and where s 12 and s 2 are the unbiased sample variances o fX1 and X2 . Note thatweights 
are applied throughout and, thus, n 1 and n 2 are the weighted num ber of observa- 
tions23.
23 The weighted num ber of observations deviates only slightly from the actual num ber of ob-
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Proportion of Teachers with Negative Prejudice
Table 4.1 shows the proportions of school teachers, all educators, and all respondents 
holding negative prejudices against Turks, Eastern Europeans, and Italians along with 
the num ber of observations (n) and standard erro rs(SE )for two different operational­
izations of negative prejudice. While the absolute num bers speak for themselves,
their stability over the two different groups of teachers—school teachers versus all edu- 
cators—lends credibility to the absolute num bers themselves as well as to the follow­
ing analyses regarding the differences and relative distances between groups. As is 
apparent from the numbers in table 4.1, the ranking of the groups is stable over all 
operationalizations of prejudice and all groups of respondents: Most negative is the 
prejudice towards Turks, followed by Eastern Europeans, and then Italians, against 
w hom the two groups ofteachers reportvirtuallyno negative prejudice no m atterthe 
operationalization (0%-3%). Compared with—depending on the operationalization— 
25 to 44 percent of teachers reporting negative prejudice against Turks and 12 to 28 
percent reporting negative prejudice toward Eastern Europeans, this leads to a clear 
“ethnic hierarchy” (Hagendoorn, 1995) in social distances towards the three groups.
All contrasts between different ethnic groups are statistically significant with p <  
.05 for all groups ofrespondents and operationalizations ofprejudice, except the dif­
ference between Turks and Eastern Europeans in the more conservative m easure of 
prejudice (“AND” in table 4.1) for the smaller group ofschool teachers; this contrast 
is only significant on the 10% level (t =  1.68, p =  .099).
4.5.2 Mean Differences and Effect Sizes
Virtually the same results are obtained by turning to m ean differences between the 
sum scores of prejudice towards the different ethnic groups. For school teachers, 
sum scores yield the following num bers: Prejudice towards Turks (M =  - .0 5 , SD  =  
2.74, a = .82), prejudice towards Eastern Europeans (M = .56, SD = 2.46, a = .73), 
prejudice towards Italians (M =  3.03, SD =  2.35, a = .73). For all educators the 
num bers are very similar: Prejudice towards Turks (M =  -.07 , SD =  2.95, a  =  .82), 
prejudice towards Eastern Europeans (M =  .97, SD =  2.65, a  =  .73), prejudice to­
wards Italians (M =  2.92, SD =  2.37, a  =  .73). Again, all possible contrasts between
servations (e.g., nw e ig h te d  =  49.13 instead of n r e a l  =  48 for the sum  score of school teachers' 
prejudice against Turks).
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Table 4.1: Proportion of school teachers, all educators, and all respondents holding
negative prejudices against different ethnic groups.
Respondents Target group n
AND OR
Proportion (SE) Proportion (SE)
Turks 49 .25 (.06) .44 (.07)
School teachers Eastern Europeans 49 .15 (.05) .28 (.06)
Italians 49 .00 .02 (.004)
Turks 70 .26 (.05) .44 (.06)
All educators Eastern Europeans 72 .12 (.04) .24 (.05)
Italians 72 .01 (.01) .03 (.02)
Turks 3316 .34 (.008) .51 (.009)
All respondents Eastern Europeans 3310 .20 (.007) .34 (.008)
Italians 3321 .03 (.003) .10 (.005)
Source: ALLBUS 2006, own calculations applying weights.
AND: marriage and  neighbor unpleasant; OR: m arriage or neighbor unpleasant
ethnic groups are statistically significant (p <  .01) for both school teachers and all edu­
cators except the contrast between Turks and Eastern Europeans for the smaller group 
of school teachers that only reaches significance on the 10% level (t =  -1 .73, p =  .09).
Even more so than differences in proportions, effect sizes help to substantiate in­
terpretations of how large the size of a group difference really is. Again, I prefer to let 
the num bers speak for themselves—instead of applying arbitrary schemes that sup­
posedly help to decide when a difference is small, medium, or large (Cohen, 1977, 
pp. 24-27)24. Effect sizes for all contrasts between ethnic groups and both groups 
of teachers (d1 : school teachers; d2 : all educators) are: Turks-Eastern Europeans 
(d1 =  - .2 3 , d2  =  -.37), Turks-Italians (d1 =  -1 .21 , d2  =  -1.12), Eastern Europeans- 
Italians (d1 =  -1 .03 , d2  =  -.77). As with all other measures, the relative ranks ofthe 
groups according to effect size differences are such that Turks are target o fthe most 
negative prejudice,followed byEastern Europeans,followed,in turn ,byItalians.
24 Should the reader be interested or in  need of a rem inder or both, Cohen (1977, pp. 24­
27) suggested to call d =  .2 small, d =  .5 medium, and d =  .8 large, even though he ac­
knowledged that “a certain risk inherent in  offering conventional operational definitions 
for these term s for use in  power analysis in  as diverse a field of inquiry as behavioral sci­
ence” (Cohen, 1977, p . 25).
118 GESIS Series |  Volume 26
Discrimination in Education
4.6 Summary and Conclusion
In  this chapter, I have been concerned with teachers' prejudices. Understood as an at­
titude towards and, hence, as an evaluation of a  particular group or category of people, 
prejudice is both theoretically and empirically a key and, in  fact, the m ost important 
determ inant of discriminatory behavior.
Previous research on teachers' prejudice has not been particularly enlightening be­
cause of several shortcomings of which the m ost im portant are that these studies typ­
ically rely on geographically limited convenience samples of students, that their find­
ings or reported num bers can neither be interpreted in a meaningful absolute way 
nor used to calculate differences between various ethnic or social groups, and some­
times use different terminology than the one proposed in  this chapter and investigate 
stereotypes or other forms of beliefs instead of prejudice.
In  this chapter, I have used data from  the German general social survey, ALLBUS, 
collected in  2006, to show how biased the samples of previous studies are. Judging by 
effect sizes, studies based on geographically limited convenience samples of students 
appear to underestim ate teachers' prejudice towards immigrants by about one stan­
dard deviation. Using the same data set, I address this and the other limitations of 
previous studies by investigating teachers' explicit attitudes towards different ethnic 
groups living in  Germany. Using the 4-digit ISCO-88 unit code, I am  able to identify a 
groupofN  =  51teachersinelem entaryorprim aryandsecondaryschoolsandagroup 
of N =  76 educators that additionally include lecturers and professors at universities 
as well as educators in  preschool and kindergarten. Obviously, analyses based on the 
larger group have higher statistical power and allow to assess the sensitivity of my 
results for school teachers—the group I am primarily interested in.
To examine teachers' prejudice, I make use of m easures of social distance in  two 
social situations and towards three different ethnic groups, namely Turks, Eastern 
Europeans of German descent, and Italians. I construct and calculate both absolute 
and relative m easures of prejudice. As for an absolute m easure, I calculate the propor­
tions of teachers with negative prejudice towards the three ethnic groups. Using two 
different operationalizations—one more, one less conservative—I can show that neg­
ative prejudice against Turks is pretty widespread among teachers in  German schools 
but less so against Eastern Europeans and virtually non-existent against Italians. More 
im portant than absolute num bers are the relative distances between groups. Based on 
sum  scores of social distance measures, I find differences in  the magnitudes of bias 
against the groups that result in effect sizes of d >  1 for the contrast between Turks 
and Italians, and around d =  .8 and d =  1 for the contrast between Eastern Europeans 
and Italians.
GESIS Series |  Volume 26 119
Sebastian E. Wenz |  4 Prejudices of German Teachers
In  conclusion, my analyses of explicit prejudice confirm the findings of Glock and 
Klapproth (2017) for implicit prejudice, namely that teachers in  Germany hold atti­
tudes that are biased against Turks. What it adds is that teachers also hold negative 
prejudice against Eastern Europeans, but not Italians. To put the findings into broader 
perspective, note that all my analyses provide evidence for a  very clear ethnic hierar­
chy that—from  top to bottom—looks as follows: Italians >  Eastern Europeans >  Turks. 
This pattern confirms findings in other studies for Germany (e.g., Ganter, 2003; Klein­
ert, 2004; Steinbach, 2004) but also other countries; especially the finding of Turks at 
or near the bottom of the hierarchy has been replicated for different western countries 
at different historical times (Bogardus, 1925; Hagendoorn, 1995; Hraba et al., 1989).
With regard to discrimination in  German education on both individual and group 
level and, eventually, the explanation of inequality between students of different eth­
nic origin, my findings suggest that prejudice-based or taste-based discrimination to 
the disadvantage of students with Turkish as well as Eastern European background 
cannot be ruled out. In  contrast, the disadvantage of Italian students (e.g., Kristen, 
2002; Kristen & Granato, 2007; Olczyk, 2016) is probably not due to such a  form of 
discrimination.
There are some noteworthy limitations of the study presented in  this chapter. First, 
even though the sample sizes for the two groups of teachers I distinguished are of com­
parable size as the samples of other studies on teachers' attitudes or beliefs (e.g., Glock 
& Karbach, 2015; Lorenz et al., 2016), a replication using a larger sample of teach­
ers would be desirable. Secondly, using data from a  general social survey, we cannot 
know whether teachers actually teach students of Turkish, Eastern European, or Ital­
ian origin. The experiment in  chapter 6 will address this problem . Thirdly, a point I 
briefly m entioned when discussing the design of Glock and Klapproth (2017)'s study
is that m easures of ethnic prejudice may confound ethnic and social class prejudice
(e.g., Blalock, 1967, pp. 199-203), since the ethnic groups towards which prejudice is 
expressed usually vary regarding their endowment with cultural, economic, and so­
cial resources—in particular compared to the ethnic majority. For the analyses and 
findings in this chapter, though, Isuggestthatsocial class differences should notplay 
an important role in explaining the differences in teachers' social distances towards 
ethnic groups since socioeconomic differences between ethnic groups in Germany 
are simply not pronounced enough (Büchel & Frick, 2004; Kalter, 2008; Kogan, 2007). 
Fourthly, just like previous research, I could not examine teachers' prejudice against 
different social classes or againstm en and women or boys and girls, for thatm atter.
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Stereotypes systematically 
affect how people perceive, 
process information about and 
respond to , group members.
(Dovidio et al., 2010)
In  this chapter, I am  concerned with stereotypes of German teachers towards different 
groups of students. In  line with many contributions to the social cognition literature—
the dominant field within social psychology since several decades—I define a stereo­
type as a belief or a set of beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, or behaviors ofapar- 
ticular group or category ofpeople (see, e.g., Hilton & von Hippel, 1996, p. 240; Ashmore 
& D elBoca,1981, p.16; D.J. Schneider, 2004,p .  24; Ehrlich,1973, p.20).
Itisv italforanystudyofdiscrim ination ineducationtounderstandthem echanics, 
contents, and valence of teachers' stereotypes, since stereotypes are the key determi- 
nantofdiscrim inatorybehaviorinsom eofthem ostim porttheoriesofdiscrim ination 
(e.g., Aigner & Cain, 1977; Fiske et al., 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Phelps, 1972) 
andhave beenshow ntoserve particularfunctionsinperceiving,storing,andretriev- 
ing information in  numerous studies. It has been shown that stereotypes and their 
use in  interpersonal interactions are connected to a largely inevitable and automatic 
processofcategorizingpeopleonthebasisofbiologicalandsocialcues(A llport,1954; 
Fiske, 1998; Fiske e ta l., 1999). Also, people tend to seek (Darley& Gross, 1983; Snyder 
& Swann, 1978), encode (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), recall (Bodenhausen & 
Lichtenstein, 1987), and interpret (Darley & Gross, 1983) information in  a stereotype- 
consistent way. Eventually, stereotypes may influence the way people judge and treat 
other people and, therefore, lead to discrimination that disadvantages individuals or, 
potentially, whole groups. Understood as hypotheses about outgroups or ingroups 
(D. J. Schneider, 2004, pp. 197-228; Snyder & Swann, 1978), stereotypes may turn into 
self-fulfilling prophecies (Jussim, 1989; Jussim et al., 1996; Jussim & Harber, 2005; 
Jussim, Robustelli, et al., 2009; Lorenz et al., 2016) or affect the behavior of targets 
of stereotypes such that members of the targeted group behave in a way that tends 
to confirm the stereotype and, thus, affect real-world outcomes in, for example, edu­
cation (e.g., Lee et al., 1995; Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Schmader et al., 2008; Stricker et
25 This chapter is based on joint work with Melanie Olczyk and Georg Lorenz (Wenz et al., 
2016).
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al., 2015). Therefore, the first research question I am going to address in this chapter 
is simply this: Can we validly measure teachers' stereotypes about different groups of 
students?
However, the links from  categorization to stereotype activation, from stereotype 
activation to application, and from stereotype application to discrimination are not 
automatic and inevitable processes that occur regardless of other, moderating, fac­
tors (see, e.g. Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Therefore, we need theories of dis­
crimination (see chapter 3) that tell us under which conditions stereotypes do turn  
into discriminatory behavior and under which conditions they don't and under which 
conditions discriminatory behavior based on stereotypes disadvantages whole groups 
(see sections 2.4.1 and 3.1.2 for the distinction between individual discrimination 
and group discrimination). Following different theoretical approaches (e.g., Aigner 
& Cain, 1977; Fiske et al., 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), stereotypes—i.e., their 
content or valence—need to differ between groups, in  order to explain individual 
discrimination. Therefore, the second question I seek to answer in  this chapter is 
whether teachers hold stereotypes about different groups of students that differ be­
tween groups? Although there are other conditions under which group discrimina­
tion arises from individual discrimination, with regard to the nature of stereotypes, 
it is the erroneous perception of group differences that leads to group discrimination 
(Aigner & Cain, 1977; England & Lewin, 1989). Therefore, the third question I intend to 
address is whether teachers' stereotypes are accurate or biased and, if they are biased, 
to which groups' (dis)advantage?
5.1 Conceptualizing Stereotypes
Research on stereotypes has a  long history: From Lippmann (1922)'s “pictures in  our 
heads” m etaphor until today's multifaceted perspectives on the term , definitions of 
stereotypes abound. I will—unlike in  chapter 2—not provide an in-depth discussion of 
many different conceptualizations. But since this chapter deals with the development 
of a  new measure of teachers' stereotypes, it is necessary to provide a more detailed 
account of how stereotypes have been conceptualized than for prejudice in  chapter 4. 
Therefore, I will—as concise as possible—explain why I chose a particular definition 
over others, that is, why I find it m ore useful in an  empirical study on discrimination 
in education than alternative conceptualizations.
For m ore detailed reviews of different conceptualizations of stereotypes see e.g.,
D. J. Schneider (2004, pp. 14-26), Ashmore and Del Boca (1981), Leyens et al. (1994, 
pp. 9-18), Nelson (2006, pp. 4-7).
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5.1.1 Useful and Not so Useful Definitions
Recall that I—in line with key contributions to the literature (e.g., Hilton & von Hippel, 
1996,p.240;Ashmore&DelBoca, 1981, p.16; D.J.Schneider,2004,p .24 ;E hrlich ,1973, 
p. 20)—define a stereotype as a belief or a set of beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, 
or behaviors of a particular group or category of people.  Defined in  this way, a stereotype 
is a cognitive structure that links knowledge to a category of people (Bless et al., 2004, 
p. 53; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000).
My definition is very close to one of the most widely used definitions, namely the 
one proposed by Ashmore and Del Boca (1981):
Thus, we propose the following as the core meaning of the term  “stereo­
type”: A set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people.  (Ash­
m ore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 16, their emphasis)
Also very similar is the definition by D. J. Schneider (2004), who also provides a key 
argum ent in  favor of his—and my—definition:
The most basic definition I can offer, the one with the fewest constraining 
assumptions, is that stereotypes are qualities perceived to be associated with 
particular groups or categories of people.  (D. J. Schneider, 2004, p. 24, his 
emphasis)
D. J. Schneider (2004) argum ent that should be a key argum ent for any researcher to 
pick a definition, is that it is a basic or general one. It is a definition that does not 
constrain stereotypes in  unnecessary ways to be a particular subset of beliefs about 
groups or empirically work in particular ways. I discuss these subsets and empirical 
mechanisms in  the paragraphs below.
True or false?
One of the oldest debates around the term  has been concerned with the question of 
whether stereotypes should be conceptualized as incorrect per se. Katz and Braly 
(1933, 1935), who conducted the first systematic empirical studies on stereotypes, de­
fined a  stereotype as “a fixed impression, which conforms very little to the facts it 
pretends to represent” (Katz & Braly, 1935, p. 181). Similarly, Allport (1954) suggests 
that a stereotype is “an exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191) and, 
hence, rules out by definition that a stereotype can be “a valid generalization” (p. 192). 
In  contrast, some 20 years later, Ehrlich (1973) was m uch less restrictive and allowed 
stereotypes to also be correct, in  referring to stereotypes as “a set of beliefs and dis­
beliefs about any group of people”.
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Over tim e it has become the “standard viewpoint” (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996, 
p. 240) to allow stereotypes to contain m ore or less accurate beliefs—that is, empir­
ically, they can be exactly right or completely wrong or anything in  between. My con­
ceptualization, that was also adopted for the item development in  the NEPS (Wenz 
et al., 2016), is consistent with this standard viewpoint; only from this standard view­
point it makes sense to ask and empirically investigate the question whether and, if 
so, how biased teachers' stereotypes are.
Individual or cultural?
Furthermore, different forms of stereotypes have been discussed. One im portant dis­
tinction separates personal or individual from cultural stereotypes (Ashmore & Del 
Boca, 1979, 1981; Gardner, 1973). Ashmore and Del Boca (1981), for instance, sug­
gested “that the term  'stereotype' should be reserved for the set of beliefs held by an 
individual regarding a  social group and that the term  'cultural stereotype' should be 
used to describe shared or community-wide patterns of beliefs” (Ashmore & Del Boca, 
1981, p. 19).
Especially earlier contributions conceptualized stereotypes as shared or consen­
sual beliefs about the characteristics or attributes of groups. That is, cultural consen­
sus of some form was a  necessary condition for a belief to be called a stereotype. The 
studies of Katz and Braly (1933), Katz and Braly (1935), for example, implicitly built on 
this prem ise. Vinacke (1957) argued that these and other earlier studies on stereotypes 
were based on an understanding of stereotypes as “a collection of trait-names upon 
which a large percentage of people agree as appropriate for describing some class of 
individuals (Vinacke, 1957, p. 230). Even Gardner (1973), who introduced an individ­
ual perspective by focusing on the individual stereotyper and, thus, on the process of 
stereotyping, upheld the “traditional definition of stereotypes as consensual beliefs 
about the characteristics of ethnic groups” (Gardner, 1973, p. 134).
Around that time—i.e., in  the 1970s (D. J. Schneider, 2004, p. 22)—m ore and m ore 
scholars changed to a m ore individual perspective on stereotypes and processes of 
stereotyping (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979; Ehrlich, 1973, e.g., ). In recent years, it has 
been a shared belief among social psychologists and other social scientists that stereo­
types should be conceptualized as beliefs held by individuals (see, e.g., Bordalo et al., 
2016; Dovidio et al., 2010; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Nelson, 2006; D. J. Schneider, 
2004). Note, however, that this perspective does not imply that there is no social or 
cultural aspect to stereotypes: Indeed, individual level and societal level variables and 
processes do interact in  determining contents and valence of individual beliefs—i.e.,
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stereotypes. Stereotypes held by one individual can but do not have to be shared by 
others and widely shared beliefs are likely to be known by those who do not endorse 
them  explicitly (Devine, 1989, p. 5). Conversely, knowing about cultural stereotypes 
might be enough to build implicit associations that are different from explicit beliefs 
in  that they are hard to control, automatic constructs (Devine, 1989).
While I am  not particularly interested in  stereotypes held by single individuals— 
i.e., single teachers—I follow the logic of methodological individualism and aim at 
m easuring individual stereotypes. This position was also adopted in  the NEPS and 
the question whether and how to aggregate the individual beliefs—e.g., in a statistical 
model or by defining a criterion for a  cultural consensus among teachers—was left to 
the data user (Wenz et al., 2016, p. 5).
Explicit or Implicit?
In  recent years the distinction between explicit beliefs and implicit associations has 
been the most im portant and most debated in  research on stereotypes and attitudes 
(see, e.g., Cunningham et al., 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). While some scholars suggest 
a distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes and stereotypes (e.g., Cunning­
ham  et al., 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998), others distinguish
between explicit and implicit measures of stereotypes, attitudes, and the like (Fazio &
Olson, 2003, pp. 302-303). In line with Wenz et al. (2016), I take the latter position and 
will elaborate on this distinction below in section 5.2.
Stereotypes and related constructs
Before I continue with a discussion of how stereotypes have been measured, let 
me briefly summarize the differences between stereotypes and related constructs, 
namely stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. While the latter two have been 
discussedinchapters2 and4,Ihavehithertonotelaboratedonthedifferencebetw een 
stereotypes and stereotyping.
In linew ith theliterature , Iexplicitlydistinguishstereotypesfrom stereotypingand 
conceptualize stereotyping as the process o f applying a stereotype in any judgment, impres­
sion, or expectation formation—be it towards an individual or a number ofindividuals (see, 
e.g., Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Leyens et al., 1994; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; 
Zarate & Smith, 1990). The distinction m atters more than is obvious on first sight, 
because it implies that stereotypes themselves cannot be m easured by assessing im­
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pressions or judgments of individuals. For example, teachers' stereotypes about the 
educational abilities of different groups of students cannot be m easured by asking 
teachers to rate the educational ability of single students and then assess potential 
bias in these ratings by virtue of particular group characteristics such as ethnicity, 
social class, or gender.
As laid out in chapter 4, by the term  prejudice I refer to an attitude toward a partic­
ular group or category of people (see also, e.g., Correll et al., 2010; Ehrlich, 1973; D. J. 
Schneider, 2004). Since by an attitude, I mean “general evaluations of people, ob­
jects, and issues” (Fazio & Petty, 2008, p. 1), prejudice is an evaluation of a group or 
category of people. In contrast, stereotypes, understood as beliefs, lack any evalu­
ative component. Thus, the key difference is that, while stereotypes can be correct 
or—probably more often—more or less incorrect, prejudices can't. An evaluation is 
positive or negative but neither false or inaccurate nor true or accurate, respectively. 
However, stereotypes—sometimes referred to as the cognitive component of preju­
dice (Dovidio et al., 2010, p. 5; Fiske, 1998, p. 357)—may serve as justifications for 
prejudice (Crandall etal., 2011). Therefore, anegative prejudice can certainlybe built 
on a biased and, thus, incorrectstereotype.
Discrimination, as defined in chapter 2, is the causal effect o fan  information about 
or a signal sent out by an individual on how this individual is treated by another indi­
vidual. That is, discrimination refers to behavior, whereas stereotypes refer to knowl­
edge and prejudices refer to evaluation. This distinction is also known as tripartite 
conceptualizationofcategorybasedreactionswithstereotypesascognitive, prejudice 
as affective, and discrimination as behavioral component, respectively (Fiske, 1998, 
p. 357). Ofcourse, discrimination is not simply the behavioral manifestation ofprej- 
udice or stereotypes and, hence, neither equals stereotyping nor applied prejudice 
(J. M. Jones, 1997).
People with negative prejudices or negative stereotypes do not necessarily engage 
in discriminatory behavior toward members of the target group—be it on rational 
grounds or because theyfollow norm s (Gaertner &Dovidio, 1986;LaPiere, 1934;M er- 
ton, 1949). On the other hand, rational-calculating or norm-following behavior might 
also cause people to discriminate againstm em bers o faparticu lar group even though 
they do not hold negative stereotypes about or have negative prejudices against the 
samegroup—see, forexample, M erton(1949)'sclassictypologyonthisorthe contribu­
tions to the institutional discrimination literature (e.g., J. R. Feagin & Booher Feagin, 
1986; Gomolla, 2016; Gomolla & Radtke, 2010).
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5.2 How (Not) to Measure Stereotypes
5.2.1 Explicit Versus Implicit Measures of Stereotypes
Probably the most im portant distinction between various measures of stereotypes is 
the one between explicit measures, o r measures of explicit beliefs,  and implicit mea­
sures, or m easures of implicit associations. Implicit m easures of stereotypes and atti­
tudes are relatively recent tools that have created a lot of attention among social sci­
entists. These measures—e.g., prim ing m ethods (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995) or the im­
plicit association test (IAT) (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and related tasks—“rely on pro­
cesses that are uncontrolled, unintentional, autonomous, goal-independent, purely- 
stimulus-driven, unconscious, efficient, or fast” (De Houwer & Moors, 2007, p. 192)— 
or at least “less controllable by respondents” than explicit m easures (Fazio & Olson, 
2003, p. 636; Gawronski, 2009).
Therefore, it has been suggested that implicit m easures have two major advantages 
over explicit measures: Firstly, implicit m easures should be less sensitive to social 
desirability bias (Fazio et al., 1995, p. 1022; Greenwald et al., 1998, p. 1465). In  an 
“era of contested prejudice” (Lucas, 2008), respondents might shy away from honestly 
reporting their stereotypes to not violate personal or societal norm s (also see, e.g., 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Secondly, implicit m easures could allow for a m ore ac­
curate m easure of stereotypes, since respondents might lack introspective access to 
implicitly stored associations and, hence, would simply be unable to accurately report 
all aspects of a stereotype explicitly (Hofmann & Wilson, 2010).
Not only have these supposed advantages been called into question (Gawronski, 
2009; Gawronski et al., 2007), there are also at least two major advantages of explicit 
m easures that m ade them  our m ethod of choice to assess teachers' stereotypes in  the 
NEPS: Firstly, they are very easy to implement, as the researcher only has to ask one 
or m ore questions and the respondent answers in m ore or less closed form . Secondly, 
explicit m easures usually can be implemented in  a paper-pencil survey questionnaire 
like they are used in  the NEPS and filled in  by the respondents without assistance26. 
Hence, they do not require additional data collection and are, thus, m ore cost effective 
in  a large scale survey such as the NEPS.
26 While there are paper pencil versions of the IAT and other implicit measures (see, e.g., 
Vargas et al., 2007, for a review), they are all still much m ore complex than explicit closed- 
ended questions, where one item can be enough to assess the stereotype dimension of in­
terest.
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5.2.2 A Brief History of Explicit Measures of Stereotypes
Explicit m easures of stereotypes have a long history in social science research. Katz 
and Braly (1933) m easured stereotypes by using an adjective checklist.  This m ethod 
asks the respondents to select those adjectives they consider to be typical of a par­
ticular group of people. The adjective checklist yields estimates of socially shared 
stereotype contents in  the aggregate presumably due to both prevalence and extrem­
ity of individual stereotypes. However, on the individual level these m easures are less 
useful, as differences between groups on a particular dimension cannot be quanti­
fied beyond the dichotomy 'mentioned-not mentioned'. For example, asking teachers 
whether they think particular groups of students are “hard-working” or not does not 
allow teachers to rank several groups according to how hard-working they supposedly 
are. The only feasible solution would be to present multiple items that qualify the ad­
jective of interest—e.g., “somewhat hard working”, “rather hard-working”, “extremely 
hard-working”, and so on. However, even this procedure does not yield m easures that 
allow to assess the accuracy of teachers' beliefs. Also, neither is it a  very efficient way 
to investigate beliefs, nor will it yield data that can readily be used for data analyses 
that aim  for testing hypotheses derived from theories of discrimination, such as sta­
tistical discrimination theory.
Percentage estimates or scale ratings are usually used to assess the prevalence of a 
stereotype but also allow for a more nuanced rating of groups. Percentage estimates 
ask the respondent to estimate the proportion of people from a social group that is 
characterized by an attribute or engages in a particular behavior (see, e.g., B. Park 
& Rothbart, 1982). Brigham (1971), for example, used percentage ratings to assess 
how prevalent respondents believe a particular characteristic or behavior is among a 
particular group of people and to quantify the deviation of individuals from the aver­
age respondent in  the sample. This way Brigham (1971) seeks to identify unjustified 
generalizations, precisely what he defines as a stereotype. The m ethod of percentage 
estimates could be used to assess the beliefs of teachers about the percentage of stu­
dents from  different ethnic and social groups that show a  particular skill or ability or 
successfully complete a  particular track. Such a m easure would allow to rank differ­
ent groups of students and—as long as the true prevalence is known, e.g., how large 
the proportion of students with a Turkish background is that successfully completes 
Gymnasium—to assess the accuracy of teachers' beliefs.
Similarly, in  scale ratings respondents either rate the likelihood or how typical it is 
that a  m em ber of a social group features a particular attribute or engages in  a partic­
ular behavior. These ratings can be very similar to percentage estimates and, hence, 
sometimes the two are treated interchangeably (e.g., D. J. Schneider, 2004, p. 40).
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However, how similar scale ratings are to percentage estimates obviously depends 
on the scale and the items used. Items that describe behavior and then  ask how much 
the respondent agrees that this behavior occurs (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1996) are not very 
useful for purposes of assessing the accuracy of teachers' beliefs—in particular with 
regard to group differences. Combining questions that ask for a clearly quantifiable 
characteristic with scales that represent or mimic the corresponding units seem s to 
be a much m ore useful approach.
The stereotype differential technique (Gardner, 1973) builds on the methodology of the 
semantic differential (Osgood et al., 1957) to assess respondents' stereotypes. Respon­
dents rate social groups on a bipolar scale—usually a 7-point scale—with endpoints 
labeled with opposing adjectives or traits. Socially shared or cultural stereotypes are 
defined through a  significant deviation of the sample m ean from the scale's midpoint 
and through the standard deviation in the sample, where a smaller variation means 
m ore consensus. An individual's stereotype score could be obtained by summing up 
an  individual's ratings on those dimensions identified as being part of the cultural 
stereotype (Gardner, 1973, p. 141).
Yet another way of measuring stereotypes is the diagnostic ratio,  suggested by Mc­
Cauley and Stitt (1978). Applying a Bayesian logic, the authors argue that form er m eth­
ods ignore baseline probabilities and suggest that a valid m easure of stereotypes has 
to relate group specific estimates of the prevalence of a particular characteristics or a 
particular behavior to estimates how prevalent the same characteristic of behavior is 
among all people.
Methods that focus on the distribution of a  particular characteristic or behavior 
among m em bers of a group of people are the so called histogram or distribution task 
(B.Park& Judd,1990;W yereta l.,2002)andrangetask(B .Park& Judd,1990). W hilethe 
former—drawing a histogram or distribution of a characteristic within a social group— 
seem s to be too m uch of a burden for some respondents (B. Park & Judd, 1990, p. 175), 
the range task is considered a fairly easy to understand measure that yields reliable 
estimates of both stereotypicality and dispersion (Correll et al., 2010, p. 53).
However, none of these methods—stereotype differential technique, diagnostic ra­
tio, histogram task, distribution task, or range task—yields informative quantitative in­
dividual level data that is easy to collect through a concise instrum ent in paper-pencil 
self-administered questionnaires. At the NEPS we concluded that some kind of sim­
ple and straightforward rating scale approach would b e the  m ostprom ising wayto end 
up with a quantitative m easure that yields within- and between-teacher variation that 
could be used in  a statistical model. How we developed and improved our m easure is 
described in  the next section.
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5.3 Development of an Item Battery to Assess Teacher's Stereotypes27
Since NEPS uses paper-pencil self-administered questionnaires for educators and 
teachers at all stages, implicit measures were unfeasible to implement and we turned 
to explicit measures instead. The first assessment of teachers' stereotypes about the 
performance of different groups of students takes place in the fourth wave of Starting 
Cohort 2 (“Kindergarten and Elementary School”). This wave focuses on second grade 
students and features interviews with their teachers and parents. We implemented 
m easures of stereotypes in  this cohort and at this early stage of the academic career 
since effects of stereotypes on academic performance are reported to be strongest 
among the youngest pupils (Jussim, Robustelli, et al., 2009, p. 360). Measures of child 
competencies undertaken at later times may, thus, be influenced by teachers' stereo­
types.
Becauseof thelim itedscopeof the questionnaires and our interest inseveral groups 
of students, we had to restrict our m easure toone key dimension. Theory suggests that 
the single most im portant belief for teachers' judgments in  grading, ability grouping, 
and track recommendations should be the performance of a student or, for that m at­
ter, the average performance of the group the student is categorized in by the teacher. 
This is backed up by empirical studies that find individual test scores to be the best 
predictor of grades and track recommendations at the end of elementary school in 
Germany (see, e.g., Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012). Also, teachers explicitly nam e competen­
cies and educational achievement or performance as the most im portant determ inant 
for their decision which track to recom mend (Stahl, 2007). Surprisingly, we neither 
found an  explicit m easure of teachers' stereotypes about average group competencies 
readily available, nor did we find a m easure that could have served as a  starting point. 
Hence, we developed our own explicit m easure of teachers' beliefs about the average 
competencies of students from various social and ethnic groups. On this way, we had 
to answer the following questions:
Which groups? At the NEPS, we decided to ask teachers to report their stereo­
types about those groups on which researchers in  German education have—for vari­
ous reasons—recently focused (for reviews see Kristen et al., 2011; Stocke et al., 2011). 
These groups are: Girls, boys, students with lower, middle, and upper social class
27 The development of the instrum ent introduced in  this section was a collaborative endeavor 
of pillar 3 and pillar 4 of the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) at the University of 
Bamberg, Germany, now at the Leibniz-Institute for Educational Trajectories. Melanie Ol- 
czyk (at the tim e pillar 4) and I (at the time pillar 3) were mainly responsible for developing 
and (pre)testing the instrum ent. Also see Wenz et al. (2016) on which this chapter is based.
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background, students of Turkish and Russian origin, as well as immigrants and ethnic 
majority students in  general. This includes the groups I focus on in this dissertation.
Which stereotypes exactly should we assess? We decided to assess teachers' stereotypes 
regarding mathematical and reading competencies because m ath and German are the 
two major subjects inGerm anelem entaryschool whosegrades in  several statesare ex­
plicit legal determ inants of the track recommendation at the end of elementary school 
(Helbig & Nikolai, 2015). Also, m ath and reading competencies are assessed in  wave 4 
of starting cohort 2 in  the NEPS, which enables researchers to directly investigate the 
accuracy of teachers' stereotypes.
How to ask for stereotypes? The introductionserves the purpose of a cover story and is 
supposed to reduce social desirability bias by turning teachers' attention to the NEPS 
competence tests—instead of just asking for general or innate abilities or competen­
cies of groups of students. Therefore, the introduction for the item  battery reads as 
follows (see also Figure 1):
In  the NEPS study “Educational trajectories in  Germany” the competencies 
of children are assessed in different domains. What do you think how sec­
ond graders from various groups will perform  in mathematics [reading]?
Through this introduction we intended to direct the teacher's attention away from the 
assessment of stereotypes and to their diagnostic competence as experts about educa­
tional achievement and competencies of different groups of students. Put differently, 
we reckoned that the framing of the question would be crucial for a high response rate 
as well as for keeping the social desirability bias as low as possible. Also, we wanted 
to ask in a general way that would allow teachers to report whatever they think of first 
when thinking of the competencies of different groups.
In which order should we ask for groups? The initial idea about the item  order— 
unfortunatelynotm entionedinW enzetal.(2016)—wastwofold: First,theitem battery  
should start with girls and boys to provide teachers a gentle start into a series of ques­
tions that some might find unpleasent to think about and, thus, answer. Secondly, that 
the generic group of “immigrants” appears before the groups of students with Turk­
ish and Russian immigrant background was a  deliberate choice that aims at avoiding 
an  assimilation effect as it typically occurs when specific items precede general items 
that tap the same domain (Schwarz et al., 1991). That the items on the different social 
classes appear before the items on immigrants and that ethnic majority students are 
assessed at the end had no particular reason.
Which response scale should we use? For the response scale we had three major cri­
teria: First, we wanted to allow teachers to express the belief that a  particular group's 
competencies are average and, therefore, decide that the scale should have a mid-
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In the NEPS study "Educational trajectories in Germany" the competencies of 
children are assessed in different subjects. What do you think how 2nd graders 
from various groups will perform in mathematics [reading]?
Compared to the mathematics [reading] performance of 2nd graders in general.
The further left you tick, the worse the group will perform according to your estimate, the further right 
you tick, the better. Please tick one square each line.
perform very
poorly
6 7
perform very
well
0 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10
a) ... girls □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
b) ... boys □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
c) ... children from lower social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
d) ... children from middle social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
e) ... children from higher social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
f) ... children of immigrant origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
g) ... children of Turkish origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
h) ... children of Russian origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
i) ... majority □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Figure 5.1: First version of the instrum ent to m easure teachers' stereotypes in  the NEPS.
Figure including translation adopted from Wenz et al. (2016)
point. Secondly, we wanted to avoid confusion with the German grading scale that 
ranges from 1 for “very good” to 6 for “insufficient” or “failed”, respectively. Thus, the 
labels of the response scale should be sufficiently distinct from the German grading 
scale. Thirdly, we wanted to allow teachers to express finely nuanced beliefs through 
enough points on our response scale. Taken together, these criteria led us to pick an 
11-point scale—instead of 9-, 7-, or 5-point scale.
Based on these considerations we developed an  item  battery featuring two items for 
each of the nine groups, asking about the average level of m ath and reading competen­
cies, respectively. Figure 5.1 shows the first version of our instrum ent (see Appendix 
C for the original version in  German language).
5.3.1 Developing the Instrument and Assessing its Validity Through Cognitive 
Interviews
This first version (see figure 5.1) was modified after feedback from both colleagues 
and teachers with whom we conducted cognitive pretests (Desimone & Floch, 2004;
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Miller et al., 2014; Schwarz & Sudman, 1996; Willis, 2004). We evaluated our instru­
m ent through structured interviews with five teachers, recruited in the region of Bam­
berg, Germany. The interviewed teachers taught at least mathematics or German. 
Two teachers were working in  elementary schools, three in  secondary schools. The 
recruitm ent of these teachers was realized through social contacts within the NEPS 
project. We probed participants retrospectively by asking them  immediately after 
each question they had answered to tell us about, for example, how they understood 
the questions and their understanding of key term s used in  the question. We decided 
against the think aloud technique, to not disturb the thought process that respondents
go through whenanswering our items and keep the respondents' burden as low as pos­
sible (Collins, 2003; Willis, 2004, pp. 52-57). Results from the cognitive interviews lead 
to three majormodifications ofthe firstversion (see figure 5.2 andAppendix2):
Lead-in: While in the first version (see figure 5.11 and Appendix 1) it was asked how 
children attending the second grade perform compared to second graders, in the sec- 
ondversion—w hichw asalso im plem entedinthe p ilo tstudyofthe NEPS—we addeda 
concrete reference and asked teachers to report their beliefs “[...] compared to the av­
erage”. We did this because through the cognitive interviews we learned thatteachers 
alm ostexclusivelyreferredtostudentsintheircurrentorpreviousclasses. Wewanted 
the question toallow forabroaderunderstand ingofit. To testthe  m odificationofthe 
lead-in, we recruited new teachers for cognitive pretests and conducted four further 
interviews. A llfourteachersw ere w orkinginelem entaryschoolsinornearB am berg 
andtaughtm athem aticsandG erm anatthetim e. The resultsindicate thatthe  modifi­
cation successfully turned attention away from the own students to the performance 
ofsecond graders more generally.
Repetition of the question wording: In the revised second version (see figure 5.2) we 
repeated the key question and separated the different groups to rem ind the teachers 
of the task at hand. This was done to assure that teachers use the same anchor of 
reference for all judgments, and, thus, to avoid unwanted assimilation and contrast 
effects (Schwarz et al., 1991).
Labels of the response scale: In addition, results ofthe cognitive interviews suggested 
thatthein itiallabelingofallnum ericalvaluesfrom 0to10ontheresponsescalem ight 
have been misleading to some o fthe  teachers who had in mind the German grading 
scale, which ranges from 1 to 6. Apparently, they ticked the value they had in mind in 
term s o fag rad —e.g., 2 for “good”—ignoringthe o thervaluesand the endpointlabels. 
Byrestrictingthe labelstovalues0, 5, and10 we aim edatdecreasingthe likelihoodof 
such misunderstandings butstill allowteachers to successfullynavigate the scale.
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In the NEPS study "Educational trajectories in Germany" the competencies of 
children attending the 2nd grade are assessed in different domains.
What do you think how 2nd graders from the following groups will perform 
compared to the average in the domain mathematics [readingl?
The further left you tick, the worse the group will perform according to your estimate, the further 
right you tick, the better. Please tick one square each line.
very very
poorly well
0 5 10
a) Girls □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
b) Boys □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
And how will the following groups perform compared to the average?
very very
poorly well
0 5 10
c) Children from lower social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
d) Children from middle social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
e) Children from higher social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
And how will the following groups perform compared to the average?
very very
poorly well
0 5 10
f) Children of immigrant origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
g) Children of Turkish origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
h) Children of Russian origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
ij Majority □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Figure 5.2: Second version of the instrum ent to measure teachers' stereotypes in  the
NEPS. Figure including translation adopted from  Wenz et al. (2016)
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5.3.2 The Final Version
In  the final version of the instrum ent (see figure 5.3 and Appendix 3)—which was im­
plem ented in the m ain study and, hence, through which the data for the scientific use 
files of the NEPS is collected—three further modifications were undertaken based on 
discussions with colleagues:
Lead-in: We modified the lead-in to what might be translated to “What do you think 
how second graders from the following groups will perform  compared to all second 
graders in Germany in the domain mathematics [reading]?” Hence, while in the sec- 
ondversion“theaverage” isthe reference,in theth irdandfinalversionam oreprecise  
description of the reference, namely “all 2nd graders in Germany” is used.
Labels of the response scale: For the final version, we changed the labels of the re­
sponse scale from perform  “very poorly” and perform  “very well” into perform  “far 
belowaverage” a n d “far above average”. The aim was to make the scale more relative, 
stress the reference group(“all secondgraders in Germany”),an d ,in  consequence,to 
achieve a less skewed distribution as well as more variance. This change also serves 
the purpose of allowing accuracyofbeliefs to be assessed againstthe performance of 
agrouprelative to the sample m ean ,now thatthe  m idpointofthe scale has am eaning 
in term s of the actual competence distribution.
Order of social groups: Finally, questions referring to students of different sex and 
differentsocial origin were swapped. In consequence,the querynow starts with chil­
dren from lower social strata instead of girls. The aim of this approach was to avoid a 
pattern where respondents contrast their responses within the social groups, for ex­
ample, by referring to girls when estimating the performance of boys—rather than 
referring to all children attending the second grade. This was one of the few deci­
sions we made during the process of developing this measure that I was not happy 
with, since I did and do not see how asking about girls and boys after asking about 
students from different social strata will make respondents less likely to refer to girls 
when reporting theirbeliefsaboutthe performance ofboys. In fac t,Ith ink tha ts ta rt-  
ing with girls and boys is more gentle than starting with students from differentsocial 
strata that might decrease response rates or otherwise affect the validity of teachers' 
answers28.
28 W hetherthisisaneffectoftheirpedagogicaltrainingorm oreduetoself-selection, teachers 
in  Germany seem to be rather cautious when it comes to answering questions that gener­
alize over groups of students—at least according to my experience at the NEPS.
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More results from cognitive interviews
Taken together, we conducted nine cognitive interviews to pretest the instrum ent. In 
addition to the results reported above, the interviews show that teachers share a com­
m on understanding of key term s used in the questions. Also, their understanding of 
both questions and key term s is similar to our understanding. Teachers understand 
that the questions aim  at their personal assessment. Two of the nine teachers explic­
itly reckoned that the questions aim  at their stereotypes about certain groups and 
the stereotypes' potential influence on the academic success of students from these 
groups. However, there was no evidence that teachers would change their responses 
because of that.
Almost all interviewed teachers define social strata mainly through parental in­
come or parental education or a combination of the two. In addition, some refer to 
the occupational status of the parents as well as to the learning environment and sup­
port at home. All in all, the teachers tend to have a similar understanding of the var­
ious social strata. Only one teacher had problems classifying different social strata. 
According to the interviewed teachers, lower social strata are characterized by living 
on welfare or a relatively low household income or a less beneficial learning envi­
ronm ent at hom e. The middle social strata are associated with higher income than 
the lower strata. The higher social strata are associated first and foremost with high 
education—for example, a high rate people holding tertiary degrees—and, therefore, 
also also with higher financial resources.
Seven of the nine teachers provided definitions of persons of immigrant origin. 
Again, the results show that teachers largely agree: Almost all teachers referred to 
individuals who were born in a foreign country themselves or have at least one par­
ent born abroad. Only one teacher restricted the definition to first generation immi­
grants. As with social strata, teachers also explain their understanding of the term  by 
mentioning educational outcomes as indicators of an immigrant background: Six of 
the seven teachers m ention language competence and language use in  the hom e envi­
ronm ent as criterion. Furthermore, when estimating the performance of children of 
Russian origin, all interviewed teachers consider children from  today's Russia as well 
as children with parents born in  the Soviet Union and its successor states.
With regard to reading and mathematics competencies, teachers show a rather sim­
ilar understanding of these term s. Finally, there is no evidence that teachers were led 
astray by the fact that the value labels for the endpoints of the scale range over m ore 
than one box.
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In the NEPS study "Educational trajectories in Germany" the competencies of 
children attending the 2nd grade are assessed in different domains.
What do you think how 2nd graders from the following groups will perform 
compared to all 2nd graders in Germanv in mathematics freadingl?
The further left you tick, the worse the group will perform according to your estimate, the further right 
you tick, the better. Please tick one square each line.
far below far above
average average
0 5 10
a) Children from lower social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
b) Children from middle social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
c) Children from higher social strata □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
And how will 2nd graders from the following groups perform compared to all 2nd 
graders in Germany?
far below far above
average average
0 5 10
d) Girls □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
e) Boys □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
And how will 2nd graders from the following groups perform compared to all 2nd 
graders in Germany?
far below far above
average average
0 5 10
f) Children of immigrant origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
g) Children of Turkish origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
h) Children of Russian origin □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
i) Majority □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  □
Figure 5.3: Final version of the instrum ent to measure teachers' stereotypes in  the NEPS.
Figure including translation adopted from Wenz et al. (2016)
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5.4 Data and Analytic Strategy29
In this section I briefly describe the data I use and the analytical strategy I adopt to 
answer the research questions raised in the beginning of the chapter: First, can we 
validly m easure teachers' stereotypes about different groups of students? If so, do 
teachers' stereotypes, secondly, differ between groups? And, thirdly, are teachers' 
stereotypes accurate or m ore or less biased and, if so, to the disadvantage of which 
groups of students? Note that these questions are also investigated in  Wenz et al. 
(2016), who argue that the latter questions are informative with regard to the qual­
ity and validity of the new instrum ent. I will return  to the argum ents below in section
5.4.2
5.4.1 Data
As in Wenz et al. (2016), the analyses below are based on data of the fourth wave of the 
pilot study in  the NEPS Kindergarten cohort. At the tim e the survey was conducted, 
the children attended the second grade. The m ain aim  of the NEPS pilot studies is to 
guarantee smooth m ain studies—for example by testing instrum ents and fieldwork. 
Just like the m ain studies, the corresponding pilot studies are conceptualized as panel 
studies. The sampling procedures of m ain and pilot studies are essentially equivalent. 
However, the pilot studies feature smaller samples and are conducted only in  selected 
federal states of Germany. The sample for the pilot study in  the Kindergarten cohort 
was drawn on four states: Bavaria, Thuringia, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Hamburg. 
In total, I can draw on 52 teacher interviews. Note that data from NEPS pilot studies 
is not released to the scientific community.
All quantitative results reported in this section refer to the second version of the 
instrum ent (see figure 5.2). This version was implemented only in  the pilot. Since the 
final version of theinstrum ent (seefigure 5.3) differs only slightly, I expectconclusions 
to be substantively the same in replications using the final version of the instrum ent 
as long as data from the same federal states are used. Replications using all data from 
the m ain study might differ due to differences between teachers in  different federal 
states.
29 Syntax for all quantitative analyses in  this chapter is available at https://osf.io/dqtkg/. How­
ever, the data from the NEPS pilot study is unfortunately not available for replication pur­
poses.
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5.4.2 Analytic Strategy
While I will largely reproduce the analyses of Wenz et al. (2016), I shift the emphasis 
slightly towards answering two of the three research questions asked in  the beginning 
of this chapter: Do teachers' stereotypes regarding mathematical and reading compe­
tencies of different groups of students differ between groups? And: Are these stereo­
types accurate or are they biased and, if so, to the (dis)advantage of which groups? In 
answering both questions, I go beyond Wenz et al. (2016) regarding both theorizing 
what to expect and analyzing what teachers' told us.
I stick to the perspective in  Wenz et al. (2016) that both questions relate to the quality 
and validity of the instrum ent—and, thus, to question one—and check the instrum ent 
for the following desirable properties: (i) variation between groups as a consequence 
of variation within teachers, (ii) variation between teachers, (iii) validity of the mea­
sure, and for the rather undesirable property of (iv) missing values. While examining 
missing values as well as variation within and between teachers is straightforward, 
validating the m easure is less so. With regard to different forms of validity—content, 
criterion, and construct validity—I argue that content validity is satisfied by the ques­
tion wording that rather explicitly asks for what has been defined as stereotype above. 
Remember that the cognitive interviews provided evidence that teachers understand 
the questions as intended, which, in  turn , provides evidence in  favor of the content 
validity of the instrum ent (Miller et al., 2014, p. 3; Haynes et al., 1995; Willis, 2004).
To assess criterion validity and construct validity—of which the latter is often seen 
as the most general, overarching form of validity that encompasses criterion and con­
tent validity as special cases (e.g., Haynes et al., 1995)—I perform  the same quantita­
tive tests I have performed in Wenz et al. (2016). I also stick to the line of argument 
laid out in  Wenz et al. (2016) and suggest that if the instrum ent is a valid m easure of 
teachers' stereotypes, m ean differences between groups, corresponding effect sizes, 
and correlations should follow theoretical expectations and previous research as sum­
marized in  section 5.4.3 below.
Assessing accuracy
There are different ways of defining and assessing accuracy (e.g., Jussim, 2012,
pp. 170-194; Jussim et al., 2015). However, an in-depth discussion of different con­
ceptualizations and methods is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead I briefly 
present my understanding of accuracy and bias as well as the methods I will use be­
low to assess accuracy in teachers' beliefs as m easured using the new instrument.
My conceptualization distinguishes between a dichotomous understanding of ac-
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curacy and a  dimensional understanding: From a dichotomous perspective, a  belief 
is accurate if and only if it is correct or true and, thus, not inaccurate. Put differently, 
as soon as a belief is not true or correct, it is inaccurate. Obviously, this perspec­
tive applies to questions to which there are only two possible, one correct, one incor­
rect answer or at least answers that can be meaningfully dichotomized. However, di- 
chotomization typically involves loss of information and, thus, I also acknowledge that 
beliefs about categorical or continuous outcomes require a  m ore nuanced language 
that allows beliefs about groups to range “from completely accurate to completely in­
accurate” (Jussim et al., 1995, p. 16). This implies that beliefs, assessed against such 
an accuracy-inaccuracy dimension (Jussim et al., 1995, pp. 16-17) can be more or less 
accurate. Not only is this useful for comparing the accuracy of beliefs of different 
people orgroupsofpeople butalso because, strictlyspeaking, some beliefs can never 
be exactlyright. This holds forall beliefs aboutaveragesor o therscalarvalues ofcon- 
tinuously distributed group characteristics, such as body height of men and women 
or competencies of different groups of students, since the probability for one exact 
value along a continuous distribution is zero. This issue is sometimes addressed by 
definingarange aroundthe true value asconstitutinganaccurate belief(Jussim etal., 
2015, p. 492). I do notfind such dichotomization strategies particularly helpful—first, 
because of a loss of information; secondly and more importantly, because defending 
a particular range is virtually impossible using scientific methods.
Note that while I have used and will use bias as an antonym to accuracy and thus 
inaccurate and biased interchangeably, I typically use inaccurate when I simply mean 
false or incorrectin  an absolute sense butbiasedw hen Ire fer to the under- or overes­
timation of a group relative to another group.
Now which strategies of assessing accuracy in teachers' stereotypes about groups 
of students will I (not) use below? The developed instrum entdoes notallow to assess 
accuracy in an absolute sense, that is, it is not possible to simply take the belief about a 
group's average performance and compare it to a criterion taken from real data—be 
it the NEPS competence test or any other competence test or published results. The 
reason is that both the instrum ent assessing teachers' stereotypes as well as contem- 
porarycompetence testsineducationhave nostraightforwardabsolute interpretation 
but only make sense in relative terms.
A relative comparison that focuses on one group only wouldbe possible byassessing the 
accuracy of beliefs against the performance of a group relative to the sample mean. 
However, the data used here do not allow for such an interpretation, because of the 
absolute response scale used in the second version of the instrument. Such compar­
isons will be possible with data from the NEPS scientific use files, since the final ver­
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sion of the instrum ent (see figure 5.3) used a scale labeled ranging from “far below 
average” to “far above average”.  The midpoint (5) of this scale can then be interpreted
as coinciding with the sample average of the actual competence distribution.
Other relative assessments of stereotype accuracy have to be built on group compar­
isons involving at least two groups. One possibility is to calculate effect sizes of group 
differences that—under certain assumptions—allow to directly compare group differ­
ences as perceived by the teachers with group differences as reported in published 
studies30. HowexactlyIcalculate the effectsizes is explainedfurtherbelow.
Using both effect sizes and simple mean differences I will also look at comparisons 
inrelationtootherreferencegroupsandacrossdomains. Com parisonsinrelationtorefer- 
ence groups mayinvolve comparingrelative distances of, for example,two groups of 
im m igrantstotheethnicm ajority . Acrossdom ains,too,relative distancescaninform  
the assessment of accuracy. Take, for example, boys and girls whose performance 
differences in mathematics and their performance differences in reading might be 
of similar size but estimated to of different size. Note that these strategies follow a 
difference-in-differences logic, that is, bias is only detected i fa  group is overpropor­
tionally over-or underestimated bythe teachers ,no tifa ll groups are over-or under­
estimated by the same factor.
A rather simple m ethod ofassessingthe accuracy ofteachers' stereotypes is to in­
vestigate w hetherteachers getthe relativerankingofgroupsright. Forasingle teacher 
and two groups, I  and J  , there are three possible outcomes: (1) The groups are be­
lieved to perform equally; (2) group I  is believed to perform better than group J ,  or 
(3)vice versa. Givenasam ple o fteachers,b iasin teachers 'beliefscan thenbe quanti- 
fiedbycalculatingthe proportionofteachersthatcorrectlyassessthe groups'relative 
positions.
Calculating effect sizes
To enable com parisonsofm eandifferencesfree oftheiroriginal m easurem entunits, 
Cohen (1977, p. 20) suggested to use the effect size d, defined as the mean difference 
oftw ogroupsorpopulationsdiv idedbythestandarddeviationofeithergrouporpop- 
u lation thatare  assum edequal. To estimate d from sam ple dataIfollow C ohen(1977, 
pp. 66-67) and calculate
d = X1 — X2 (5.1)
30 Data from the NEPS competence tests were not available for such calculations when the 
analyses for this chapter were conducted. However, this will be possible with data from the 
NEPS scientific use files.
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where
s (n1  -  1)s12  +  (n2  -  1)s2
n1  +  n2 -  2
(5.2)
and where s12  and s2 are the unbiased sample variances of x1 and x2  that are the beliefs
of teachers about average performances of groups 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, Xi  and 
x 2 are the means of the beliefs about the performances of groups 1 and 2, respectively, 
over all teachers. Note that this strategy assumes that s2i  and s 2 are valid proxies for 
theaveragedispersionofgroups1and2,respectively ,asperceivedbytheteachers.
This assumption has to be made since the instrum ent does not directly measure 
the perceived variability or variance on the level of the individual teacher. In princi­
ple, thiscouldhavebeenaccom plishedbyapaper-pencilself-adm inisteredquestion- 
naire implementing some kind of distribution task or range task (see section 5.2.2). 
However, the lim itedspace in the NEPS questionnairesandthe riskofdecreasingre- 
sponse rates on the level of teachers and educators lead us to decide against a more 
elaborated assessment. Therefore, all we know are the estimated group averages in 
testperform ance—theirvariancebetw een teachersisourbestestim ateforperceived  
variance within groups.
Correlations
Correlationsbetw eenestim atedaveragegroupcom petenciesw illalsoserveasanindi- 
catorofvalidityiftheyfollow theoreticallyexplainablepatternsasoutlinedinsection
5.4.3 below.
5.4.3 Theory Driven Validation and Expectations
In the rem ainder of this section, I will argue that answering the two major substan- 
tiveresearchquestionso fth ischap terand thevalidationoftheinstrum en tw edevel- 
oped at the NEPS—that is, question num ber one—pose related problems, connected 
bythem echanism sthatbringaboutaccuracyandbiasinstereotypicalth inking. Gen­
erally speaking, it seems reasonable to expect that a valid explicit measure ofstereo- 
typical beliefs of teachers yields similar results as other, different—but nevertheless 
comparable—instruments that aim for measuring the same or similar constructs. I 
am not aware of any studies that assess the accuracy of beliefs about groups of stu­
dents. The closest and most relevant literature in this regard is research on teachers' 
beliefsandexpectationsasself-fulfillingprophecies(Jussim , 1989;Ju ss im e ta l.,1996; 
Jussim & H arber,2005;Jussim ,R obuste lli,e ta l.,2009;L o re n z e ta l.,2016).
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Studies from  this line of research suggest that, by and large, teachers' beliefs and 
expectations—typically about individual students, though—are fairly accurate and not 
biased heavily by social, racial, or ethnic criteria (see, e.g., Jussim & Harber, 2005; 
Jussim, Robustelli, et al., 2009, for reviews). Certainly, there is evidence for some bias 
against particular groups of students in  the international literature (e.g., Campbell, 
2015; Ready & Wright, 2010) as well as in  the German literature (e.g., Lorenz et al., 
2016) and I will return  to these biases below.
In  addition to the empirical studies cited above, there are different theoretical con­
siderations that can inform expectations about the accuracy and the biases in teach­
ers' beliefs. For decades research in  social psychology has highlighted the biases and 
inaccuracies of stereotypes—often by merely defining stereotypes as incorrect (see 
section 5.1). Sometimes by empirically investigating and stressing the biased nature 
of stereotypes defined in  such a way—e.g., “as an exceptionless generalization about 
the target group (e.g., 'All Asians are sm art')” (Jussim et al., 1995, p. 6)—that empirical 
investigations could only yield the conclusion that stereotypes are biased. Sometimes 
by confusing the stereotype itself with the outcome of a  process of stereotyping (Jus- 
sim , Cain, et al., 2009, p. 215) that almost inevitably results in  individual discrimina­
tion (Aigner & Cain, 1977; England & Lewin, 1989) which, in  tu rn , constitutes a  biased 
view of an individual. Remarkably, the confusion of stereotypes with the process of 
stereotyping—that is, confusing beliefs about groups with the judgment or treatm ent 
of individual group mem bers—is also present in  major contributions to the research 
on stereotype accuracy (Jussim et al., 1996; Jussim & Harber, 2005; Jussim, Robustelli, 
et al., 2009; but cf. Jussim et al., 2015, who acknowledge the confusion). Only rarely 
have biases in stereotypes been investigated and, if so, research typically shows that 
these biases tend to be m oderate in  size (see, e.g., Jussim, Cain, et al., 2009; Jussim 
et al., 2015; C. Ryan, 2002, for reviews; Diekman et al., 2002).
Not only has m ore recent research shown that stereotypes—understood simply as 
beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, or behaviors of a group of people—are not 
always inaccurate (Jussim, Cain, et al., 2009; Jussim et al., 2015; C. Ryan, 2002), there 
is convincing evidence that processes of stereotype formation, categorization, and
stereotype application are deeply rooted in  the biology of the hum an brain (Fishbein,
2002, pp. 39-82; Fiske, 2000; Caporael, 1997). It seems highly unlikely that cognitive 
processes that arguably have been key to the survival of individuals and groups in 
the evolution of the hum an race should be built on largely inaccurate beliefs produc­
ing largely inaccurate judgments, expectations, or maladaptive behavior. However, 
note thatsuch  an explanation does notru le  outparticular forms of biases—especially 
in term s of affect and emotion, that is prejudice—that might, indeed, also increase
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reproductive fitness. All this evolutionary perceptive suggests is that beliefs and the 
related mechanisms should not be grotesquely mistaken or flawed.
In  addition to the argum ents for why stereotypes in  general should not be too in­
accurate, there are good reasons to believe that teachers' stereotypes about groups 
of students in  particular should be fairly accurate. Teachers are experts in  teaching 
students from different social and ethnic groups as well students of different gender 
and can, therefore, be expected to be knowledgeable with regard to the competencies 
of different groups of students. In  fact, experts' judgments are sometimes used as 
a criterion against which the accuracy of stereotypes is assessed (Judd & Park, 1993, 
p. 114).
However, convincing theoretical reasons for biases in  teachers' beliefs rem ain and 
whenever teachers' stereotypes are not accurate—that is biased—these biases should 
show patterns of ingroup favoritism or outgroup derogation (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), respectively, if the m easure is a valid m easure. That is, teachers' as­
sessments should show a  bias in favor of groups they belong to, and a negative bias 
towards those they do not belong to. Since teachers in  German elementary schools are 
overwhelmingly female, belong to the middle or upper (middle) class, and are of Ger­
m an ethnicity without immigration background, I expect biases—if any—to the disad­
vantage of boys, students from lower class families, as well as immigrants in  general, 
and different groups of immigrants in  particular.
Another well replicated phenom enon in intergroup perception is outgroup homo­
geneity, which m eans that—under certain conditions—m em bers of outgroups tend to 
be perceived as m ore similar to one another than they really are (Judd & Park, 1993; 
Judd et al., 1991; C. S. Ryan & Bogart, 2001) and m ore similar than m em bers of in­
groups (Brown & Wootton-Millward, 1993; Judd & Park, 1988, 1993; Judd et al., 1991; 
B. Park & Rothbart, 1982; C. S. Ryan & Bogart, 2001). Especially m em bers of minority 
or low status groups tend to be perceived this way (e.g., Fiske, 1993a; Lorenzi-Cioldi 
et al., 1995; but cf. Brauer, 2001).
I suggest that the outgroup homogeneity effect should also hold on the group level:
minority outgroups that can easily be categorized into one superordinate minority
outgroup (Ashmore & Longo, 1995; Gaertner et al., 1993; Gonzalez & Brown, 2003; B. 
Park & Rothbart, 1982) should be perceived as more similar to one another than they 
actually are. In particular, I expect different groups of immigrants, Turks and Rus­
sians, to be perceived more similar than they actually are, as they are easily catego­
rized into a superordinate group of immigrants. Also, teachers' beliefs about groups 
that can be categorized into one superordinate group or groups that are otherwise 
perceived to be similar should correlate positively. Therefore—and even though the
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chosen item  order should reduce a  possible part-whole assimilation effect (Schwarz 
et al., 1991)—, I expect positive correlations between teachers' stereotypes for immi­
grants and Turks, immigrants and Russians, as well as Turks and Russians.
In  contrast, I expect low and insignificant correlations between unrelated groups 
such as girls or boys on the one hand and different groups of immigrants on the other 
hand. Especially because they are likely to serve as standards of comparison for each 
other, teachers' stereotypes about the competencies of boys and girls should correlate 
positively again. The same logic should apply to the different social classes. Thus, I 
also expect positive and significant correlations among teachers' stereotypes for the 
three groups. However, how exactly teachers understand the term s lower, middle, 
and upper class is less clear than it is for boys and girls. Also, the correlations might 
in  part be due to item order and, thus, items that are further apart can be expected to 
correlate less than those that are closer together (Schwarz et al., 1991; Weijters et al., 
2009). However, predicting patterns of item  intercorrelations in  m ore detail seems 
difficult for theoretical reasons, because how exactly teachers will categorize groups 
into superordinate groups or how they will use groups as reference for one another is 
not clear ex-ante, also because the fixed item  order could and, indeed, can be expected 
to influence the process of categorizing and referring to groups.
5.5 Quantitative Results
From the theories discussed in chapter 3 it should be clear that the relation between 
stereotypes and discrimination is everything but straightforward. This is true for both 
individual and group discrimination. However, it is worth reminding ourselves which 
major patterns we should look for and why: When stereotypes are introduced as ex­
planation for discrimination as an individual level causal effect, they will usually have 
to vary between groups to make such an explanation work. If stereotypes are biased 
to the (dis-)advantage of certain groups or if other conditions are present, they may 
also explain group discrimination—even if they do not vary between target groups. 
For more on the role of stereotypes in  explaining discrimination, see section 3.1.2 in 
particular.
5.5.1 Within Teacher Variation
Figure 5.4 summarizes between group variations as m ean differences between teach­
ers' stereotypes of the competencies of different groups. Teachers' stereotypes vary 
considerably between groups for both m ath (left panel) and reading (right panel).
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Figure 5.4: Means of teachers' estimation of students' results in  NEPS competence tests
for m ath (left panel) and reading (right panel). Groups (num ber of 
observations by stereotype in  parentheses) from top to bottom: girls (math: 
49/reading: 50), boys (49/50), lower class (45/46), middle class (45/48), upper 
class (45/48), immigrants (40/42), Turkish immigrants (35/37), Russian 
immigrants (37/39), majority (40/42).
As m ath and reading competencies are empirically strongly correlated (Rindermann, 
2007), it is not surprising that the overall patterns look very similar. However, there 
are systematic differences with regard to gender, which is the category I start my dis­
cussion of results with.
Gender
While teachers believe that boys outperform  girls in  m ath (mean difference: - .5 5 , p <  
.05), the opposite is true for reading (mean difference: +1.08, p <  .001). Empirical 
studies provide strong evidence for this pattern (Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, 
et al., 2012; Mücke & Schründer-Lenzen, 2008). However, the same studies suggest 
that the teachers are mistaken in  estimating the advantage of girls in  reading (Cohen's 
d: .78) to be about twice as large as boys' advantage over girls in  mathematics (Co­
hen's d: - .41 ). Nationwide evidence for fourth-graders suggests that the gender gaps 
in m ath and reading competencies are of similar size (mean difference in reading: +8, 
d =  . 12 , Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012, pp. 97, 126; m ean difference in  m ath: -  8 ,  d =  -  . 13 , 
Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012, pp. 65, 208)31. Using data from a  longitudinal study of 26 
schools in  Berlin, Mücke and Schründer-Lenzen (2008) moreover find that boys' ad­
vantage in  m ath is even larger than their disadvantage in  reading. Interestingly, the
31 Neither Bos, Wendt, et al. (2012) nor Bos, Tarelli, et al. (2012) report d or any other effect 
size. I calculated d using the information given on the pages I cite above.
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teachers' stereotypes are consistent with the German results in the PISA study (e.g., 
Prenzel et al., 2013)—a study German media has covered extensively. If and only if 
the assumption holds that the variances between teachers are valid proxies for the 
teacher's perception of dispersion, it is also possible to conclude that the differences 
between girls and boys in  both domains are overestimated by the teachers. How accu­
rate teachers are with regard to ranking boys and girls in  both domains is investigated 
below in  section 5.5.2.
Social class
Teachers perceive large competence differences between students from different so­
cial classes (math: lower - middle: d =  -1 .44 , middle - upper: d =  -1 .04 , lower - 
upper: d =  -2 .10; reading: lower - middle: d =  -1 .35 , middle - upper: d =  -1.106, 
lower - upper: d =  -2 .35; all differences are statistically significant with p <  .001). 
Figure 5.4 confirms the similar patterns for m ath and reading. However and despite 
the promising results from  the cognitive interviews, it is not clear what teachers had in 
m ind exactly when reporting their expectations about the competencies of different 
social classes and, thus, whether their understanding matches any operational defi­
nition used in  published studies. Thus, I cannot assess teachers' accuracy as precisely 
as for their stereotypes on gender differences. The m eans over all teachers suggest 
that, on average, teachers correctly rank the three groups: All available studies show 
that—whatever the exact operational definition—students from  lower class families 
perform  worse than those from middle class families who, in  turn , perform  worse 
than those from  upper class families (e.g., Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 
2012; Prenzel et al., 2013; Stanat et al., 2012).
However, effect sizes, calculated based on num bers reported in  published studies, 
suggest that teachers probably overestimate the differences between students from 
different social classes. Based on Stanat et al. (2012, p. 202), I find that students from 
upper middle class and upper class families (EGP classes I and II) perform  better than 
students from middle and lower working class families (EGP classes V, VI, VII) with 
d =  - .7 9  in  m ath and d =  - .8 1  in  reading 32. The group specific m eans in  Bos, Wendt, 
et al. (2012, p. 241) and Bos, Tarelli, et al. (2012, p. 185) allow for even m ore extreme 
comparisons, such as the difference between students from  upper class families (EGP 
I) and students from low skilled working class families (EGP VII) that yield a  difference 
of d =  - .7 4  in m ath (Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012) and d =  - .8 0  in  reading (Bos, Tarelli, et
32 Stanat et al. (2012) do not report group specific standard deviations, so I divided the mean 
group differences by the standard deviation of the test for the whole sample (SD =  100).
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al., 2012)33. Of course, less extreme comparisons that might resemble the comparison 
of upper class and middle class or middle class and lower class, yield considerably 
lower effect sizes, which is why I don't report them  here. Since all effect sizes based 
on empirical studies are smaller than the smallest effect size of those quantifying the 
differences as perceived by the teachers, the conclusion that teachers are biased to 
the disadvantage of students from  lower class families in m ore generally and to the 
disadvantage of students from middle class families in  comparison with upper class 
families seem s justified.
Immigrant background
On average, teachers also correctly believe that ethnic majority students perform  bet­
ter on average than their peers with an immigrant background in both m ath and 
reading. Virtually all empirical studies on the achievement of immigrants and their 
descendants in  the German education system have shown that they perform  worse 
than students without immigrant background in  both m ath and reading (see, e.g., 
Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; Stanat et al., 2012, for results for 
fourth graders). Given the extensive media coverage of these studies and of the com­
paratively low achievement of immigrants in  particular, this result is not surprising. 
However, judging by effect sizes it seems that teachers overestimate the immigrants'
disadvantage to the ethnic majority: While the teachers in the NEPS pilot sample see
differences of d = -1.63 in math and d = -1.41 in reading, Stanat etal. (2012, pp. 214­
221) report differences o fd  =  -.31 in m ath and d =  -.26  in reading for children of 
which only one parent is born abroad and o fd  =  -.56  in both math and reading for 
children ofwhich both parents are born abroad. Group specific means and standard 
deviationsreportedinBos, Wendt, etal. (2012, p. 258), Bos, Tarelli, e tal. (2012, p. 199) 
result in very similar effect sizes for these groups and domains. My own calculations 
basedon the  num bersreported inS tanateta l. (2012)com biningbothgroupsintoone 
groupofim m igrantsbyusingw eightedm eansandw eightedvariances, yieldd =  -.46  
fo rm athandd  =  -.44forreadingaseffectsizeoftheim m igrantdisadvantage. Again, 
these num bers suggest that teachers underestimate students with immigrant back­
groundrelative to students w ithoutim m igrantbackgroundin both domains.
The results for students of Turkish and Russian origin are similar to those for im-
33 Although group specific standard deviations are reported in  both texts, here, too, I divided 
the m ean group differences by the standard deviation of the test for the whole sample 
(SD =  62 in  Bos, Wendt, e t al., 2012; SD =  66 in  Bos, Tarelli, e t al., 2012), since neither 
text provides group specific num bers of observation.
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m igrants in  general: On average, teachers are correct in  believing that students of 
Turkish origin perform  worse than those of Russian origin in  both m ath (mean dif­
ference: - .4 5 , p <  .05) and reading (mean difference: - .3 4 , p =  .07) (for results for 
both groups of immigrants in  both domains, see Stanat et al., 2012, p. 225; for simi­
lar results using data from  the PISA studies of 2000, 2003, and 2006, see Walter, 2009). 
That teachers also get the ranking of these two groups of immigrants right on average 
is much m ore remarkable than the ranking of immigrants and ethnic majority, since 
German media has rarely covered comparisons of different groups of immigrants in 
general or the performance of students with a  Russian background in particular. Ef­
fect sizes of the differences between ethnic majority students and students of both 
Turkish and Russian origin suggest that teachers perceive larger differences between 
the majority and the two groups of immigrants (disadvantage of Turks: d =  -1 .72  for 
m ath, d =  -1 .62  for reading; disadvantage of Russians: d =  -1 .17  for m ath, d =  -1 .44  
for reading) than  actually exist (disadvantage of Turks: d =  - .9 3  for m ath, d =  - .8 8  
for reading; disadvantage of Russians: d =  - .3 5  for m ath, d =  - .3 4  for reading), 
as suggested by my calculations of effect sizes based on num bers reported in  Stanat 
et al. (2012, p. 225). Based on these num bers, it seem s that teachers underestim ate 
both groups of immigrants relative to their ethnic majority peers—this pattern might 
be due to an  absolute underestim ation of both groups, an  absolute overestimation of 
the ethnic majority, or both. As expected, teachers believe that students of Turkish 
and Russian origin are m ore similar than they really are: The disadvantage of Turkish 
students is estimated to be d =  - .3 6  in  m ath and d =  - .1 8  in  reading, while my cal­
culations based on Stanat et al. (2012, p. 225) yield d =  - .5 7  in  m ath and d =  - .5 6  in 
reading as differences between these two groups of immigrants.
Should the reader not buy into the assumption necessary to make the effect size 
comparisons work (see paragraph Calculating effect sizes in  section 5.4.2 above), it 
might be of interest to learn that analyses using relative ratios of m ean differences 
only, as conducted in  Wenz et al. (2016), by and large yield the sam e conclusions as 
based on effect sizes.
5.5.2 Between Teacher Variation
Since the same between group variation may stem  from  few teachers perceiving large 
differences or many perceiving small differences, figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the varia­
tion within teachers as a difference between two selected groups as rated by the same 
teacher. For both m ath and reading the plots show that teachers differ to some de­
gree in their estimates of group differences: Not only are different groups of students
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Figure 5.5: Range plots of the differences between teachers' stereotypes of group specific
competencies in  m ath by teacher ID.
estimated to have different competencies, some teachers perceive much larger differ­
ences between the groups than  others, some see no differences at all. Note, however, 
that these patterns might partly be due to differences in  teachers' interpretation of the 
response scale.
Ranking groups
Teachers not only rank groups correctly on average, the perception of which group of 
two—if any—is in front, is also mostly correct on the individual level. Actually, for all 
comparisons shown in figures 5.5 and 5.6—except the one between girls and boys— 
teachers agree on which group, if any, they expect to be ahead. A notable exception is 
the difference between girls and boys in m ath, where some teachers (18.4%) see girls 
ahead of boys, while about a third of teachers perceives no differences (32.7%) and 
almost every second teacher believes boys to perform  better than girls (49%). There­
fore, judged by the empirical studies cited above (Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, 
et al., 2012; Stanat et al., 2012) and the definition of accuracy and bias in  section 5.4.2, 
only about every second teacher holds accurate beliefs about m ath performance of 
boys and girls. Over fifty percent hold beliefs that are biased to the disadvantage of
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Figure 5.6: Range plots of the differences between teachers' stereotypes of group specific
competencies in  reading by teacher ID.
boys. Note that those who think that girls outperform boys in m ath hold least accu­
rate or, put differently, most biased beliefs. In  reading, the num ber for those who hold 
accurate beliefs is similar: 54 percent of teachers see girls ahead of boys, which is cor­
rect (Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; Stanat et al., 2012). The other 46 
percent incorrectly believe that there is no difference between the sexes. Thus, these 
teachers are biased to the disadvantage of girls. Note, however, that, in  contrast to the 
results for m ath, none of the N =  52 teachers believes the reversed order to be true. 
Thus, the bias to the disadvantage of girls for reading is less severe than the bias to the 
disadvantage of boys for m ath.
Most teachers correctly rank students of different social class background: 80% 
expect students from middle class families to perform  better than their lower class 
peers. In the same vein, 86.7% expect students from upper class families to outper­
form students with lower class background. 73.3% also see an advantage for upper 
class students compared to middle class students. Except for the comparison of mid­
dle versus upper class, where in both domains one teacher believes that students 
from  middle class families will perform  better, the rem aining teachers believe that 
the groups perform  equally well. Applying the definition of accuracy and bias from 
section 5.4.2, these teachers are biased in favor of students from the respective lower
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class, since all available evidence shows that students from higher social class families 
perform  better on average than students from  lower class families (e.g., Bos, Tarelli, 
et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; Stanat et al., 2012). However, judging by the av­
erage over all teachers (see section 5.5.1 above), it seem s that teachers' stereotypes 
are biased to the disadvantage of students from  lower class families and—compared to 
students from  upper class families—to the disadvantage of students from  middle class 
families.
Most teachers correctly expect students from the ethnic majority to outperform  im­
migrants in  both reading (85%) and m ath (76.3%) assessments. Here, too, the rem ain­
ing percent—except one teacher in case of reading—believes that immigrant and eth­
nic majority students perform  equally well. Thus, the situation is similar to the one of 
students from  different social classes and judging merely from how accurately groups 
are ranked by the teachers, we might be tem pted to conclude that teachers are biased 
in favor of immigrants. However, based on the effect sizes reported in  section 5.5.1 
above, on average, teachers' stereotypes appear to be biased to the disadvantage of im­
migrants.
Teachers' ranking of students of Turkish and Russian origin are less accurate than 
the ranking of immigrant and ethnic majority students: For m ath, only 39.4 percent of 
teachers expect students of Russian origin to perform  better than students of Turkish 
origin, while a majority of 51.2 percent mistakenly believes that these groups of stu­
dents will perform  equally well and 9.1 percent think that that students of Turkish ori­
gin will perform  better than those of Russian origin. The num bers are similar for the 
domain of reading and, thus, similarly biased: only about ever third teacher (31.4%) 
expects what actually is the case, namely that Russians outperform Turks in  reading. 
Instead, 62.9 percent expect the two groups to perform  equally well, 5.7 percent ex­
pect Turks to perform  better. These results suggest a bias disadvantaging students of 
Russian origin and, as expected, that teachers perceive these two groups of immigrant 
students as m ore similar and homogenous than they really are.
Before I move on to the next section, one last look at yet another visualization of 
teachers' stereotypes: Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show histograms of all single items. The his­
tograms highlight the variation between teachers. If there were none, each histogram 
would only show one bar. It is quite clear from figures 5.7 and 5.8 that for both m ath 
and reading there are large differences between teachers in  the assessment of aver­
age competencies of one and the same group of students. In addition to the variation 
between teachers, the histograms also show that there are differences in the degree to 
which teachers vary in their assessment of one and the same group. Take immigrants' 
and majority students' m ath competencies (figure 5.7), for instance: While teachers'
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Figure 5.7: Histograms of teachers' stereotypes about group specific competencies in
m ath.
stereotypes of ethnic majority students' competencies are virtually limited to 5, the 
midpoint of the scale, and 6, immigrants' competencies are estimated to vary consid­
erably.
5.5.3 Item Intercorrelations
While substantively they are certainly less relevant for a study on discrimination in 
education, item  intercorrelations also speak to the validity of an  instrum ent—a valid 
instrum ent should show correlation patterns that can be theoretically predicted. Ta­
bles 5.1 and 5.2 present item intercorrelations for both domains and all groups. As 
expected, girls and boys seem  to serve as standards of comparison for each other in 
both domains: The correlations are positive and significant with r  =  .42 for m ath 
and r  =  .56 for reading. With regard to social class, things are—also as expected—a 
little m ore complex: Interestingly, I observe positive and significant correlations in 
both m ath and reading between lower class and middle class (math: r  =  .41, reading: 
r  =  . 60 ) and between middle class and upper class (math: r  =  . 60 , reading: r  =  . 40 ) 
but not between lower class and upper class (math: r  =  - .1 9 , reading: -.14).
The correlations among the estimates for immigrants in  general and immigrants of 
Turkish and Russian origin in  particular are all statistically significant and range from
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Figure 5.8: Histograms of teachers' stereotypes about group specific competencies in
reading.
r  =  . 56 to r  =  . 79 (see tables 5.1 and 5.2). These strong correlations contrast with low 
and insignificant correlations between unrelated groups such as girls and boys on the 
one hand and the different groups of immigrants on the other hand—most of them  are 
virtually zero.
5.6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I have—building on and extending my joint work with Melanie Ol- 
czyk and Georg Lorenz (Wenz et al., 2016)—introduced an item  battery to m easure 
teachers' stereotypes about the average competencies in m ath and reading of differ­
ent social and ethnic groups, namely girls, boys, students with lower, middle, and 
upper class background, students of Turkish and Russian origin, as well as students 
of immigrant origin and majority students. Furthermore, I have raised three research 
questions, crucial for any study of discrimination in  education: First, can we validly 
m easure teachers' stereotypes about different groups of students? If so, do teachers' 
stereotypes, secondly, differ between groups? And, thirdly, are teachers' stereotypes 
accurate or m ore or less biased and, if so, to the disadvantage of which groups of stu­
dents?
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Table 5.1: Item  intercorrelations for m ath.
Girls Boys L ow er
Class
M iddle
Class
U pper
Class
Im m i­
g ran ts
T urks R ussians M ajority
Girls 1.00
Boys .42** 1.00
L ow er Class .10 .16 1.00
M iddle  Class .48*** .25 .41** 1.00
U pper Class .25 .36* - .1 9 .60*** 1.00
Im m ig ran ts .09 - .1 2 .21 .12 .04 1.00
T urks .04 .06 .34* .06 .03 .59*** 1.00
R ussians .04 .09 .18 .06 .07 .69*** .75*** 1 . 00
M ajority .57*** .46** - .1 2 .28 .34* .06 .00 .04 1.00
* p  <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001
Table 5.2: Item  intercorrelations for reading.
Girls Boys Lower
Class
Middle
Class
Upper
Class
Im m i­
grants
Turks Russians Majority
Girls 1.00
Boys .56*** 1.00
Lower Class - .0 3 . 36* 1.00
M iddle Class .39** . 62 *** . 60 *** 1 . 00
Upper Class . 61 *** . 58 *** - .1 4 . 40 ** 1.00
Im m igrants - .0 8 . 13 . 26 . 29 . 07 1.00
Turks - .1 7 . 11 . 34 * . 26 . 02 . 78 *** 1.00
Russians - .0 6 . 00 . 29 . 19 - .1 1 . 56 *** .79*** 1 . 00
Majority .33* . 26 . 05 . 16 . 29 - .2 8 - .1 1 .15 1.00
* p  <.05, ** p  <.01, *** p  <.001
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Understood as a belief or a set of beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, or be­
haviors of a particular group or category of people, a  stereotype contains m ore or less 
accurate beliefs, is held by individuals, and may be m easured using implicit or explicit 
methods. Like many other large-scale assessments in  education, the NEPS makes use 
of paper-pencil self-administered questionnaires, where implicit m easures are unfea­
sible to implement. Therefore, we at pillars 3 and 4 of the NEPS developed an  explicit 
m easure of teachers' stereotypes. By m eans of cognitive interviews we identified a 
few m inor problems respondents might have had with the first version and developed 
an improved second version of the item  battery. This second version was tested in a 
pilot study with a sample of N  =  52 second-grade teachers from four German federal 
states.
I set up quantitative analyses to answer the three related research questions. The 
analyses show both variation between groups—as a consequence of variation within 
teachers—and variation between teachers. Both are desirable properties if the instru­
m ent is to be used to answer substantive research questions by m eans of quantitative 
analyses. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that teachers' stereotypes are quite accu­
rate overall: On average, teachers' stereotypes reflect actual group rankings as judged 
by num bers reported in  the empirical literature. Also, for most group comparisons 
most teachers correctly rank the different groups. Since teachers are experts with re­
gard to scholastic achievement of different groups of students, I take this as indicative 
of the instrument's validity. There are two notable exceptions: First, a sizable m inor­
ity of teachers ranks boys as performing equally or worse as girls in  mathematics and, 
thus, shows a bias against boys. Secondly, students of Russian origin are often seen as 
performing equally well or even worse compared to students of Turkish origin, while, 
in fact, the opposite is true.
Evidence based on effect sizes comparing differences in  teachers' stereotypes and 
differences as reported in  the literature, suggests that teachers stereotypes are biased 
to the disadvantage of boys, students from lower social class families or—in compar­
ison with students from upper class families—students from  middle class families, 
immigrants in  general, as well as immigrants of Turkish and Russian origin in  par­
ticular. As expected, these results speak to the general phenom enon of bias in  favor 
of one's—here: teachers'—ingroups, and, hence, to the validity of the instrum ent. I 
also find evidence for an  outgroup homogeneity effect on the group level: Students 
of Turkish origin and those of Russian origin are perceived to be m ore similar than 
they are according to published studies. What is especially harm ful for students of 
Russian origin—they receive relatively poor assessment in  comparison to students of 
Turkish descent—is yet another piece of evidence for the validity of our m easure of
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teachers' stereotypes. The fact that estimates for similar or related groups correlate 
positively, while estimates for unrelated groups do not, also speaks to the validity of 
the instrum ent.
Quite obviously, both the instrum ent and the analysis have their shortcomings and 
limitations: With regard to the instrum ent, it cannot be ruled out that teachers adjust 
their responses towards what they believe to be socially desirable responses. If they 
do, chances are that they report smaller group differences in  general and less negative 
stereotypes than they truly hold towards outgroups in particular. However, as shown 
by cognitive interviews, this should only affect the responses of a minority of teachers. 
Our question wording seems to successfully hide the true purpose of the instrum ent 
and motivate teachers to truthfully report their beliefs. Therefore, the problem of 
social desirability bias should not be severe.
An im portant limitation refers to the first research question, namely whether or not 
teachers' stereotypes can be validly m easured by the instrum ent we developed. The 
quantitative analyses reported above provide rather indirect evidence that the instru­
m ent is indeed a valid measure of teachers' stereotypes. Unfortunately, we could not 
implement alternative m easures of the assessed stereotypes to more directly test the 
instrument's validity. In  this regard future research using the new instrum ent might 
provide further insights. However, I think that the quantitative analyses, but espe­
cially the theoretical reasoning underlying the item  development, and the cognitive 
interviews provide evidence in favor of the validity of the instrum ent, since, first and 
foremost, “validity (as distinct from  reliability) is a theoretical concern, not an empir­
ical one” (Lucas, 2008, p. 6). Another limitation is that the instrum ent does not pro­
vide a direct individual-level measure of teachers' perception of the variation within 
groups. To calculate effect sizes, I assum e that the variances between teachers are 
valid proxies for the average of teachers' perception of within-group variation.
A shortcoming that Wenz et al. (2016) discuss in m ore detail is the relatively large 
share of missing values for immigrants, Turks, Russians, and majority students (see 
figure 5.4 for the numbers). However, it might be that teachers who did not answer 
these items have less or no experience with students of such origin. If so, the larger 
share of missing values for these groups would be less problematic, since teachers' 
stereotypes should affect only the outcomes of students they actually teach. This re­
lates to the problem already m entioned in  chapter 4 that teachers who contribute to 
the bias against particular groups of students in the sample as a whole may not teach 
students from the respective group. However, I did not restrict the sample of N =  52 
any further to restrain keep the sampling error low and statistical power as high as 
possible. W hether teachers who did not report a particular stereotype actually have
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less or no experience with students from  the group in question and whether teachers 
who show biases against particular groups of students do in  fact teach students from 
the respective groups, could and should be tested in  future research using the data 
from the scientific use files from the NEPS that feature larger sample sizes and were 
published after the analyses for this chapter were conducted.
Despite the shortcomings and limitations that the new instrum ent and the analyses 
presented in  this chapter certainly have, I am confident that the new instrum ent—the 
first explicit m easure of teachers' stereotypes in  a panel study on education—is a valid 
m easure of teachers' beliefs about the average competencies of different groups of 
students. I also think that the analyses in this chapter provide sound evidence for the 
conclusion that, while they are not grotesquely off, teachers' stereotypes are some­
what biased to the disadvantage of boys compared to girls, and more so to the disad­
vantage of students from  lower social class families, immigrants in general, as well 
as immigrants of Turkish and Russian origin in particular—always to the respective 
comparison group of students from  higher social classes or ethnic majority students. 
Applying these stereotypes to individual students in  situations such as grading or rec­
ommending tracks at the end of elementary school should, thus, not only lead to in­
dividual discrimination, but also group discrimination and, hence, help explain in­
equality in  German education.
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6 Discrimination in German Education: An Experiment34
Establishing that [...] 
discrimination did or did not 
occur requires causal inference.
(Blank et al., 2004)
For obtaining causal inferences 
that are objective, and therefore 
have the best chance of
revealing scientific truths, 
carefully designed and executed 
randomized experiments are
generally considered to be the 
gold standard.
(D. B. Rubin, 2008)
In  this chapter I address the question of whether there is discrimination in  German 
education along the lines of ethnicity, social class, and gender by means of an exper­
imental study. Based on the conceptualization proposed in  chapter 2, I am  interested 
in  discrimination as causal effect of an information about or signal sent out by a  stu­
dent on how this student is treated by a teacher. Here, I am  interested in  the causal 
effects of signals that carry information about a student's ethnicity, social class, and 
gender. With regard to ethnicity, I focus on students of Turkish origin in  comparison 
to students of the German ethnic majority. Regarding social class, I am interested in 
the treatm ent effects for signals of lower class versus upper middle class backgrounds. 
As for gender, I look at the contrast between girls and boys.
6.1 Observational Studies
As briefly m entioned in  chapter 1, there are not many studies that explicitly investigate 
ethnic discrimination or discrimination against immigrants in German education and 
even less that discuss sex or gender discrimination or discrimination by virtue of a stu­
dents socioeconomic background. In  her seminal study on ethnic discrimination in
34 This chapter is based on joint work with Kerstin Hoenig (Wenz & Hoenig, 2020). While there 
are only m inor differences between this chapter and Wenz and Hoenig (2020), I recommend 
reading and citing Wenz and Hoenig (2020) instead of this chapter.
GESIS Series |  Volume 26 159
Sebastian E. Wenz |  6 Discrimination in German Education: An Experiment
German education, Kristen (2006b) does not find evidence for ethnic discrimination to 
the disadvantage of students of Turkish or Italian background in  both grades and track 
recommendations at the end of elementary school. Only one particular model specifi­
cation yields a  statistical significant disadvantage for students of Turkish backgrounds 
in German grades after controlling for test scores (Kristen, 2006b, p. 90, footnote 7). 
Evidence from  other studies is m ore mixed: Conditional on relevant controls—usually 
including a m easure of socioeconomic background—, other studies find disadvantages 
in term s of statistically significant negative ethnic residuals in  grades or track recom­
mendations (e.g., Gresch, 2012; Kiss, 2013; Lüdemann & Schwerdt, 2013), but some 
even find positive residuals (e.g, Gresch, 2012). Virtually all observational studies on 
ethnic discrimination in  education also find non-significant ethnic residuals in  some 
models, depending on the exact specification. For a review on ethnic discrimination 
in German education see Diehl and Fick (2016).
The evidence from  observational studies with regard to social class is much 
stronger: Even though studies typically do not investigate social class discrimination 
explicitly (cf. T. Schneider, 2011)—which is, given the large socioeconomic dispari­
ties in  educational achievement rather surprising in  and of itself—there are num erous 
studies whose findings can be interpreted as evidence for discrimination in  grading 
and, even m ore so, track recommendations by virtue of students' social class back­
ground: Conditional on competencies andother relevantcovariates, these studies find 
that teachers recom mend or prefer lower tracks for students from lower class families 
(e.g., Arnold et al., 2007; Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; Bos, Wendt, et al., 2012; Ditton, 2013; 
Ditton et al., 2005; Maaz et al., 2011; Maaz et al., 2010; T. Schneider, 2011; Wendt et al., 
2016).
With regard to gender, some studies find that boys receive lower grades conditional 
on test scores and other relevant controls (e.g., Hochweber, 2010; Maaz et al., 2011), 
other studies do not find such an effect (e.g., Wendt et al., 2016). By and large, obser­
vational studies suggest that, if anything, discriminatory grading to the disadvantage 
of boys is rather small in  effect size. Similarly, some studies find statistical significant 
disadvantages of boys remaining in  teachers' track recommendations or track prefer­
ences (e.g., Arnold et al., 2007; Ditton et al., 2005), but others—typically m ore recent 
studies—find no such effect (e.g., Bos, Tarelli, et al., 2012; T. Schneider, 2011).
6.1.1 Limitations of Observational Studies
Residual estimates of discrimination Oaxaca (1973) hinge on the assumption that all 
relevant controls have been included in  the model and m easured without error. An
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im portant case in  point is the students' actual performance at school, be it in  the class­
room, homework assignments, or in  tests and quizzes. Results from  standardized 
competence tests usually serve as a  proxy, but these do not perfectly represent the 
students' performance in class and that is the basis of teachers' evaluations. Note, 
that such residual estimates might either over- or underestim ate discrimination due 
to under- or overcontrolling of key variables, respectively (Holzer & Ludwig, 2003). 
With regard to discrimination in  education, an obvious example for undercontrolling 
and, thus, overestimation of discrimination, is the lack of valid and reliable measures 
of classroom participation. Overcontrolling might happen in the face of racially bi­
ased test scores: If, for example, ethnic minority students' test scores are negatively 
affected by the students' fear of confirming negative stereotypes about their intellec­
tual means, that is controlling for these racially biased test scores would lead to an 
underestim ation of discrimination (Croizet, 2008; Steele & Aronson, 1995).
6.2 Experimental Studies
One proposed solution to the problems of observational studies is an experimental re­
search design, in which randomization, if successful, prevents both unobserved het­
erogeneity and self-selection of any kind. In  experiments conducted in  the lab or in 
the field, actual performance is under the control of the researcher. Natural experi­
m ents typically exploit some kind of “natural” randomization.
6.2.1 International Studies
Most research has been conducted in  the US, where a tradition of experimental re­
search on discrimination in education dates back to the 1970s (e.g., DeMeis & Turner, 
1978; Feldman & Orchowsky, 1979; Harari & McDavid, 1973; Rubovitz & Maehr, 1973; 
Taylor, 1979). More recent contributions to US literature have focused on using data 
from  larger field experiments, natural experiments, or similar quasi-experimental de­
signs (e.g., Dee, 2004b; Figlio, 2005). But there are also experimental studies from Swe­
den (Hinnerich et al., 2011), the Netherlands (van Ewijk, 2011), Israel (Lavy, 2008), In­
dia (Hanna & Linden, 2012), and Germany (e.g., Schulze & Schiener, 2011; Sprietsma, 
2013). They typically employ a design similar to the one proposed in  the present study: 
participants, usually teachers, but quite frequently also students, are asked to evaluate 
the performance, such as an essay, a written exam or an  audio recording, of a subject 
whose characteristics, e.g., gender, social class, ethnicity or immigrant background, 
are varied randomly. Often, this is done by varying the subject's name, but some stud­
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ies provide pictures or extensive vignettes (e.g., Hanna & Linden, 2012; Schulze & 
Schiener, 2011). Another popular type of design are natural experiments. Lavy (2008), 
for instance, compares blind and non-blind examination data from official registers. 
Hinnerich et al. (2014) explicitly hired teachers to blindly grade exams to compare this 
blind score to the non-blind grade as given by the students' teachers.
The majority of these studies finds evidence for discrimination against under-pri­
vileged groups on various dimensions, including race (Dee, 2004b; DeMeis & Turner, 
1978; Feldman & Orchowsky, 1979; Rubovitz & Maehr, 1973), ethnicity (Sprietsma, 
2013; van Ewijk, 2011), immigrant background (Hinnerich et al., 2014), caste (Hanna 
& Linden, 2012), attractiveness (DeMeis & Turner, 1978; Harari & McDavid, 1973), and 
gender (Lavy, 2008; Lindahl, 2016). However, Lindahl (2016) finds the opposite effect 
when it comes to migration background: students with a non-native nam e are favored 
by teachers when it comes to deciding who gets a  school leaving certificate. Van Ewijk 
(2011), whose design is very similar to the present study, finds no discrimination at all 
in essay grading, but lower expectations for immigrants' future academic success.
6.2.2 Evidence From Germany: The Study by Sprietsma (2013)
As a replication and extension of van Ewijk (2011), Sprietsma (2013) assesses teachers' 
biases in  grading and recommendations for secondary school tracks. To this end, Spri- 
etsm a (2013) randomly assigns names that signal a Turkish immigrant background 
and names that signal German heritage to four sets of essays that were sent out to 3500 
schools in two otherwise unspecified regions in  Germany. N =  88 teachers sent back 
the graded essays and filled in questionnaires. Sprietsma (2013) finds, based on lin­
ear regression models, a statistically significant bias in  grading of about .1 standard 
deviation to the disadvantage of what appeared to be Turkish students to the teach­
ers. Using so-called feeling therm om eters, she does not find—in contrast to what I 
find in  chapter 4 using m easures of social distance—statistically significant negative 
prejudice against Turks except for the group of teachers that reports to have little ex­
perience in  teaching students of immigrant background.
However, Sprietsma (2013) finds a discriminatory bias in  grades assigned to essays 
of about .1 standard deviations to the disadvantage of those essays that were suppos­
edly written by students with a Turkish immigrant background. She also finds that 
teachers are on average 11 percentage points less likely to recom mend Gymnasium 
to a  student with a Turkish nam e compared to a  student with a German nam e but 
no effect for Realschule. While the results from this first larger experimental study in 
Germany on ethnic discrimination by teachers are certainly informative with regard
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to the question of whether or not ethnic discrimination exists in  German education, 
it has—at least—two noteworthy limitations: A first limitation that I will discuss in 
m ore detail below is that, by comparing average Turkish names to average German 
names, Sprietsma (2013) cannot distinguish between ethnic discrimination and social 
class discrimination. Secondly, the sample of N =  88 teachers was recruited out of 
3500 schools that were sampled and, thus, “the response rate was extremely low and 
[the] sample is not representative of the prim ary school teacher population of these 
regions” (Sprietsma, 2013, p. 529).
6.2.3 Problems of Experimental Studies
While the experimental design is often described as the gold standard of causal anal­
ysis (see, e.g., Gangl, 2010; Imbens & Rubin, 2015; Morgan & Winship, 2015; D. B. Ru­
bin, 2008), it is not without problems. Some of theses problems are design-immanent, 
some are mainly due to the way researchers handle experimental designs. The follow­
ing three problems strike m e as the most severe problems of experiments on discrim­
ination.
Sampling and sample of analysis
There are two distinct problems most experimental studies suffer from that concern 
the sample these studies rely on. I have already m entioned both in  chapter 4 and 
chapter 5. First, many experimental studies in  the field of discrimination rely on con­
venience samples, often drawn from  populations such as university students in  educa­
tion programs or preservice teachers (e.g., Bonefeld & Dickhäuser, 2018; Glock et al., 
2015; Schulze & Schiener, 2011). In  their sample, Glock et al. (2015) even mix teachers 
from  one European country with preservice teachers from another. Therefore, these 
studies have rather low external validity and, in  fact, can be shown—as I have done in 
section 4.4.1—to result in rather biased estimates of population param eters.
Secondly, a  point I have also m ade in  section 2.4.1 but have not seen addressed in 
any study is based on insights by Becker (1957/1971), nicely summarized by Heckman 
(1998) in  the following sentence: “finding a discriminatory effect of race or gender 
at a randomly selected firm does not provide an  accurate m easure of the discrimi­
nation that takes place in  the market as a whole” (Heckman, 1998, p. 102). In  the 
labor market, the difference is mainly due to self-selection of employees into non­
discriminating firms; a behavior that causes segregation (Becker, 1957/1971). In  el­
ementary education in  Germany, differences in  the level of discrimination between
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an average or typical teacher and a  teacher that actually teaches students of a particu­
lar background—e.g., students of Turkish background—might more likely arise from 
teachers self-selecting into schools with different shares of students of such back­
ground or from a change in  attitudes and beliefs as a consequence of teaching such 
students. Self-selection of students into elementary schools is heavily restricted in 
most states in  Germany and, hence, should play less of a  role. I have not seen this 
exact point being explicitly addressed in any empirical study on discrimination in ed­
ucation, although van Ewijk (2011) makes a similar point and oversamples schools 
with a  share of at least 25% non-ethnic Dutch students.
Effect heterogeneity across the competence distribution
From models of statistical discrimination theory we know that discrimination may 
differ along the distribution of observed performance, y (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Phelps, 
1972). In  fact, if teachers engage in  reliability-based statistical discrimination it is pos­
sible that not only does the discriminatory effect vary but also change its direction 
over the range of y. Therefore, studies that only assess discrimination at one point 
along the distribution of y are severely limited with regard to what can be inferred 
from them  about discrimination in the market or sector of interest. Put differently, 
without making additional assumptions, these studies cannot say anything about the 
average level or direction of individual discrimination nor can they say anything about 
group discrimination—not even which group is on average suffering from  it (also see 
Heckman, 1998; Heckman & Siegelman, 1993; Neumark, 2012, for this argument).
Confounding ethnic and social class discrimination
That ethnic or racial discrimination might at least partly be a  problem of social class 
discrimination is an  insight that dates back to the earliest days of research in race re­
lations (e.g., Myrdal, 1944, p. 75). Blalock (1967), for example, devotes an  appendix to
the questions whether racial prejudice is essentially class prejudice or to what degree
race and class attitudes are interchangeable (Blalock, 1967, pp. 199-203). He summa­
rizes the problem as follows:
The problem ofdistinguishingbetw eenracialprejudice andclassattitudes 
arises because of the fact that ethnic and racial backgrounds are among 
the important criteria used to determine one's general status. As long as 
minority membership remains among the defining criteria of class position it
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will indeed be difficult to separate the two phenomena empirically.  (Blalock,
1967, pp. 201-202, his emphasis)
Put differently: Because ethnicity and social class are confounded, m easures of eth­
nic prejudice or discrimination might be confounded with social class prejudice or 
discrimination. And, indeed: What was true back then is still true today in virtu­
ally all societies. In  Germany, for example, immigrants with Turkish background are 
overrepresented in  the lower classes and have generally worse labor market outcomes 
than the ethnic majority (Below, 2007; Büchel & Frick, 2004; Kalter, 2008; Kogan, 2004, 
2007).
In  conjunction with the standard research design of manipulating ethnicity by vary­
ing names or pictures (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Deming et al., 2016; Glock 
& Klapproth, 2017; Jacquemet & Yannelis, 2012; Sprietsma, 2013; Weichselbaumer, 
2016), this, as I argue, may pose a serious problem. The problem lies in  the selection 
of stimuli and the corresponding signal: By selecting a nam e or picture typical for an 
average minority group m em ber and an average majority group member, the stimuli 
signal not only ethnicity but also all societal correlates of which, in  case of ethnicity, 
the most im portant is arguably social class. So, in contrast to most studies relying 
on observational data, social class is not held constant in  the experimental m anipu­
lation. Thus, it is possible that any discrimination found in  these studies is—at least 
partly—the result of class differences, not ethnicity (for this and similar arguments 
see Bertrand & M ullainathan, 2004; Figlio, 2005; Fryer Jr & Levitt, 2004; Gaddis, 2015, 
2017a, 2017b). Figure 6.1 visualizes the problem: Names, N , are determ ined by both 
ethnicity at conception, E C  ,  and social class at conception, CC  , and affect, that is, 
send, both ethnic signals, E S  , and social class signals, CS  .
To my knowledge, the present study was the first experimental study that made 
a conscious effort to disentangle class and ethnic discrimination in  education using 
nam es as stimuli. Tobisch and Dresel (2017)—who cite Hoenig and Wenz (2013) in  a 
correction (Tobisch & Dresel, 2020)—have since published a  study with a similar de­
sign that replicates the m ain findings of our study as reported in  Hoenig and Wenz 
(2013) and in  this chapter below.
Note that while vignette designs that make use of extensive descriptions of students 
(Glock et al., 2015; Hanna & Linden, 2012; Schulze & Schiener, 2011) may help to ad­
dress the problem , they have other limitations of which the most im portant is that 
they create rather artificial settings that make it difficult to provide a reasonable cover 
story that hides the true purpose of the study. I have not reviewed the vignette study 
by Schulze and Schiener (2011) in  detail above as it relies on a  student sample. Its 
finding that immigrant background—operationalized via language spoken at home—
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Figure 6.1: Stylized directed acyclic graph (DAG) showing the problems of identifying
ethnic discrimination, E S Y , and social class discrimination, CS Y ,
using names, N  , as treatm ents. A randomized assignment of names, N , 
blocks the backdoor paths through ethnic and social class at conception, EC 
and CC . However, if N  carries both ethnic and social class signals, E S and 
CS, the backdoor paths ES N  C S  Y and CS N  ES Y remain 
open.
does not affect the probability of a  recommendation for Gymnasium independent of 
the parents' education, is nevertheless an interesting finding on the backdrop of the 
discussion about the confounding of ethnicity and social class.
6.3 The Situation at the End of Elementary School in Germany
Discrimination by teachers may occur in  at least three situations: First, day-to-day 
classroom interactions, for example by calling m ore on some students than others. 
Secondly, in  the evaluation of a specific performance, for example when grading a 
test or assignment. And, thirdly, in the evaluation of a student's general potential or 
in the formation of expectations about a  student's development—such expectations 
should play a major role for all kinds of treatm ents including decisions about ability 
grouping or tracking and may lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. In  this experiment I 
take a look at the two latter types—grading and expectations. I rely on the theories I 
discussed in chapter 3 and the findings regarding teachers' prejudices and stereotypes 
in chapters 4 and 5 to derive hypotheses depending on the situation. Each of the two 
situations features a  different logic with different conditions that allow to indirectly 
test the mechanisms suggested by different theories.
In  chapter 1,  I have argued and cited evidence for the importance of the first transi­
tion in  German education, namely the transition from elementary school to secondary 
school. This transition provides us with a test case scenario in  which both teachers'
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grading and expectation formation m atter a  lot. Even though the 16 German federal 
states are responsible for their education policy, their education systems are actually 
fairly similar (Helbig & Nikolai, 2015). All children start elem entary school around 
the age of six. Usually, a single teacher teaches the m ain subjects and there is no for­
mal ability grouping or streaming. In  most states, students are tracked into different 
school types after four years of elem entary school when they are on average 10 years 
old.35 The num ber and specifics of tracks differ between states, but in all states, the 
highest track is the Gymnasium, which leads to the Abitur, the highest secondary de­
gree and entrance ticket to university. In  all states, elementary school teachers give 
official recommendations suggesting the track they believe would be ideal consider­
ing the child's potential. The major—or, in  some states, only—determ inants of these 
recommendations are grades, but teachers are, legally or empirically, asked to con­
sider the child's overall potential. These track recommendations are legally binding 
in  some federal states, but can be overruled by parents in  others (Helbig & Nikolai, 
2015).
Because tracking between different school types occurs unusually early in  the Ger­
m an education system and because a student's track is largely determ ined by the 
teacher's recommendation, discrimination by elementary school teachers can have 
especially severe consequences for children's educational attainm ent in  Germany. 
However, my theoretical and methodological contributions are of much broader sig­
nificance, as both the grading of students' performance in a non-anonymous set­
ting and some form of tracking, streaming, or ability grouping, dependent largely on 
teachers' evaluations and grading, takes place in  virtually all education systems. The 
only unusual feature of the German system is the young age at which between-school 
tracking occurs (OECD, 2010). Furthermore, and as discussed in chapter 5, teachers' 
expectations may turn  into self-fulfilling prophecies that can be especially harm ful to 
students from stigmatized groups (Jussim, 1989; Jussim et al., 1996; Jussim & Harber, 
2005; Jussim, Robustelli, et al., 2009; Lorenz et al., 2016).
6.4 Hypotheses
The most obvious and, as I am  going to show in this section, theoretically important 
difference between forming expectations and grading a  manifest performance such 
as a written essay is the amount and reliability of individuating information available 
to the teacher. While in  principle an  essay provides the teacher with all information
35 In  two states—Berlin and Brandenburg—children are tracked after six years at the age of 12.
GESIS Series |  Volume 26 167
Sebastian E. Wenz |  6 Discrimination in German Education: An Experiment
needed to grade it, tracking or grouping decisions are based on expectations that are 
themselves necessarily based on imperfect information about the latent construct of 
ability or potential and—especially in situations of explicit between school tracking—a 
yet unobserved future. As I intend to provide indirect evidence on the mechanisms 
governing teachers' judgments, in  this section I briefly recapitulate theoretical mech­
anisms that could govern discrimination in grading and expectation formation as dis­
cussed mainly in  chapter 3 but also in  chapters 4 and 5. I then deduce hypotheses from 
different theories and perspectives.
6.4.1 Tastes, Prejudice, and In-Group Favoritism
As discussed in  chapter 3, Becker (1957/1971)'s theory of taste discrimination and social 
identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) are similar in the sense that 
both do not put emphasis on the role information or situational ambiguity plays but 
m ore on intergroup relations and common group m embership. Becker (1957/1971) 
suggests that discrimination in  favor of or to the disadvantage of a m em ber of a par­
ticular group compared to a  m em ber of another group occurs whenever an  actor has 
different discrimination coefficients (DCs) for the two corresponding groups. SIT sug­
gests that both personal and social identity determine a person's self-esteem and self­
concept. Since hum ans strive to m aintain a positive self-concept and enhance self­
esteem, they also strive for strive for positive personal and social identities. The social 
identity might be positively affected by favoring ingroups and ingroup m em bers or by 
derogating outgroups and outgroup m em bers. This mechanism not only explains dis­
crimination but also why people tend to hold negative prejudices towards outgroups 
and outgroup m em bers.
In  chapter 4 I have reviewed studies and provided own evidence that suggests that 
German teachers indeed hold negative prejudices against Turks in  general and stu­
dents with a  Turkish background in particular. The social distance m easures I used 
as global m easures of prejudice can also be understood as measures of Becker (1957/ 
1971)'s DC. Since elementary school teachers in  Germany are also overwhelmingly 
female instead of male and are themselves—as academics employed in  the public 
sector—m em bers of the service class, boys and children from lower social class back­
grounds are outgroup m em bers that teachers arguably also hold negative prejudices 
against. In  sum , both SIT and Becker (1957/1971) expect discrimination to occur 
largely regardless of the amount and reliability of individuating information against 
outgroups and outgroup members.
However, before I deduce hypotheses from these perspectives, please recall that in
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chapter 4 I have also suggested that the mechanism, Becker (1957/1971) proposes to 
explain discrimination with regard to wage setting or hiring decision—namely “disu­
tility caused by contact with some individuals” (Becker, 1957/1971, p. 15)—, cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to all kinds of situations in  education including essay grad­
ing and recommending tracks. While I stick to this interpretation, I would like to re­
m ind the reader, that in the economic and sociological literature Becker (1957/1971)'s 
model is often interpreted m ore generally as a model in  which tastes, prejudice, or in­
group favoritism govern hum an behavior (e.g., Hanna & Linden, 2012; Kristen, 2006b; 
Sprietsma, 2013; van Ewijk, 2011). From this perspective, the predictions of Becker 
(1957/1971)'s theory of taste discrimination and social identity theory coincide. But, 
as as a theory test, I suggest that the following hypotheses are m ore informative with 
regard to SIT than Becker (1957/1971):
Hypothesis 1a  : German teachers discriminate in both essay grading and expectation 
formation by virtue of students' ethnic background to the disadvantage of students 
with a nam e signaling a Turkish background.
Hypothesis 1b : German teachers discriminate in  both essay grading and expectation 
formation by virtue of students' social class background to the disadvantage of stu­
dents with a  nam e signaling a lower social class background.
Hypothesis 1c : German teachers discriminate in  both essay grading and expectation 
formation by virtue of students' gender to the disadvantage of students with a name 
signaling m ale gender.
6.4.2 The Role of Imperfect Information and Ambiguity
Empirical evidence and m ore recent theoretical contributions point to situational 
moderators of the link between categorization and the application of stereotypes or 
prejudice and, hence, discrimination. I discussed three rather different theories that 
fall in  this camp: Statistical discrimination theory (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; 
Phelps, 1972), the continuum  model (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and 
the theory of aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). 
However, mechanisms and theoretical reasoning differ considerably among these ap­
proaches as I have already discussed in  detail in  chapter 3.
Statistical discrimination (e.g., Aigner & Cain, 1977), for instance, points to imper­
fect knowledge as the key reason for why rational decision makers discriminate on the 
basis of observable group characteristics. Following statistical discrimination theory, 
teachers should be expected to construct a  weighted average of observed individual 
performance and assumed group ability to estimate a  student's individual ability: The
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lower the reliability of the individual information, the further the estimate is pulled 
towards the assumed group m ean, that is, towards the teacher's stereotype.
The continuum model (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) acknowledges 
available information as one of “two prim ary factors” in  more or less category or 
stereotype driven and, hence, m ore or less discriminatory judgments and behavior. 
If the target is of minimal interest or relevance for the perceiver in the very moment 
of categorization, perceivers are motivated to allocate attention to individuating in­
formation and move down the continuum  from category-based “affect, cognitions, 
and behavioral tendencies” toward a “piecemeal integration” of individual attributes 
(Fiske et al., 1999, p. 233). Of course, this process of recategorization and, eventually, 
piecemeal integration may only be started if the available information is rich enough 
and the perceiver has the tim e and the cognitive capacity to take it into account.
The theory of aversive aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008; Gaertner & Do- 
vidio, 1986) suggests that in m odern societies, where negative prejudice and discrimi­
nation to the disadvantage of ethnic and social m inorities is condemned by a majority 
of people, many people are motivated to uphold a positive self-image as unprejudiced 
nondiscriminator but at the same tim e hold negative implicit prejudices and stereo­
types about outgroups and outgroup m em bers. These aversive racists are expected to 
discriminate only in situations that are ambiguous enough to not reveal the discrimi­
natory behavior to the aversive racists themselves and others.
As for teachers' stereotypes and attitudes, I have reviewed evidence provided by 
others and provided own evidence in  chapter 5 that teachers in  Germany hold stereo­
types that are biased to the disadvantage of Turkish students, students from  lower so­
cial class families, and boys. Therefore, in  case teachers rely on a decision algorithm 
as proposed by statistical discrimination theory and individual information is not per­
fectly reliable, we should expect the special case of “error discrimination” (England 
& Lewin, 1989). Biased stereotypes as well as implicit and explicit negative prejudices 
(see chapters 5 and 4) are relevant and may lead to discrimination if teachers rely on 
a category-based judgment instead of a piecemeal integration of individual attributes 
(Fiske et al., 1999)o r  can get awaywith a discriminatory response(Gaertner&  Dovidio, 
1986).
As for the logic of the situation teachers find themselves in  when grading a writ­
ten essay, sufficiently motivated teachers should not show any discriminatory biases, 
since all relevant information is available (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Fiske et al., 1999) and 
a discriminatory bias is hard to hide (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).
However, when the same teachers need to predict future development of students 
when recommending tracks, the available information based on an  essay might not
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be perceived as perfectly reliable (Aigner & Cain, 1977), or—put differently—might not 
be rich, diagnostic, or clear enough (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008; Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). In  this case, teachers should make use 
of beliefs about group m eans and stereotypes in  general (Aigner & Cain, 1977), may 
have not enough information to go all the way from a category-based response to a 
piecemeal-based response (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and may take 
the opportunity to hide a judgment based on stereotypes or prejudices behind vague 
information and the ambiguity of the situation (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).
Based on how statistical discrimination theory, the continuum  model, and the the­
ory of aversive racism acknowledge the reliability of information and the ambiguity of 
situations as moderating factors that increase the likelihood of category based judg­
m ents, I deduce the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a  : German teachers do not discriminate when grading a written essay 
but do so when forming expectations by virtue of students' ethnic background to the 
disadvantage of students with a nam e signaling a Turkish background.
Hypothesis 2b : German teachers do not discriminate when grading a  written essay 
but do so when forming expectations by virtue of students' social class background to 
the disadvantage of students with a nam e signaling a lower social class background.
Hypothesis 2c  : German teachers do not discriminate when grading a  written essay 
but do so when forming expectations by virtue of students' gender to the disadvantage 
of students with a  nam e signaling m ale gender.
6.4.3 Further Thoughts on What to Expect
Instead of deriving m ore concrete hypothesis, in  this section I offer some further 
thoughts on what different theoretical models might predict for the different situa­
tions with a special focus on effects at different points in  the distribution of observed 
performance.
Clearest guidance in this regard comes from statistical discrimination theory. As 
discussed elsewhere in  this dissertation (see, e.g., section 3.1.2 again), statistical dis­
crimination models suggest that discrimination may differ along the distribution of 
observed performance (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Phelps, 1972). If teachers attach differ­
ent reliabilities to performance signals from different groups—e.g., students of Turk­
ish background and those without immigrant background—, individual discrimina­
tion should vary over the range of observed performance. However, without knowing 
the group-specific reliabilities, where exactly teachers see the performance presented 
in  the experiment—i.e., in  which part of the distribution—, and how risk-averse teach­
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ers really are (cf. Maaz et al., 2008), it is difficult to derive concrete hypotheses. This 
is why I will not do so but simply rem ind the reader that and why interaction effects 
with essay quality will be specified and are of great interest.
With regard to the other two theories that highlight situational m oderators such as 
the richness of information and ambiguity, it might certainly be the case that essays 
of different quality relate to these mechanisms.
The continuum  model (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) proposes that 
category-based affect, cognition, and behavioral responses are the default mode of 
hum an cognition. Only if the initial categorization of a person does not seem  to fit the 
data—here: the written essay—, a recategorization process is started that potentially 
leads all the way down to a piecemeal integration of the available data and, thus, to 
an individuating response. It could be, for example, that the better of two essays is 
so good, that the teacher finds it difficult to achieve a fit to the stereotype of a stu­
dent with Turkish background and, instead of a category-based response, looks very 
careful for individuating information and behaves accordingly. At the same time, the 
teacher might achieve a good fit for this essay and the stereotype of a  German student 
from an upper middle class family. This might result in  similar predictions for these 
students and no discrimination on the basis of ethnic signals that could disadvantage 
the Turkish student. If at the same time, the bad essay's nature is such that it allows 
the teacher to proceed with a  category-based response in  both cases—because the es­
say is rather average, not very good, not very bad—there should be discrimination on 
the basis of the ethnic signal and corresponding stereotypes. Of course, this example 
also works the other way around—with a very bad and an average essay. In  either case, 
the resulting pattern of this scenario would be an  interaction effect of discriminatory 
responses with essay quality.
Similarly, relying on m echanisms from aversive racism theory we might also pre­
dict such an interaction effect. If performance is clearly very good or very bad, aver­
sive racists will not apply stereotypes and prejudices in  their judgments and behavior.
6.5 Experimental Design
I designed an  online experiment to identify and estimate ethnic discrimination, so­
cial class discrimination, and gender discrimination in grading of a specific assign­
m ent and in  teachers' expectations. In 2010 I collected the data together with Kerstin 
Hoenig and Anne Landhäußer. Test subjects were elementary school teachers from 
the German federal state of Baden-Württemberg who taught German at the tim e of 
data collection. I limited the sample to teachers from  one federal state because cur­
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ricula and grading standards differ between states. I employed a 2 x 2 x 3 factorial 
design, varying essay quality, the student's gender, and the student's social and ethnic 
background. Gender and background were varied by random assignment of names 
to the essays and participants. In addition to grading one essay each, teachers were 
asked to answer a shortquestionnaire.
6.5.1 Sampling and Contact
The main goal in sampling was to increase external validity and reduce bias in my es­
timates compared to most previous research. To this end, I drew a random sample of 
720schools from all prim aryschools in the state ofBaden-W ürttemberg, bothpublic 
and private, and contacted them  via e-mail. The recipient—in most cases, probably 
either the school's principal or secretary—was asked to forward the e-mail to all teach­
ers at the school who taught German at the time. As an incentive to participate, I put 
u p a lo tte ry o fth ree  g iftcertificatesforanonline bookstore worthEUR20.00each,as 
w ellasthe optionto receive inform ationaboutresults. N  =  237teachersparticipated 
in the survey.36
6.5.2 Essays
Each teacher was presented with one of two essays of different quality. By varying 
essayquality,I addressthe shortcom ingofsom e previousstudiesthatassessdiscrim - 
inationm erelyatonepoin tin thedistribu tionofy . Essaysw ereobtainedfrom afourth 
grade class from Baden-Württemberg37. They were about 200 words long and were 
based on the assignment to write a story around a given title. The two essays for our 
experimentwere chosenbasedonthe resu ltso fap re testinB avaria ,asta te  whose ed­
ucation system and educational outcomes are similar to that ofBaden-Württemberg. 
T hepre testa lsoservedasatesto fthesam plingandcontactingprocedureofthe  main 
study. 27 teachers from randomly sampled Bavarian elementary schools took part in 
the pretest. Theygradedeachessayw ithoutreceivinganyinform ationaboutthe sup­
posed author except for age and grade level. Additionally, they were asked to guess 
the child 'sgenderandto answ erashortquestionnaire abouttheirow nteachingexpe-
36 Due to restrictions by the state's Ministry of Education, which had to approve the study, I 
was not allowed to ask teachers the nam e of their school in  the questionnaire. This unfor­
tunately m eans that I am  unable to account for potential clustering of teachers by schools 
in  my analyses.
37 I would like to thank Anne Landhäußer for collecting the essays.
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rience. Based on the results of the pretest, I selected two essays that were of different 
quality and comparatively gender-neutral, as I would assign both male and female 
author's names to each essay in  the m ain study.
6.5.3 Names
To identify and estimate ethnic and class discrimination, I chose one male and one 
female nam e each that signal a German upper middle class (Jakob, Sophie), German 
lower class (Justin, Jacqueline), or Turkish background (Ayse, Murat), respectively. I 
made sure that the German names I selected are about equally prevalent in  the birth  
cohort of 2000 and that none of the nam es are linked to a certain geographical re­
gion in Germany. Although there are apparently typical upper and lower class Turkish 
names, I have reason to believe that German teachers are simply not familiar enough 
with Turkish culture to recognize the difference. Therefore, I cannot vary class back­
ground independently of ethnic background by nam e m anipulation. Instead, I as­
sume that a Turkish nam e indicates a class background that is comparable to that of 
German lower class names. This assumption was tested in a m anipulation check on 
a different sample (see below). With regard to the definition of ethnic discrimina­
tion as causal effect of an ethnic information or an  ethnic signal, the two causal states 
whose difference define this causal effect are nam es that signal Turkish background 
and names that signal German lower class background. The differences between how 
these groups are treated by teachers are interpreted as evidence of ethnic discrimina­
tion. The differences between nam es signaling German upper middle class and Ger­
m an lower class are interpreted as social class discrimination. I return  to the question 
whether these definitions are the only meaningful and defendable ways of defining 
ethnic discrimination and social class discrimination in  such an experimental design.
The alternative to using names as treatm ents would have been a  design based on 
comprehensive vignettes that explicitly include child background characteristics. I 
decided against the use of vignettes because these create a rather artificial setting in 
which teachers are bound to ask themselves why the researcher provided them  with 
this information in this form—vignettes typically use extensive descriptions of a sit­
uation or person. In  contrast, nam es make for a much m ore subliminal stimulus, 
that—embedded in  a reasonable cover story—should reduce social desirability bias to 
a minimum . Also, among other m ore substantive reasons, I motivated the present 
study by pointing to methodological problems of research designs that use nam es as 
stimuli without addressing the question of whether or not ethnic or racial signals may 
be confounded with social class signals.
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Manipulation check
The nam es underwent a m anipulation check using a separate sample of elementary 
school teachers (N =  75), who were asked to guess the migration and class back­
ground (upper, middle, or lower class) of each nam e. As intended, the vast major­
ity of teachers indicates that Murat (69%) and Ayse (70%) have a Turkish background, 
whereas Jakob (94%), Sophie (97%), Justin (99%), and Jacqueline (92%) are virtually 
unanimously identified as German.38 Remarkably, a sizable minority identifies Murat 
(23%) and Ayse (24%) as German.
Regarding social class, Sophie and Jakob are believed to come from families with 
an  upper class (Sophie: 53%, Jakob: 59%) or middle class (Sophie: 40%, Jakob: 36%) 
background. As expected, for Jacqueline and Justin the pattern is reversed: these 
nam es are perceived predominantly as nam es held by children with a lower social 
class background (Jacqueline: 71%, Justin: 67%). However, a sizable minority of 
teachers categorizes them  as middle class (Jacqueline: 21%, Justin: 25%) or even up­
per class (both 8%). The Turkish names are also perceived as being m ost likely to be 
nam es from  students with a lower social class background (Ayse: 52%, Murat: 53%), 
followed by middle class (Ayse: 39%, Murat: 36%) and upper class (Ayse: 9%, Mu­
rat: 11%). Yet, fewer teachers report to perceive Ayse and Murat as lower class than 
Jacqueline and Justin.
Overall, teachers tend to perceive the selected nam es as intended. However, there 
are potential problems: If a  sizable minority of participating teachers really perceive 
students with Turkish names as ethnically German, and students with lower class 
nam es as having a middle class background, our estimates of both ethnic discrimina­
tion and social class discrimination would be downwardly biased. Also, the estimate 
of ethnic discrimination would be downwardly biased if teachers perceived students 
with Turkish names as having a higher social class background than students with 
ethnic majority lower class names.
To better understand how severe these potential problems really are and how they 
compare to other studies, consider this: First, my estimates are biased if and only 
if the num bers above deviate from  the perception teachers in  the population have. 
So, if in the population, for instance, the same sizable minority of teachers perceives 
students with a Turkish immigrant background not as having a Turkish background 
but as ethnic majority German, then the num bers above do not indicate bias in  my
38 Although Justin and Jacqueline are not traditional German nam es, foreign nam es are popu­
lar among German families with a lower socioeconomic background. Evidently, the teach­
ers in  the sample recognize this fact.
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estimates. However, I do not know this num ber. Secondly, the num bers reported 
abive are similar to those reported for the perception of names of Blacks and Whites 
in the US: Gaddis (2017a) finds congruent perceptions of 87.3% for first names held by 
Whites and 75.0% for first nam es held by Blacks. That doesn't m ean that my num bers 
are fine, but that in  other countries and cultures, similar rates and differences are 
found.
Thirdly, and maybe most importantly, a closerlook at the data reveals that the devia­
tions on all three dimensions—ethnicity signal of Turkish names, class signal of lower 
class names, and class signal of Turkish names—are highly correlated. It is virtually 
the same group of teachers who deviates on all three items, except for the additional 
some 20% that declare to perceive the Turkish nam es as middle or upper class. The 
behavior of this group of teachers could well be a manifestation of social desirability 
bias instead of a  real difference in perception. Admittedly, I do not know whether the 
deviations are due to socially desirable behavior by some teachers. I also don't know 
whether this social desirability bias, should it indeed be the explanation of the pat­
tern  I find, may also influence teachers' behavior in  the field and, thus, not bias our 
estimates of discrimination.
6.5.4 Questionnaire39
Teachers had to answer each item  of the online questionnaire and could not go back 
once they had left a page. This was done to prevent teachers from  skipping back and 
changing their evaluation of the student's performance as a reaction to later items. 
At the beginning of the survey, teachers were presented with the essay, information 
about the specifics of the assignment and the information that it was written by a ten 
year old fourth grader with a particular nam e. They were then asked to evaluate the 
child's performance with the following items:
1. “Which grade would you give [name of child] for this essay?” Teachers could as­
sign German grades from  1 (best) to 6 (worst), including plus and m inus signs to 
differentiate further between full grades.
2. “How likely is it that [name of child] can keep up in German lessons at the Gym- 
nasiumwith thisperform ance?”,ra te d o n  the scale o f1 to  5.
The essaywas visible foreach ofthese items. Then,teachersansw eredafew ques- 
tionsabouttheirteachingexperience,theethnicandsocialcom positionoftheirclass,
39 Thanks to Anne Landhäußer for programming the questionnaire.
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and their own social and ethnic background. On average, teachers took 12 m inutes to 
complete the survey. For screenshots of all pages of the questionnaire please see ap­
pendix D or the OSF project at https://osf.io/dqtkg/.
6.6 Analytic Strategy
6.6.1 Essay Grading
In  order to assess discrimination in grading I model the grade as given by the teacher 
with two different models of which the following is the m ore simple one:
Yi — a +  Qiß i +  Fiß^ +  Tjßs  +  Liß4 +  C y  +  e» (6.1)
where Y  is the grade assigned to essay i , Q captures the quality of the essay (good =  1), 
F  identifies the gender of the nam e attached to the essay (f  emale =  1), T  distin­
guishes between Turkish and German names (Turkish  =  1), and L stands for the 
social class associated with a German nam e (low social class =  1). Q,  F , T ,  and L 
are dummy variables, C  is a vector of controls. My coding dictates that the bad es­
say, male names, and those representing an upper middle class background are the 
according reference groups. e is an error term  with the usual properties in  an OLS 
scenario. To assess the sensitivity of the standard errors, I also estimated models fea­
turing heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This did not change the significance 
levels of any of the parameters.
In  the second model I examine interaction effects between some of the variables.
This model examines whether nam e effects depend on the quality of the essay and 
looks as follows
Y * — a +  Qi ß i  +  Fiß ^ +  Tißz  +  L,. ß.-j +  (QßTßßs +  (QiLß)ßß +  (QiF»')ßf  +  C y +  e» (6.2)
Now, ß 1 captures the differencebetw eenbad and goodessay forG erm anupper middle
class boys, ß2 captures gender differences in  the bad essay, ß3 estimates the difference 
between Turkish and German upper middle class names when the essay is bad, and 
ß4 the one between German lower class and upper middle class names for the bad 
essay. Finally, ß5 , ß6,  ß7 estimate whether theeffects estimated b y ß2, ß3,  and ß4 are 
any different when the essay quality is good instead. Obviously, some of the effects
of interest the results rely partly on the sums or differences of these coefficients and 
the corresponding confidence intervals. For example, ß3 +  ß5 yields the difference
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Table 6.1: Teachers' expectations, dependent on essay quality.
Essay Quality
Likelihood of keeping up 
at the Gymnasium
No.
good
Col % No.
bad
Col% No.
Total 
Col % Cum %
1 (very unlikely) 22 19.5 58 46.8 80 33.8 33.8
2 32 28.3 40 32.3 72 30.4 64.1
3 42 37.2 21 16.9 63 26.6 90.7
4 17 15.0 3 2.4 20 8.4 99.2
5 (very likely) 0 0.0 2 1.6 2 0.8 100.0
Total 113 100.0 124 100.0 237 100.0
between good essays with Turkish and German upper middle class names on them
and ß 1 +  ß5 estimates the returns to a good essay compared to a bad essay for students 
with a Turkish name. Ethnic discrimination for the bad essay is returned by ß3 — ß4, 
for the good essay by (ß3 +  ß5) -  (ß4  +  ß6 ).
The participating teachers graded the essays according to a usual15 pointGerm an 
grading scale, Y =  {1,1—, . . . , 5 —,6}, turned into ascale ranging from 0(w orstgrade, 
German 6) to 14 (best grade, German 1), Y =  {0, 1, . . . , 13, 14}. Empirically, teachers 
assigned grades from 2 (German 5) to 12 (German 2+).
6.6.2 Teachers' Expectations
In the German education system, elem entaryschoolteachers' expectations aboutthe 
future development of students' abilities and skills are crucial for students' success 
in the education system. In fourth grade teachers recommend a secondary school 
track to each child. Practically speaking, they need to answer the question whether 
the childin question willbe able to keep u p a tth e  schooltracks offeredin aparticular 
state. Since the Gymnasium is the highest track available in all federal states, I focus 
onteachers'estim ation ofthe likelihoodthatthe childcan keep up in Germanlessons 
at the Gymnasium.
Discrimination in expectations is assessed by modeling the probability ofhaving a 
teacher assigning a particular likelihood of success. This ordinal variable originally 
has five categories with the endpoints labeled as “very unlikely” (1) and “very likely”
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(5), respectively. I model this ordinal dependent variable using an  ordinal logit model 
(OLM) (Long, 1997).40
For both essays, teachers are hesitant to assign high likelihoods of success (see ta­
ble 6.1)—in fact, the highest category (5: very likely) was used only twice. In  part, this 
is probably due to the average to low grades teachers have given for the essays—grade 
and expectations are correlated (r =  0.51, p <  .001). On the other hand, teachers 
have admittedly little information about the child's true ability after only one short 
essay, and we know from past research that German elementary school teachers tend 
to be risk averse when making track recommendations (Maaz et al., 2008). Thus, we 
should expect them  to be cautious in their estimation of children's potential. Due to 
the skewed distribution, I recoded the variable so that the three highest categories 
(medium to high likelihood of success) were collapsed into a single category. The de­
pendent variable now has three categories (J  =  3), and is linked to the m easurem ent 
model of the OLM as follows
Yi  =
1 1 (“very unlikely”)
2 2
3 3, 4, and 5 (“very likely”)
if T0 =  - to < Y* < ti 
if ti < Y* < T2 (6.3)
if t 2 < Yi * < t 3 =  to
where T1 through TJ - 1 are cutpoints estimated in the OLM (Long, 1997).
A sin equation 6.1, Im odel the underlyinglatentvariable o fthe  OLMasfollows
Y* = a +  Qiß i +  F ß  +  T',:ß  +  Liß4 +  C y  +  e» (6.4)
w hereQ capturesthequalityoftheessay(good =  1), F identifiesgender(fem ale  =  1), 
T  distinguishesbetween TurkishandG erm an nam es(Turkish  =  1), a n d L standsfor
the social classassociatedw ithaG erm annam e (low socialclass =  1). C isav ec to ro f
controls and e is a random  error that follows a logistic distribution with m ean 0 and 
variance n 2 /3.
Forteachers'expectationsIalsoestim ateam odelfeaturinginteractioneffectsusing 
the same model specification as for grading (see equation 6.2):
Y * = a +  Qi ß i  +  F ß +  Tißz  +  Liß^ +  (QiTßß s +  (QiLß)ßß +  (QiFi')ßf  +  C y +  e» (6.5)
40 I also ran  all models as OLS regressions using the original Likert scale, as well as logistic 
regressions using a dichotomized variable combining categories 1 and 2 versus 3 to 5. Sub­
stantively, this does not alter my conclusions as discussed below. For results and syntax 
see the supplementary m aterial at https://osf.io/dqtkg/.
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The interpretation of the coefficients is also just like in  equation 6.2, only that now the
dependent variable represents the underlying latent variable of the OLM. For both
model specifications, I test the parallel regression assumption, also known as propor­
tional odds assumption, using the Wald testsuggested by B rant(1990). Results suggest 
that the assumption holds for both models.
To foster interpretation of the results from this non-linear model and to address 
problem sofgroupcom parisons(Allison, 1999;K arlsonetal., 2012;Long, 2009;Mood, 
2010), Icalculateandplotthe probabilitiesoffallingintothe differentcategoriesofthe 
dependent variable as
Pr(y = m|x ) =  F(rm -  xß) -  F(rm- i  -  xß) (6.6)
where F  is the cdf for e and is logistic with Var(e) = n2 /3. In order to calculate dis­
crete change effects in the probabilityfor aspecific change in one ofthe independent 
variables, I take the difference oftwo probabilities:
A P r(y = m|x ) =  P r (y =  m | x, x k  =  1) -  P r (y =  m | x, x k  =  0) (6.7)
6.6.3 Analysis Sample
All models are estimatedusing arestrictedsam ple: I onlylookatteachers who report 
to have students with an immigrant background in their classes. The reason for this 
is, once again, my concern about external validity. Following arguments from labor 
economics(Becker, 1957/1971;Heckman, 1998) discussedabove in th ischapterasw ell 
as elsewhere in this study, I posit that teachers' behavior toward ethnic minorities 
only matters as long as they actually teach them  and, hence, have the opportunity 
to discriminate against them. Thus, by restricting the sample to those teachers who 
do teach children ofim m igrantbackground, I arrive a ta  more accurate estimation of 
discrim inationintheactualschoolcontext. Iloseafew furthercasesbecauseIcontro l 
for background variables, ofw hich some have missing data. The variables I control 
are the teacher's sex, immigrant background, and teaching experience, as well as the 
education ofthe teacher's parents. This way, the sample shrinks to N  =  199.41
41 I also ran  all models with the full sample, with similar results and substantively unaltered 
conclusions. Results and Stata syntax for replication purposes are available at https://osf. 
io/dqtkg/.
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics of grades, dependent on child's
nam e and essay quality.
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Good essay
Jakob 18 6.72 1.87 7 3 10
Sophie 16 7.56 2.16 8 4 10
Justin 21 7.43 1.94 7 4 11
Jaqueline 21 6.90 1.61 6 5 12
Murat 19 6.95 2.46 8 2 11
Ayse 18 7.83 1.76 8 5 12
Total 113 7.22 1.97 7 2 12
Bad essay
Jakob 24 5.71 2.14 6 2 11
Sophie 22 5.45 2.06 6 2 10
Justin 12 4.83 1.40 5 2 7
Jaqueline 18 6.11 1.68 6 3 9
Murat 19 5.16 1.89 5 2 9
Ayse 29 5.69 1.81 5 3 9
Total 124 5.55 1.88 6 2 11
6.7 Results42
6.7.1 Grading
The essay that was pretested as “good” received rather average grades, with a m ean of 
7.22 (SD =  1.97). However, it is significantly better than  the bad essay that has a m ean 
of 5.55 (SD =  1.88; t  =  6.68, p <  0.001). Table 6.2 shows basic summary statistics for 
each of the six names, again separated for the good and bad essay. Although there is 
some variation, no clear patterns are visible. In fact, there are no significant differ­
ences in  the m ean grade between child names. Apparently, the nam e of the child does 
not have a systematic impact on essay grading. This conclusion is also supported by
42 Results and Stata syntax for replication purposes is available at https://osf.io/dqtkg/.
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Table 6.3: Regression of essay grades on essay quality, child's gender and
child's background.ab
Model 1.1 Model 1.2
Essay quality: good ß i 1.65** (0.27) 1.50** (0 .55)
Gender: female ß2 0.38 (0.27) 0.43 (0 .38)
Name: Turkishc ß3 - 0.10 (0.33) - 0.28 (0 .44)
Name: German lower classc ß4 0.14 (0.34) 0.08 (0 .49)
Turkish x good quality ß5 0.41 (0 .67)
Lower x good quality ß6 0.16 (0 .68)
Female x good quality ß7 - 0.08 (0 .54)
Constant 5.95** (0.44) 6.02** (0 .47)
Observations 199 199
R 2 0.211 0.213
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
a Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in  parentheses. 
b The model includes controls for teacher characteristics (gender, parental educa­
tion, migration background, years of teaching experience) 
c Reference group: German upper middle class name.
the regressions I ran , as can be seen in  table 6.3. Except the coefficient for essay qual­
ity, ß i , no coefficient turns out significant on conventional levels. The same holds for 
the linear combinations that allow to test whether grades differ between groups for 
the good essay. The results also clearly show that there are no group differences in 
returns to the good essay compared with the bad essay—all interaction effects with 
essay quality are far from being statistically significant on conventional levels. Thus, 
Ifin d n o  evidence ofdiscrim inationin essaygradingandrejectthe hypotheses1a , 1b, 
and 1c . However, the results are perfectly compatible with hypotheses 2a , 2b, and 2c .
6.7.2 Expectations
In contrast to the results for grades, I do find a significant effect o fa  student's back- 
groundin the expecteddirectionsinthe ordinallogitm odel(see table 6.4, model2.1): 
with the performance shown, children whose name indicates a Turkish background 
are perceived to be less likely (ß3  =  -.94 , p <  .01) to succeed at the Gymnasium than 
children with a German upper middle class background (reference category). The dif-
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Table 6.4: Ordinal logistic regression of expectations on essay quality, child's
gender and child's background.a b
Model 2.1 Model 2.2
Essay quality: good ß l 1.17** (0.28) 2 .03** (0.56)
Gender: female ß2 0.03 (0.28) - 0.02 (0.28)
Name: Turkishc ß3 - 0.94** (0.34) - 0.35 (0.43)
Name: German lower classc ß4 - 0.52 (0.35) - 0.31 (0.48)
Turkish x good quality ß5 - 1.55* (0.72)
Lower x good quality ß6 - 0.76 (0.74)
Female x good quality ß7 - 0.40 (0.56)
T1 - 0.87t (0.45) - 0.64 (0.48)
T2 0.54 (0.45) 0.79 (0.48)
Observations 199 199
Log Likelihood - 203.46 - 201.02
Pseudo R 2 (McFadden) 0.07 0.08
t  p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
a Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in  parentheses. 
b The model includes controls for teacher characteristics (gender, parental educa­
tion, migration background, years of teaching experience) 
c Reference group: German upper middle class name.
ferences between German names signaling different social classes (ß4 =  -.52, p > .1) 
and between Turkish names and German lower class names (ß3 — ß4 = -.42, p > .1) 
arein theexpecteddirection ,butnotsta tisticallysignificant.T hissim plem odelcon- 
testshypotheses2 a and2b. H ow ever,no tetha tifId ropL from equation6 .5and,thus, 
com paretheresu ltsforT urkishnam estoallG erm annam esnom atterw hatclasscon- 
notation they have, I get ß3 * =  —.68 (p < .05). This result suggests that students with a 
T urk ishbackgroundsufferfrom discrim inationatleastpartlybecausetheyarefrom  
a lower social class. Given the insignificant difference to German lower class names, 
ethnic discrimination alone does not seem to be the decisive factor. Also, this first 
model shows no evidence for discrimination based on gender—the corresponding co- 
efficientisvirtuallyzero. Thisresultclearlyrejectshypothesis2 c .
Next, I added interaction effects between essay quality and child's background (ta- 
b le6.4,m odel2.2)toinvestigatedifferentreturnstoperform anceforthethreegroups.
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Figure 6.2: Left panel: Predicted probabilities for a high likelihood of success at the
Gymnasium, dependent on nam e and essay quality. All other variables held
constant at the m ean. Right panel: Discrete changes in  probabilities for each
of the three contrasts—upper class vs lower class (UC -  LC), upper class vs 
Turkish (UC -  T), lower class vs Turkish (LC -  T), with 95% confidence bars. 
Calculations are based on model 2.2 in table 6.4.
It turns out that the previously discovered advantage for the German upper middle 
class depends on essay quality. If the essay is bad, there is no significant difference
in estimated expectations for either contrast between the three groups (ß3 =  -.35, 
p > .1; ß4 = -.31, p > .1; ß3 — ß4 = -.04, p > .1). However, for the better es­
say, German upper middle class children have—on the 10% level—significantly higher 
odds than German lower class (ß4 +  ß6  =  -1.07, p =  .059) and Turkish children 
(ß3 +  ß5  =  -1.9, p =  .001) to be trusted to succeed at the Gymnasium, and German 
low erclasschildreninturnhavehigherodds—significantonthe10% level—thanTurk- 
ish children ((ß3 +  ß5 ) -  (ß4 +  ß6 ) =  -.83, p =  .067). Thus, I find no evidence for dis­
crimination for the bad essay, but I do find evidence for discrimination on the basis 
of social class, as evidenced by the contrast between German upper and lower class 
names, and ethnicity, captured by the contrast between Turkish and German lower 
class names. These results suggestthathypotheses 2a  and2 b holdonlyconditionalon 
essay quality.
Another interesting result is that in this model, essay quality is not a significant 
predictorofthe teachers'expectationtow ardsTurkishchildren(ß1 + ß 5  =  .48, p > .1), 
whereas it does m atter for both groups of German children (lower class: ß1  +  ß6 = 
1.27, p <  .01; upper middle class: ß1  =  2.03, p <  .01). Put differently, the returns 
to performance are not statistically different from zero and therefore lowest for the 
Turkish students, higher—albeitnot significantly (ß6  -  ß5 =  .79, p > .1)—for German
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lower class children, and highest for upper middle class children, whose returns are
significantly higher than those of Turkish children (ß5 = —1.55,p. < .05).
Predicted probabilities as effect sizes
To get a more vivid impression of the effect sizes behind the coefficients from the 
otherwise hard to interpret ordinal logit model, I visualize the results of model 2.2 
in figure 6.2. On the left panel it shows predicted probabilities for falling into the 
category with the highest likelihood ofsuccess at the Gymnasium as assigned by the 
teachers for the three groups ofstudents whose contrasts define social class discrim­
ination and ethnic discrimination. The right panel shows discrete change effects in 
the corresponding probabilities for the three contrasts.
Fromfigure 6.2,th e  difference betw eenthe two essays becomes veryclear: forthe 
bad essay, it is simply not im portant who wrote it—the slight advantage for German 
upper middle class children is clearly not significant. Among those who supposedly 
wrote a good essay, group differences increase substantially: Teachers assign signifi­
cantly higher probabilities to children with a German upper middle class name com­
pared to children with a German lower class name and children with a Turkish name. 
The difference between children with German lower class names and those with a 
Turkishnam e iso faboutanequalm agnitude asthatbetw een the  two Germangroups 
and narrowly misses the 5% significance level.
6.8 Discussion
In this chapter, I have presented the design and the results o fan  experimental study 
thatw asexplicitlydesignedtoaddresscom m onshortcom ingsofpreviousexperim en- 
tal research on discrimination in education. Shortcomings I sought to address con­
cerned the usage of biased or uninformative samples, ignored effect heterogeneity 
acrossthedistributionofobservedperform ance,and,lastbutnotleast,theconfound- 
ing of ethnic and social discrimination. To address these issues I set up a 2 x 2 x 3 fac­
torial design,varyingessayquality,gender,andsocial andethnicclass background. I 
examined discrimination by teachers in two outcomes in German elementary school 
that are of critical importance for children's educational achievement: grades and 
track recommendations. I argued that examining discrimination in these different 
outcom esandsituationsalsoallow sto indirectlytestdifferenttheoriesofdiscrim ina- 
tion.
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Findings
Different regression models of grades on essay quality and students' names show no 
evidence of discrimination by virtue of students' ethnic or social class background or 
gender. In  contrast, I find statistically significant differences in teachers' expectations 
between German upper middle class and Turkish students averaging over the com­
petence distribution. The estimate for ethnic discrimination, the difference between 
Turkish and German lower class students, is not statistically significant. However, if 
I do what other studies typically do—i.e., if I lump together German students of dif­
ferent class background—I find a statistically significant difference between German 
students and Turkish students. Thus, it seems that social class discrimination plays a 
major and probably m ore im portant role in  discrimination against Turkish students 
than previously thought on the basis of experimental studies that do not disentangle 
ethnic from  social class discrimination.
A second model featuring interaction effects reveals that there is indeed discrim­
ination on the basis of both social class and ethnicity but only for the better of two 
essays that, in  fact, turned out to be rather average, even though it was pretested as 
“good” in  a federal state with comparable standards. The results from the model with 
interaction effects can also be interpreted as evidence for differential returns to es­
say quality: for Turkish students the returns are lowest, followed by German lower 
class students, followed by German upper middle class students for whom returns are 
highest.
A very clear and robust finding over all models for both outcomes is that teachers 
do not discriminate on the basis of gender.
Implications for theories of discrimination
Taken together, the results provide evidence against more simple models of ingroup- 
favoritism or outgroup derogation, such as social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986). For those who think that Becker (1957/1971)'s model of taste discrim­
ination is applicable to either or both situations I investigated, the results would also 
provide evidence against this model. However, I have argued that the mechanism 
Becker (1957/1971) suggests is not really applicable to either situation, so that I think 
that the results should not be read as evidence against Becker (1957/1971). Also, his 
theory might be helpful in  understanding discrimination in  other situations in educa­
tion.
The other models I have discussed and the hypotheses derived from the models re­
ceive more support from  the findings. A statistical discrimination model with group-
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specific reliabilities (Aigner & Cain, 1977)—lowest reliability for Turkish students, fol­
lowed by German lower middle class, and upper middle class students—is in  line with 
the findings of different returns and, thus, the observed interaction with essay quality. 
Such a model may also feature risk-averse teachers (Maaz et al., 2008) and stereotypes 
that are biased to the disadvantage of Turkish students and students from lower social 
class families without immigrant background (see chapter 5).
The findings also appear to be in line with the mechanism proposed by the continu­
um-model by Fiske et al. (1999), Fiske and Neuberg (1990). The good essay that turned 
out to be rather average might have been not bad enough to move teachers from a 
category-based response based on stereotypes to a piecemeal-integration of individ­
uating information in case of upper middle class students. Conversely, it might have 
not been good enough to foster the same process for the Turkish students and they, 
too, were treated according to the teachers' stereotypes. However, since the bad essay 
turned out to be really bad, teachers might have turned from  a category-based judg­
m ent to a  m ore individuating judgment in  case of upper middle class students and, 
thus, have graded them  as bad as Turkish and lower class students. Similarly, based 
on aversive racism theory we could also explain the observed pattern: In  case of the 
supposedly good but really rather average essay, teachers might have taken advantage 
of the ambiguity of the situation and treated students according to their stereotypes 
and prejudices.
One possibility to distinguish between different theoretical mechanisms might be 
to assess discrimination additionally for an excellent essay. While models of statisti­
cal discrimination that rely on group-specific reliabilities would predict an even larger 
gap between students' from different social and ethnic groups, applying the mecha­
nism s from  the continuum  model or aversive racism theory probably leads to the op­
posite prediction of less discrimination on the basis of these factors.
Individual versus group discrimination
I interpret the group differences found in  the present study as individual discrimina­
tion. Depending on the exact contrast I find individual discrimination by virtue of 
social class and ethnicity. I also suggest that if teachers recom mend tracks according 
to the pattern observed here, group discrimination should occur. As discussed at sev­
eral points in  this dissertation (e.g., in  section 3.1.2), models of statistical discrimina­
tion that predict the observed pattern also explain group discrimination—depending 
on the exact model for both categorical and continuous outcomes or categorical out­
comes only (Aigner & Cain, 1977). From the less formalized continuum  model and
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aversive racism theory it is less clear to make such a prediction, but should teach­
ers follow the mechanisms suggested by these theories it would be difficult to explain 
how—on the group level—the effects found on the micro level should disappear.
W hether the findings are also indicative of group discrimination in the real world, 
depends, of course, also on questions of external validity and how good of a proxy the 
expressed expectations are for actual track recommendations. I discuss these points 
in some m ore detail below.
Will the real ethnic discrimination effect please stand up?
I have argued that experimental studies typically confound discrimination on the ba­
sis of ethnicity or immigrant background or race and social class or socioeconomic 
background. However, note that this position is not im m une to critique. In section
2.3.3 I have suggested that ethnic discrimination is the total causal effect of an ethnic 
information about or an  ethnic signal sent out by an individual on how this individual 
is treated by another individual.
I see two different but related lines of reasoning that could be brought forward 
against the strategy implemented in  my experimental study. First, should social class 
really be held constant when examining ethnic discrimination? W hen, as I have ar­
gued, social class and ethnic signals are interpreted as confounders, identifying eth­
nic discrimination indeed requires to hold constant social class. However, one might 
argue that the social class content of an  ethnic signal is merely mediating a  part of 
the total effect of the ethnic signal and, thus, should not be held constant if interest 
lies in  the total causal effect of the ethnic signal. Secondly, one might argue the other 
way around, namely that if controlling for a social class signal is said to be necessary 
to identify ethnic discrimination, why then is it not necessary to control for all other 
confounding signals?
I have no final answer to these questions that I could offer here. However, the an­
swer will certainly depend on our understanding of what a signal or an  information 
is and how these should be distinguished from the beliefs and attitudes they trigger 
in the mind of the perceiver. Certainly, signals and information occur prior to cog­
nitive processes in the perceiver's m ind that handles them . Since many supposedly 
confounding signals might not be signals after all but rather contents of—possibly 
biased—stereotypes and attitudes, we would not want to control for them  if our in­
terest lies in  the total causal effect of a signal or an information.
From this perspective, a solution and answer to the question raised above might be 
to hold constant all information and signals perceivers have at their disposal in  the
188 GESIS Series |  Volume 26
Discrimination in Education
real-world situation under study but to not hold constant information that perceivers 
do not have access to and, thus, can only fill in  by a process of stereotyping or apply­
ing prejudices. Correspondence studies on labor market discrimination, for example, 
follow this approach and send out applications that are no m ore or less informative 
than other applications or the paired application. Thus, they hold constant all the 
information an employer has access to—but not more. Of course, information typi­
cally not available to the perceiver could nevertheless be of diagnostic value for the 
outcome under study. However, to identify individual discrimination, controlling for 
information the perceiver does not know but only has stereotypic knowledge about 
would m ean to induce an overcontrol bias to the estimate of the total causal effect 
that also conceptualizes individual discrimination arising from statistical discrimina­
tion as discrimination. But, to identify group discrimination m ore directly than in 
the present study and typical correspondence studies, controlling for the information 
teachers do stereotype about seems necessary.
While these questions and considerations might appear to be nit-picking, the an­
swers to them  could be of great relevance for all doing research on discrimination. 
Note, however, that the questions raised here are partly methodological, partly the­
oretical questions. Only the methodological questions may be answered by a defini­
tion. One thing I feel rather safe to conclude from this discussion and the discussion in 
chapter 2 is that researchers should be as clear as possible with regard to the meaning 
of term s such as discrimination or ethnic discrimination in  particular and also with 
regard to their identification and estimation strategy.
6.9 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The experiment presented in this chapter was designed to address various shortcom­
ings and desiderata of previous experimental research in education—not only but es­
pecially in Germany. Of course, it has itself several limitations that I will briefly dis­
cuss in  this section. Addressing these limitations will be a task for future research.
External validity
To assure a high external validity, I have sampled teachers instead of students and 
the response rate turned out to be much larger than in  comparable studies (e.g., Spri- 
etsm a, 2013). I also analyzedonly responses of teachersthat actuallyteach immigrants 
in  their classes. However, the external validity of a study also hinges upon how real­
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istic and lifelike the experimental situation is. In  this regard, my experiment is closer 
to a typical lab experiment than to a field experiment.
Statistical power
N =  237 teachers in  the whole sample and N =  199 in  the analysis sample provided
not enough statistical power for investigating fully interacted models for the 2 x 2 x 3 
factorial design. It would have been interesting to also examine interaction effects of 
ethnic and social class background with gender. This should be addressed by future 
research on the backdrop of findings about differential attitudes towards boys and 
girls with immigrant background and gender inequalities in education among immi­
grants more generally (Fleischmann et al., 2014; Glock & Klapproth, 2017). More sta­
tistical power is also needed to investigate the effects ofclassroom  and teacher char­
acteristics.
Discrimination? In track recommendations?
Ihave theorizedaboutdiscrim ination in trackrecom m endations more generallyand 
argued that expectations determine not only track recommendations but also many 
otherim portantdecisionsineducationsuchasabilitygroupingw ithintracksandm ay 
turn into self-fulfilling prophecies. However, it is unfortunate that I have not explic- 
itlyaskedteachersw hichtracktheyw ouldrecom m endbasedonthe observedperfor- 
mance. I can only hypothesize about potential differences to my findings for expecta- 
tionsoffu ture performance. Discrimination in an  outcome explicitlyaskingfortrack 
recommendations would have probably been higher, since variables such as parental 
support and involvement should play an even more im portant role than for the more 
narrowquestion onfuture performance in one subject. Ifanything,the more narrow 
question should reduce the effectofstudents'social and ethnic background and ren­
der my estimate of discrimination conservative. However, this remains speculative 
unless empirically addressed in future research.
Also, the question I asked and examined is the result of either stereotyping or, in 
caseofaversiveracism ,m aybeappliedprejudice. N eitherisitactualbehavior—except 
for ticking a box in the questionnaire—nor is it a behavioral intention. Here, too, the 
questionw hichtracktheteacherw ouldrecom m end,w ouldhave beenavery in terest- 
ing outcome to look at.
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Mechanisms of discrimination
As discussed above, the presentexperim ent only provides indirect evidence about the­
oretical mechanisms of discrimination in  education. For a m ore direct testof different 
theories of discrimination and their proposed mechanisms, direct measures of, for 
example, stereotypes and prejudices would be needed. Unfortunately, the Ministry 
of Education in  Baden-Württemberg did not approve of such items and I had to drop 
them . Future research should seek to implement such measures. However, future 
studies investigating the mechanisms of discrimination in  education may also build 
on and adapt the research design of the present study without introducing measures 
of stereotypes or prejudices. An example for an  indirect test using an excellent essay, 
I have given above.
Classroom and teacher characteristics
In  a short questionnaire after collecting the data on grades and expectations, I also 
asked teachers to answer a few questions on classroom characteristics such as the 
proportion of immigrants in  the class and the social background of students as well to 
report some personal demographics, namely their age and gender, their parents' ed­
ucation, their immigrant background, and years of teaching experience. An explicit 
look at the effects of these variables was beyond the scope of the present study. From 
some preliminary results I can tell that most of these variables have no statistically 
significant effects on discrimination in  grades or expectations. I found an  effect for 
teachers' work experience—or, alternatively, for the highly correlated variable age— 
that suggests that less experienced (i.e., younger) teachers discriminate mainly on the 
basis of social class and less so on the basis of immigrant background. More experi­
enced teachers show the exact opposite pattern. W hether this effect holds in  studies 
with m ore statistical power and how to theorize the effect of different classroom and 
teacher characteristics, I have to leave to future research.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 What Have We Learned?
My aim in the present study was to broaden our knowledge regarding discrimination 
in  education by making methodological, theoretical, and empirical contributions. I 
was concerned primarily with ethnic discrimination, followed by social class discrimi­
nation, and sex or gender discrimination.
Two motives for studying discrimination
I have argued that there are two major reasons why we study discrimination and that 
these reasons are related to different definitions or forms of discrimination. First, 
discrimination by virtue of characteristics such as race, ethnicity, social class, or gen­
der is typically considered unfair or unjust by most people in developed countries. 
Thus, discrimination may be studied in  its own right, that is, it may simply be the ex- 
planandum  in an  analysis. For such a perspective it might suffice to look at individual 
discrimination, that is, discrimination as individual-level causal effect.
However, secondly, studies of discrimination are often motivated by inequalities 
between different ethnic andsocial groups. Studying discrimination as an explanation 
for disparities between groups makes it necessary to move beyond the explanation of 
discrimination as individual-level causal effect and to also examine group discrim­
ination. Because individual discrimination does not necessarily aggregate to group 
discrimination, it is necessary to address the difference between these forms of dis­
crimination properly when defining, identifying, and estimating discrimination.
Definitions of discrimination
As a methodological contribution, I have discussed several different definitions of dis­
crimination to find a  logically consistent and useful one. I have argued that discrimi­
nation in  general is best understood as the causal effect of an information about or a 
signal sent out by an  individual on how this individual is treated by another individual. 
In  the the present study I was mainly interested in  ethnic discrimination that I—based 
on the general definition—defined as the causal effect of an ethnic information about 
or an  ethnic signal sent out by an individual on how this individual is treated by an­
other individual.
I have argued that my general definition is the most useful starting point for defin­
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ing m ore concrete forms of discrimination, for different reasons: The treatm ent, an 
information or signal, is truly manipulable and allows to ask well defined causal ques­
tions based on meaningful alternative causal states. That is, the definition avoids the 
problem of defining discrimination as the total causal effect of immutable character­
istics assigned early in  life that leads to an undesirable conflation of unconditional 
inequality with discrimination. Furthermore, it circumvents issues that arise when 
discrimination is defined as a direct effect. Last but not least, it avoids vague term s 
that are hard to define or constraints of the phenom enon of discrimination that are 
hard to justify—both usually carry normative connotation.
Recall that I have not concluded from  this that discrimination should be only under­
stood as behavior that leads to inequality on the group level. This only leads to a very 
narrow understanding of discrimination and leaves us with the problem of finding dif­
ferent term s for particular types of discrimination that—under certain conditions—do 
not lead to inequality between groups. Statistical discrimination, for example, is dis­
crimination by all m eans of a useful understanding of the term . That it does not lead 
to inequality on the group level under all—but certainly some—circumstances does 
not make it less discriminatory. To acknowledge that individual discrimination and 
group discrimination are not the same thing rem ains of great importance, neverthe­
less, or, maybe, because of the m ore general nature of the definition proposed in  this 
study.
Last but not least, based on the design of my experimental study, I came to realize 
that my definition does not solve all methodological problems without further discus­
sion. The questions what are treatm ents and what are potential confounders and what 
are m ere mediators in  a model of discrimination based on my general definition are 
crucial questions. Answers to these questions require both methodological and the­
oretical input. I will briefly return  to this point below when I recap the results of the 
experiment.
Theories of discrimination
As a theoretical contribution, I have discussed several different theories of discrimi­
nation from  different disciplines and applied them  to typical situations at the end of 
German elementary school. I have argued that, contrary to a popular line of reason­
ing, Becker (1957/1971)'s theory of taste discrimination is less applicable to education 
in general and to key situations in  German education in  particular. Conversely, I have 
argued that models of statistical discrimination (e.g., Aigner & Cain, 1977) or models 
that built on the statistical discrimination mechanism, such as error discrimination
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(e.g., England & Lewin, 1989) or inaccurate statistical discrimination (Bohren et al., 
2019), are indeed m ore useful than sometimes suggested. I have argued that they are 
applicable to many situations including the situation of recommending tracks at the 
end elementary school and that there are several models of or related to statistical 
discrimination that are able to explain group discrimination and, thus, inequality.
I have criticized institutional discrimination approaches as not very helpful to un­
derstand discrimination, since they lack clear causal mechanisms on both macro- and 
micro-level. Much m ore useful are three different theories from  social psychology 
that have I discussed: Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), 
the continuum  model (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and aversive racism 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). They all provide micro mecha­
nism s that are applicable to education and may help to understand discrimination by 
teachers.
From the theories I deemed useful and applicable, I later derived hypotheses that 
I tested in  my experimental study. My discussion was also m eant to show how im­
portant it is to understand the key determ inants of discrimination—prejudices and 
stereotypes—both of which I investigated in  the following chapters.
Teachers' prejudices and stereotypes
Research on teachers' prejudice often relies on geographically limited convenience 
samples of students. Using data from the German general social survey, ALLBUS, I 
have quantified the bias in  one of those studies and argued that, on the backdrop of 
the size of the bias, more representative research is needed. To this end, I have used 
ALLBUS data and have shown that teachers in  German education hold negative prej­
udices about Turks but less negative prejudices about Eastern Europeans of German 
descent and virtually no negative prejudices about Italians.
I have introduced a new instrum ent to investigate teachers' stereotypes about the av­
erage competences in  m ath and reading of different groups of students. Comparing 
teachers beliefs to actual group differences in  published studies shows that teachers 
correctly rank different groups of students, that is, teachers know which groups per­
form better or worse than other groups. However, I also find that teachers' stereotypes 
are probably biased to the disadvantage of boys, students from lower social class fami­
lies or—in comparison with students from upper class families—students from  middle 
class families, immigrants in  general, as well as immigrants of Turkish and Russian 
origin in particular. These results are in  line with theoretical predictions and, thus, I 
have argued that they speak to the validity of the new instrum ent.
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The findings that teachers hold both negative prejudices against some but not all 
ethnic groups and biased stereotypes about different groups of students are of great 
importance for a better understanding of discrimination in education. The findings 
suggest that, once individual discrimination is established, it is rather likely to also 
aggregate to group discrimination and, thus, help to explain inequality.
Disentangling ethnic from social class discrimination
To address the question of discrimination in  education empirically, I set up an exper­
imental study that investigated discrimination in  grading and teachers' expectations 
about future performance by virtue of ethnic and social class background as well as 
gender.
To address shortcomings of prior studies, I drew a random  sample of elementary 
schools from  a German federal state and, in  my analysis, focused on the responses of 
teachers that actually teach students of immigrant background in their classes to en­
hance external validity. I varied essay quality using two different essays of which one 
was pretested as bad and one as good to assess discrimination at different points in the 
distribution of observed performance to investigate group differences in  returns or re­
liabilities. The m ain methodological and substantive contribution of my study was the 
attempt to disentangle ethnic discrimination from social discrimination; prior exper­
imental studies that m ade use of names or photos as stimuli ignored that ethnicity 
and social class and, thus, ethnic discrimination and social class discrimination, are 
very likely to be confounded in virtually every society. I have argued that by ignoring 
social class as a  confounder, estimates of ethnic discrimination are upwardly biased, 
that is, they overestimate the part ethnicity plays in discrimination a particular ethnic 
group may suffer from.
The solution I propose is to compare Turkish names to German nam es with a sim­
ilar social class connotation instead of a representative selection of German nam es 
that would be associated with higher social class background or socioeconomic sta­
tus, respectively. This way I was able to hold constant social class in my comparison 
of teachers' responses to allegedly Turkish and German students. This difference, I 
suggest, may be interpreted as ethnic discrimination. In  my analysis I do not find any 
evidence for ethnic, social class, or gender discrimination in grading—teachers dis­
crim inate on the basis of essay quality only. However, my analysis of expectations 
provide evidence for the suspected confounding of ethnic and social class discrimi­
nation. While, in  a simple model averaging over both essays, teachers' expectations 
for Turkish students are not significantly different from  the expectations for German
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lower class students, they are significantly different from expectations for both upper 
middle class students and, most importantly, German students overall.
A more complex model reveals an interaction effect of group differences with the 
quality of the essay: For the worse essay no group differences are found. However, for 
the better essay—that turned out to be rather average—, teachers' expectations differ 
between all possible contrasts for the three ethnic and social groups. Again, gender 
plays no role whatsoever in determining teachers' expectations. In sum, there is ev­
idence for discrimination based on both social class and ethnicity. Of course, this 
result implies that a comparison of expectations for Turkish students and German 
students overall—as commonly calculated in  experimental studies that are not based 
on extensive vignettes—would yield higher estimates of discrimination.
The following isw hat Ioffer as a m ore general conclusionfrom  my attempt todisen- 
tangle ethnic discrimination from  social class discrimination in  an experiment—even 
though these insights are not entirely new (see chapter 2 again): Even if experiments 
are legitimately considered to be the gold standard of causal analysis, by no m eans do 
they solve all the problems of causal inference automatically. One problem an experi­
m ent cannot solve is the fine articulation of causal states, that is, the precise definition 
of the causal effect of interest. It is the responsibility of the researcher to make sure 
that the alternative causal states are described in  sufficient detail and that their differ­
ence captures what the researcher is substantively interested in—not more, but also: 
not less. Another and related problem that is not solved by experimental designs, is 
the problem of theorizing a phenom enon by linking cause and effect through mecha­
nisms.
Mechanisms of discrimination in education
The experiment I conducted also sheds light on the mechanisms of discrimination in 
education. More simple models of ingroup-favoritism or outgroup-derogation (SIT; 
Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) cannot explain the observed pattern of no discrim­
ination in  grading but discrimination in  expectations conditional on essay quality. 
Models that incorporate situational moderators like imperfect information and am­
biguity such as statistical discrimination theory (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; 
Phelps, 1972), the continuum  model (Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and 
aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2008; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) fare m uch bet­
ter in  explaining the results. However, distinguishing between these models was not 
possible using the indirect test based on teachers' responses to the two essays of dif­
ferent quality.
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7.2 Where Do We Go From Here?
Even though we have learned quite a  bit about discrimination in  German education 
since Kristen (2006b)—the first quantitative empirical study that explicitly theorized 
discrimination in  German education—there is still a lot we would like to learn m ore 
about. In  the remainder, I would like to stress some points that I think should be 
addressed and taken into account in  future research on discrimination in  German ed­
ucation and other countries.
Methodological rigor
After my discussion in  chapter 2, I hope it goes without saying that future research 
should pay m ore attention to clear and useful language when investigating discrimina­
tion. This applies first and foremost to the definition of discrimination. Researchers 
should be clear about what they m ean when they say discrimination and why they 
study it. This way, the appropriateness of the research design can be examined bet­
ter than for many past studies. However, even when using a m ore useful definition 
than past research, which I suggest I have done in  this study, some methodological 
problems may rem ain—not to speak of theoretical problems that cannot be solved by 
a definition but only by theory building and proper application.
It's social class, stupid!
Discrimination by virtue of social class—also known as classism—and the role social 
class plays in  ethnic or racial discrimination should be explicitly addressed by theoriz­
ing, identifying, and estimating it using different methodologies and techniques. By 
this I m ean m uch m ore than controlling for it in  a  regression model, which is what is 
usually done. However, I have shown that experimental evidence on ethnic discrimi­
nation in  education may to a large part be driven by social class differences between 
different ethnic signals such as names but, presumably, also photos and other signals 
or information. Controlling for social class differences in experimental research is 
usually not done. While there might be arguments for why researchers do not want 
to separate ethnic from social class discrimination, future research should explicitly 
discuss the problem—irrespective of the particular strategy pursued. In any case: It 
would be an im portant methodological contribution to also compare the treatm ent 
of Turkish upper middle class children to their German counterparts without falling 
back on vignettes with explicit and artificial descriptions.
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And gender?
One result of my experiment was that gender does not seem to play any role in  discrim­
ination in education. However, the sample of my experiment was not large enough to 
examine interaction effects of gender with both social class and, especially, ethnicity. 
There is evidence that such interaction effects exist (Glock & Klapproth, 2017), but 
m ore research—especially experimental—on these questions is clearly needed.
Theorizing discrimination in education
Especially economists often discuss theoretical mechanisms of discrimination in  edu­
cation rather superficially (e.g., Kiss, 2013; Sprietsma, 2013; van Ewijk, 2011). What is 
needed is quite the contrary, namely m ore rigor in  theorizing discrimination in  edu­
cation. That does not m ean that we should be overly restrictive in  applying theories to 
education. However, if key mechanisms or assumptions of a theory clearly do not ap­
ply to a situation or an environm ent, it might help to rem em ber that there are many 
models and theories from  various disciplines that can help to understand discrimi­
nation in education better. For example, given that the findings of the experiment 
were in line with the continuum  model, it might well be worth looking into other dual­
process models (see Gawronski & Creighton, 2013, for an overview). The formalized 
and general model of frame selection (Esser, 2001; Kroneberg, 2010; Kroneberg et al., 
2010) might also provide valuable insights. In  any case, future research should discuss 
and rigorously test different theories of discrimination empirically.
Micro level determinants of discrimination
Knowing m ore about the determ inants of discrimination in  education should be of 
great importance. Both implicit and explicit attitudes and beliefs—that is, prejudices 
and stereotypes—should be studied using unbiased samples of teachers and applying 
different methodologies. Methods and techniques of data collection including item 
selection should be guided mainly by theory and the results of prior studies. Other 
micro level determ inants of discrimination are teacher characteristics including per­
sonality traits such as social-dominance orientation or right-wing authoritarianism  
(Altemeyer, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Whitley, 1999).
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Macro level and institutional level determinants of discrimination
Theorizing and testing the causal effects of variables on, above, and beyond the class­
room level offers the possibility to indirectly test theories and provide evidence with 
policy implications. Here, I also see potential for developing a useful institutional dis­
crimination approach to education. Of course, such an approach will always need a 
micro-foundation of which plenty exist in various disciplines.
Discrimination in longitudinal perspective
A perspective I have largely ignored in  this study is a longitudinal or dynamic perspec­
tive on discrimination. While I  have repeatedly pointed to self-fulfilling prophecies 
and have looked at their major determ inants, namely stereotypes, I have not spent 
much tim e on discussing other forms of discrimination that take into account time 
as an im portant variable, such as cumulative discrimination (Blank et al., 2004). We 
know that such a dynamic perspective is of great relevance in education (e.g., Jussim, 
1989; Jussim et al., 1996; Jussim & Harber, 2005; Jussim, Robustelli, et al., 2009; Lorenz 
et al., 2016) and, therefore, should be pursued further.
Experiments in lab, field, and conducted by nature
Especially on discrimination in  the German education system, m ore experimental re­
search is needed. For all lab or lab-like designs, such as the one applied in  the present 
study, samples that allow inference to larger populations of actual teachers are vital. 
While field experiments are certainly more difficult to conduct in education than for 
example in  the labor or housing market, future research should aim at utilizing exper­
imental designs that are more realistic and, thus, provide m ore direct and unbiased 
evidence about discrimination by teachers. A first step in  this direction could be bet­
ter cover stories that are realistic and suggest higher stakes. A research design that, if 
done right, typically features both high internal and high external validity is a natural 
experiment. Certainly, such a design requires a  “natural” treatm ent, such as a policy 
change or truly comparable blind versus non-blind scores, for example.
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The items used in Hachfeld et al. (2011) to m easure prejudice are taken from the Ger­
man General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The response scale is a 5-point agree-disagree 
scale ranging from 1 to 5, with higher scores reflecting more prejudiced views toward 
foreigners (Hachfeld et al., 2011, p. 992). Hachfeld et al. (2011, table 4) report a mean 
of 1.76 and an SD  of .57.
Translated items (items 1-3: my own translation; translation of item 4 taken from 
Hachfeld et al. (2011, table 4)):
1. Foreigners livingin Germ anyshouldadapttheirlifestyle a b itb e tte rto  th a to fth e  
Germans.
2. When jobs become scarce, foreigners living in Germany should be sent back to 
their home countries.
3. Foreigners living in Germany should be prohibited any political action in Ger­
many.
4. Foreigners living in Germany should seek their spouses within their own ethnic 
group.
The original items are (in German):
1. Die in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer sollten ihren Lebensstil ein bisschen 
besser an den der Deutschen anpassen.
2. Wenn Arbeitsplätze knapp werden, sollte man die in Deutschland lebenden Aus­
länder in ihre Heimatzurückschicken.
3. Man sollte den in Deutschland lebenden Ausländern jede politische Betätigung in 
Deutschland untersagen.
4. Die in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer sollten sich ihre Ehepartner unter ihren 
eigenen Landsleuten auswählen.
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B ISCO-88: Teachers
ISCO-88
unit Occupations n
School
Teachers
All
educators
1210 Directors and Chief Executives (e.g., uni­
versity chancellor)
3
1229 Production and Operations Department 
Managers, n.e.c. (e.g., university presi­
dent)
0
1319 General Managers, n.e.c. (e.g., headmas­
ter, school principal)
5
2300 Teachers (tertiary degree, no further spec­
ification)
30 s s
2310 College, university, and higher education 
teaching professionals
3 s
2320 Secondary education teaching profession­
als
14 s s
2331 Primary education teaching professionals 7 s s
2332 Preprimary education teaching profes­
sionals
3 s
2340 Special education teaching professionals 0 s s
2351 Education m ethods specialists (e.g., cur­
ricula developer)
0
2352 School inspectors 0
2359 Other teaching professionals, n.e.c. 1
3300 Teachers (no tertiary degree, no further 
specification)
1 s
3310 Primary education teaching associate pro­
fessionals
0 s
3320 Pre-primary education teaching associate 
professionals
17 s
3330 Special education teaching associate pro­
fessionals
1 s
3340 Other teaching associate professionals 
(e.g., driving instructors)
6
3460 Social work associate professionals (some 
work in  schools/education)
17
5131 Child-Care Workers (e.g., nanny) 8
E n j 51 76
n.e.c.: not elsewhere classified; Sources: International Labour Organization (1990),
Geis (2011).
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C Measuring Teachers' Stereotypes: Original Instruments
Die NEPS-Studie „Bildungsverläufe in Deutschland" erfasst die Kompetenzen der 
Kinder in unterschiedlichen Bereichen. Was denken Sie, wie Schülerinnen und 
Schüler der zweiten Klassen aus verschiedenen Gruppen im Kompetenzbereich 
Mathematik abschneiden werden?
Im Vergleich zu Zweitklässlern insgesamt schneiden im Kompetenzbereich 
Mathematik [Lesen! —
Je weiter links Sie Ihr Kreuz machen, desto schlechter schneidet die Gruppe 
Ihrer Einschätzung nach ab, je weiter rechts Sie Ihr Kreuz machen, desto 
besser schneidet die Gruppe ab. Bitte in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen ankreuzen.
a) ... Mädchen
b) ...Jungen
c) ... Kinder aus niedrigen sozialen 
Schichten
d) ... Kinder aus mittleren sozialen 
Schichten
e) ... Kinder aus hohen sozialen 
Schichten
f) ... Kinder mit Migrations­
hintergrund
g) ... Kinder mit türkischem 
Migrationshinteirgrund
h) ... Kinder mit russischem 
Migrationshinteirgrund
i) ... Kinder ohne 
Migrationshinteirgrund
sehr sehr
schlecht ab gut ab
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
□  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ a
Figure C.1: German original of the first version of the instrum ent to m easure teachers'
stereotypes in  the NEPS. Figure adopted from Wenz et al. (2016)
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In der NEPS-Studie „Bildungsverläufe in Deutschland" werden die Kompetenzen 
von Kindern in der zweiten Klasse in unterschiedlichen Bereichen erfasst.
Was denken Sie, wie Zweitklässler aus den folgenden Gruppen im 
Kompetenzbereich Mathematik [Lesenl im Vergleich zum Durchschnitt
abschneiden werden?
Je weiter links Sie Ihr Kreuz machen, desto schlechter schneidet die Gruppe 
Ihrer Einschätzung nach ab, je  weiter rechts Sie Ihr Kreuz machen, desto 
besser schneidet die Gruppe ab. Bitte in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen ankreuzen.
sehr sehr
schlecht gut
0 5 10
a) Mädchen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
b) Jungen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Und wie werden die folgenden Gruppen im Vergleich zum Durchschnitt 
abschneiden?
sehr sehr
schlecht gut
0 5 10
C) Schichten8 n'edr'9en sozialen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
d) Kinder aus mittleren sozialen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Schichten
6) f ix ie r  aus hohen sozialen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Schichten
Und wie werden die folgenden Gruppen im Vergleich zum Durchschnitt 
abschneiden?
sehr sehr
schlecht gut
0 5 10
f) Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
g) Kinder mit türkischem □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Migrationshintergrund
h> M i g X s S S S end □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
°  MigrationsNntergnjnd □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Figure C.2: German original of the second version of the instrum ent to m easure teachers'
stereotypes in  the NEPS. Figure adopted from Wenz et al. (2016)
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In der NEPS-Studie „Bildungsverläufe in Deutschland" werden die Kompetenzen 
von Kindern in der zweiten Klasse in unterschiedlichen Bereichen erfasst.
Was denken Sie, welche Ergebnisse Zweitklässler aus folgenden Gruppen im 
Kompetenzbereich Mathematik [Lesenl im Vergleich zu Zweitklässlern in 
Deutschland insgesamt erzielen?
Je weiter links Sie Ihr Kreuz machen, desto schlechter werden die Ergebnisse der 
Gruppe Ihrer Einschätzung nach ausfallen, je weiter rechts Sie Ihr Kreuz machen, 
desto besser werden sie ausfallen. Bitte in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen ankreuzen.
weit unter- weit über­
durchschnittliche durchschnittliche
0 5 10
a) Kinder aus niedriqen sozialenSchichten □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
b) h inter a^m ittierensoziaien □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Schichten
e) Kinder aus hohen sozialen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Schichten
Und welche Ergebnisse erzielen Zweitklässler aus folgenden Gruppen im Vergleich 
zu Zweitklässlern in Deutschland insgesamt?
weit unter- weit über­
durchschnittliche durchschnittliche
0 5 10
d) Mädchen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
e) Jungen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Und welche Ergebnisse erzielen Zweitklässler aus folgenden Gruppen im Vergleich 
zu Zweitklässlern in Deutschland insgesamt?
weit unter- weit über­
durchschnittliche durchschnittliche
0 5 10
f) Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
g) Kinder mit türkischem □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Migrationshintergrund
h> M ig S s h te t e ^ n d  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
”  MigrationsNntergrund □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Figure C.3: German original of the final version of the instrum ent to m easure teachers'
stereotypes in  the NEPS. Figure adopted from Wenz et al. (2016)
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D Material Used in the Experiment
Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich zur Teilnahme an unserer Studie entschlossen haben!
Wir bitten Sie im Folgenden, einen kleinen Aufsatz (ca. 200 Wörter) zu bewerten und 
anschließend ein paar kurze Fragen zu Ihrem Beruf und Ihrer Person zu beantworten. Alle 
Angaben sind komplett anonym und werden ausschließlich für wissenschaftliche Zwecke 
verwendet.
Wenn Sie Informationen über die Ergebnisse unserer Studie erhalten oder an unserer Verlosung 
teilnehmen wollen, können Sie uns am Ende des Fragebogens Ihre E-Mail-Adresse hinterlassen. 
Die Adresse wird getrennt von Ihren anderen Angaben gespeichert und nicht an Dritte 
weitergegeben. Die Angabe ist freiwillig.
Die Teilnahme an der Studie wird nur wenige Minuten in Anspruch nehmen. Wir möchten Sie 
bitten, während dieser Zeit ein eventuelles Handy sowie Messenger- und Chatfunktionen 
auszuschalten. Herzlichen Dank!
Durch den Fragebogen bewegen Sie sich mit Hilfe der angegebenen Buttons. Ein Zurückblättern 
auf bereits bearbeitete Seiten ist nicht möglich.
|MMtter|
Figure D.1: First screen: Introductory screen with explanations of procedure.
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Die Richtlinien der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) sehen vor, dass 
sich jede Teilnehmerin und jeder Teilnehmer einer empirischen Studie zur 
Teilnahme bereit erklären muss.
Bitte lesen Sie die Einverständniserklärung, zu der Sie über den
nachfolgenden Link gelangen, aufmerksam durch.
Link zur Einverständniserklärung -- hier klicken
Hiermit bestätige ich, dass ich die Einverständniserklärung gelesen und vollständig 
verstanden habe und dass ich mich freiwillig bereit erkläre, unter den genannten 
Bedingungen an der Studie teilzunehmen.
O  Ja
O  Nein (hiermit beenden Sie die Studie)
Figure D.2: Second screen: Consent form of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
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Der folgende Aufsatz wurde von Sophie geschrieben, die 10 Jahre alt ist und die vierte Klasse 
einer Baden-Württembergischen Grundschule besucht. Aufgabe war, eine kurze Geschichte mit 
Einleitung, Hauptteil und Schluss zu dem Titel "Nass bis auf die Haut" zu schreiben. Der Aufsatz 
wurde auf Rechtschreibfehler korrigiert.
Nass bis auf die Haut
An einem Montagmorgen um 9:30 Uhr verabredete sich Dennis mit seinen Freunden am 
Fluss. Der eine von ihnen hieß Nils, eine andere Jana, und noch Sakada. Das waren seine 
besten Freunde.
Es waren schon alle da als Jana kam. Sie hatten sich zum Angeln verabredet. Dennis 
brachte sogar seine ganze Ausrüstung mit. Es wären die besten Angelruten die er besaß. 
Nach einer Weile warf er das erste Mal aus. Nach 7 Minuten fragte Jana: Wieso beißt da 
nichts an? Dennis wollte gerade etwas sagen, da riss ihn ein riesiger Fisch ins Wasser. Nils, 
der furchtlose, sprang ins Wasser und sagte: „Wir müssen Dennis helfen, er kann doch 
nicht schwimmen." Sakada und Jana sprangen ihm hinterher und schrien: „Für Dennis." 
Doch als die beiden das Wasser betraten, kam das Monster von Loch Ness. Das Monster 
schnappte die beiden, riefen nach Hilfe aber vergeblich. Auf einmal klingelte das Handy von 
Dennis. Die Mutter an der anderen Leitung hatte Angst um Dennis und die anderen Kinder. 
Sie fuhr gleich nach dem Anruf an den See. Als sie da war, war alles düster und neblig. Die 
Mutter von Dennis suchte nach den Kindern. Plötzlich tauchte das Monster wieder auf, die 
Mutter von Dennis versuchte mit diesem schreckenerregendem Biest zu reden, sie 
murmelte: „Entschuldigung du Monster wo sind die Kinder?" Doch das Monster machte nur 
schreckenerregende Geräusche." Die Frau stieg einfach mal auf das Biest. Das Monster 
schwomm auf eine abgelegene Insel des Sees wo es die Kinder versteckt hielt. Die Kinder 
zitterten und waren nass bis auf die Haut.
Zum Glück war alles nur ein Traum. Dennis wollte nie mehr so einen Traum haben.
Welche Gesamtnote würden Sie Sophie für diesen Aufsatz geben?
1 1- 2+ 2 2- 3+ 3 3- 4+ 4 4- 5+ 5 5 - 6
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
| w isse |
Figure D.3: Third screen: Text containing randomly allocated stimulus (here: Sophie) on 
top. Blue box containing one of the essays (here: good essay). Question on the 
bottom assesses overall grade for the essay.
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Der folgende Aufsatz wurde von Sophie geschrieben, die 10 Jahre alt ist und die vierte Klasse 
einer Baden-Württembergischen Grundschule besucht. Aufgabe war, eine kurze Geschichte mit 
Einleitung, Hauptteil und Schluss zu dem Titel "Nass bis auf die Haut" zu schreiben. Der Aufsatz 
wurde auf Rechtschreibfehler korrigiert.
Nass bis auf die Haut
An einem Montagmorgen um 9:30 Uhr verabredete sich Dennis mit seinen Freunden am 
Fluss. Der eine von ihnen hieß Nils, eine andere Jana, und noch Sakada. Das waren seine 
besten Freunde.
Es waren schon alle da als Jana kam. Sie hatten sich zum Angeln verabredet. Dennis 
brachte sogar seine ganze Ausrüstung mit. Es wären die besten Angelruten die er besaß. 
Nach einer Weile warf er das erste Mal aus. Nach 7 Minuten fragte Jana: Wieso beißt da 
nichts an? Dennis wollte gerade etwas sagen, da riss ihn ein riesiger Fisch ins Wasser. Nils, 
der furchtlose, sprang ins Wasser und sagte: „Wir müssen Dennis helfen, er kann doch 
nicht schwimmen." Sakada und Jana sprangen ihm hinterher und schrien: „Für Dennis." 
Doch als die beiden das Wasser betraten, kam das Monster von Loch Ness. Das Monster 
schnappte die beiden, riefen nach Hilfe aber vergeblich. Auf einmal klingelte das Handy von 
Dennis. Die Mutter an der anderen Leitung hatte Angst um Dennis und die anderen Kinder. 
Sie fuhr gleich nach dem Anruf an den See. Als sie da war, war alles düster und neblig. Die 
Mutter von Dennis suchte nach den Kindern. Plötzlich tauchte das Monster wieder auf, die 
Mutter von Dennis versuchte mit diesem schreckenerregendem Biest zu reden, sie 
murmelte: „Entschuldigung du Monster wo sind die Kinder?" Doch das Monster machte nur 
schreckenerregende Geräusche." Die Frau stieg einfach mal auf das Biest. Das Monster 
schwomm auf eine abgelegene Insel des Sees wo es die Kinder versteckt hielt. Die Kinder 
zitterten und waren nass bis auf die Haut.
Zum Glück war alles nur ein Traum. Dennis wollte nie mehr so einen Traum haben.
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass Sophie mit einer solchen Leistung auf dem 
Gymnasium im Deutschunterricht Schritt halten kann?
sehr sehr
unwahrscheinlich wahrscheinlich
o o o o o
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass Sophie mit einer solchen Leistung auf der 
Realschule im Deutschunterricht Schritt halten kann?
sehr sehr
unwahrscheinlich wahrscheinlich
o o o o o
Isasoasc |
Figure D.4: Fourth screen: Text containing randomly allocated stimulus (here: Sophie) on 
top. Blue box containing one of the essays (here: good essay). Question on the 
bottom assesses overall grade for the essay.
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Der folgende Aufsatz wurde von Sophie geschrieben, die 10 Jahre alt ist und die vierte Klasse 
einer Baden-Württembergischen Grundschule besucht. Aufgabe war, eine kurze Geschichte mit 
Einleitung, Hauptteil und Schluss zu dem Titel "Nass bis auf die Haut" zu schreiben. Der Aufsatz 
wurde auf Rechtschreibfehler korrigiert.
Nass bis auf die Haut
An einem Montagmorgen um 9:30 Uhr verabredete sich Dennis mit seinen Freunden am 
Fluss. Der eine von ihnen hieß Nils, eine andere Jana, und noch Sakada. Das waren seine 
besten Freunde.
Es waren schon alle da als Jana kam. Sie hatten sich zum Angeln verabredet. Dennis 
brachte sogar seine ganze Ausrüstung mit. Es wären die besten Angelruten die er besaß. 
Nach einer Weile warf er das erste Mal aus. Nach 7 Minuten fragte Jana: Wieso beißt da 
nichts an? Dennis wollte gerade etwas sagen, da riss ihn ein riesiger Fisch ins Wasser. Nils, 
der furchtlose, sprang ins Wasser und sagte: „Wir müssen Dennis helfen, er kann doch 
nicht schwimmen.”  Sakada und Jana sprangen ihm hinterher und schrien: „Für Dennis.” 
Doch als die beiden das Wasser betraten, kam das Monster von Loch Ness. Das Monster 
schnappte die beiden, riefen nach Hilfe aber vergeblich. Auf einmal klingelte das Handy von 
Dennis. Die Mutter an der anderen Leitung hatte Angst um Dennis und die anderen Kinder. 
Sie fuhr gleich nach dem Anruf an den See. Als sie da war, war alles düster und neblig. Die 
Mutter von Dennis suchte nach den Kindern. Plötzlich tauchte das Monster wieder auf, die 
Mutter von Dennis versuchte mit diesem schreckenerregendem Biest zu reden, sie 
murmelte: „Entschuldigung du Monster wo sind die Kinder?” Doch das Monster machte nur 
schreckenerregende Geräusche.” Die Frau stieg einfach mal auf das Biest. Das Monster 
schwomm auf eine abgelegene Insel des Sees wo es die Kinder versteckt hielt. Die Kinder 
zitterten und waren nass bis auf die Haut.
Zum Glück war alles nur ein Traum. Dennis wollte nie mehr so einen Traum haben.
Wie ist die obige Leistung in Relation zu Leistungen anderer Viertklässler in Baden 
Württemberg zu bewerten? Liegt sie im...
untersten obersten
Fünftel zweiten dritten vierten Fünftel
(schwächste Fünftel Fünftel Fünftel (stärkste
20%) 20 %)?
o o o o o
Figure D.5: Fifth screen: Text containing randomly allocated stimulus (here: Sophie) on
top. Blue box containing one of the essays (here: good essay). Question on the 
bottom assesses essay relative to other fourth graders in  Baden-Württemberg.
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Nun geht es um Ihre Berufserfahrung und Ihre Schüler.
Seit welchem Jahr sind Sie als Lehrerin/Lehrer tätig?
Wenn Sie Ihre Tätigkeit als Lehrerin/Lehrer für mindestens ein Jahr unterbrochen 
haben, geben Sie bitte in Jahren an, wie lange Sie im angegebenen Zeitraum nicht als 
Lehrerin/Lehrer gearbeitet haben
Jahr(e)
Unterrichten Sie zurzeit Deutsch in der vierten Jahrgangsstufe?
O  Ja
O  Nein, aber ich habe bereits Deutsch in der vierten Jahrgangsstufe unterrichtet.
O  Nein, und ich habe auch noch nie Deutsch in der vierten Jahrgangsstufe unterrichtet.
| C T a f c g  |
Figure D.6: Sixth screen: Questions on work experience as teacher, longer breaks from 
work, and experience in  teaching German to fourth graders.
Bitte denken Sie jetzt an die Schülerinnen und Schüler, die Sie zurzeit in Deutsch 
unterrichten. Wie hoch ist der Anteil der Schülerinnen und Schüler mit 
Migrationshintergrund, d.h. diese selbst oder mindestens ein Elternteil sind im Ausland 
geboren und später nach Deutschland gezogen?
1- 11- 21- 31- 41- 51- 61- 71- 81- 91-
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%o o o o o o o o o o O
Wie hoch ist der Anteil der Schülerinnen und Schüler aus eher niedrigen sozialen 
Schichten?
l- l i - 21- 31- 41- 51- 61- 71- 81- 91-
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%O O o o o o o o o o O
Wie hoch ist der Anteil der Schülerinnen und Schüler aus eher mittleren sozialen 
Schichten?
i - i i - 21- 31- 41- 51- 61- 71- 81- 91-
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%O O o o o o o o o o O
Wie hoch ist der Anteil der Schülerinnen und Schüler aus eher höheren sozialen 
Schichten?
1- i i - 21- 31- 41- 51- 61- 71- 81- 91-
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%o O o o o o o o o o O
I ■ I
Figure D.7: Seventh screen: Questions on proportion of students with immigrant
background, lower class background, middle class background, and higher 
class background in  classes taught by the teacher.
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Zum Schluss benötigen wir noch einige wenige persönliche Angaben von Ihnen.
In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren?
19
Sind Sie...
weiblich männlicho o
Welchen höchsten Bildungsabschluss haben Ihre Eltern? Wenn Ihre Eltern nicht den 
gleichen höchsten Abschluss haben, geben Sie den höheren Abschluss an. Bei 
ausländischen Abschlüssen geben Sie bitte den entsprechenden deutschen Abschluss 
an.
Q  keinen Schulabschluss 
O  Haupt-/Volksschulabschluss, 8. Klasse POS 
O  Mittlere Reife/Realschulabschluss, 10. Klasse POS 
O  Fachabitur, Abitur, 12. Klasse EOS 
O  Fachhochschulabschluss, Hochschulabschluss 
O  Promotion (Doktortitel)
O  anderen Abschluss
Haben Sie einen so genannten Migrationshintergrund, d.h. sind Sie selbst oder 
mindestens ein Elternteil im Ausland geboren und später nach Deutschland gezogen?
O  Ja, ich selbst bin im Ausland geboren.
Ja, ich selbst bin zwar in Deutschland geboren, aber mindestens ein Elternteil ist im Ausland 
geboren.
O  Nein.
I I
Figure D.8: Eighth screen: Questions on the demographics of the teacher: year of birth , 
sex/gender, highest education of parents, immigrant background.
Hiermit sind Sie am Ende dieser Untersuchung angelangt.
Wir bedanken uns ganz herzlich für Ihre Teilnahme!
Wenn Sie dies wünschen, werden wir Sie per E-Mail über die Ergebnisse dieser Studie in 
Kenntnis setzen. Außerdem haben Sie die Möglichkeit an der Verlosung dreier Amazon­
Büchergutscheine im Wert von je 20 Euro teilzunehmen. Für beide Zwecke benötigen wir Ihre 
E-Mail-Adresse. Sofern Sie Feedback erhalten und/oder an der Verlosung teilnehmen möchten, 
werden Sie nun auf eine andere Seite weitergeleitet, damit Ihre Anonymität gewahrt bleibt. Die 
Adressen werden dort in einer separaten Datei gespeichert, so dass Ihre Email-Adresse nicht 
mit Ihren übrigen Daten in Verbindung gebracht werden kann.
Möchten Sie uns Ihre E-Mail-Adresse hinterlassen?
O  Ja 
0  Nein
IWIQSC |
Figure D.9: Ninth screen: Participants are thanked for participating in  the study and
asked w hether they would like to leave their e-mail address to receive 
feedback about the study's results and/or take part in the lottery.
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I—I Bitte klicken Sie hier, wenn Sie an der Verlosung von Amazon-Büchergutscheinen 
1—1 teilnehmen möchten.
I | Bitte klicken Sie hier, wenn Sie über die Ergebnisse der Studie informiert werden möchten
Geben Sie bitte hier Ihre E-Mail-Adresse ein.
M a  |
Figure D.10: Tenth screen: Participants may choose to receive feedback about the study's
results and/or to take part in  the lottery and share their e-mail address.
Wenn Sie Fragen, Anmerkungen oder Kommentare haben, haben Sie nun die 
Gelegenheit uns diese mitzuteilen.
IrasOQar |
Figure D.11: Eleventh screen: Participants may share questions, remarks, or comments 
in  an  open-ended format.
Vielen herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme. Sie haben uns damit sehr unterstützt.
Sie können das Fenster nun schließen.
Figure D.12: Twelfth and final screen: Participants are thanked again and encouraged to
close the window.
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